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ABSTRACT
Clare Boothe Luce and the 1953-1954 
Trieste crisis
By
Jelena Velisavljavic
Dr. Colin Loader, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f History 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
My paper argues that Clare Boothe Luce, American ambassador to Italy, greatly 
influenced the Trieste crisis and negotiations o f 1953-1954. Luce’s understanding of the 
Cold War in terms o f aggressive anti-Communism against the Soviet Union in general 
and against Yugoslavia in particular, determined her actions during the Trieste 
negotiations. As a very powerful woman in the Eisenhower administration. Luce 
managed to make her voice heard on the highest levels and to direct the settlement in 
ways she thought best for the United States and its ally Italy. Although forceful reports 
she sent to the State Department and the major policymakers often exaggerated the 
danger o f communism in Italy, they helped spur action in Washington. At the end, 
according to sympathetic contemporaries. Luce deserved credit for solving the Trieste 
dispute, which helped contain communism in Italy.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
At the close of the Second World War, there was a serious possibility that the Adriatic 
territory o f Trieste would become the setting for the first armed postwar conflict between 
East and West. Yugoslav and Anglo-American troops liberated the city almost 
simultaneously and both sides claimed it. After avoiding an aimed clash with the Allies 
and calming tensions, the Yugoslavs agreed in late May to accept temporary Anglo- 
American military administration of the city until a peace treaty could be signed with 
Italy. For almost a decade thereafter, Trieste was a problem between East and West in the 
Cold War. The city remained under joint British and American military governance, 
while a larger zone south and west of the city was under Yugoslav military 
administration. The Allied peace treaty with Italy in 1947 included provisions to divide 
the two zones into an internationalized Free Territory o f Trieste (FTT). However, the 
Cold War discord among the great powers prevented implementation o f the scheme and 
as a result, Trieste remained under Allied administration until 1954, when Italy and 
Yugoslavia partitioned the disputed territory.*
The Trieste crisis and the negotiations that followed represent an important chapter in 
the reshaping of Europe after World War II. In the few existing accounts o f the crisis.
* Roberto G. Rabel, Between East and West. Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War. 
1941-1954 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), vii.
1
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little attention has been afforded to the role o f the American ambassador in Rome, Clare 
Boothe Luce, in the Trieste crisis. My research establishes the importance o f Luce in the 
policymaking process. I have organized my paper into five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a 
brief historical survey o f the disputed region. Since, the Trieste problem cannot be 
explained solely in Cold War terms, the geohistorical, ethnic, social, ideological and 
economic background also must be examined. This analysis will demonstrate why, for 
almost two hundred years, the Italo-Yugoslav frontier problem represented one o f the 
classic territorial disputes in European history.^ Chapter 2 surveys the most important 
scholarly works in this field. The third chapter examines Clare Luce’s career and 
ideology of anti-communism. I have argued that she was a Cold Warrior and her 
understanding o f the American-Soviet relations in general, and Italo-Yugoslav relations 
in particular, determined her actions during the negotiations. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on 
the crisis and negotiations of 1953-1954 and emphasize the importance o f Luce’s role in 
these events. Although Llewellyn Thompson, Geoffrey Harrison, Vladimir Velebit, and 
Manlio Brosio directly participated in the negotiations as representatives of their 
governments, they were not the only ones who influenced the process. Sources reveal that 
Luce’s understanding o f the Cold War in terms of aggressive anti-Communism greatly 
influenced the negotiations. As a very powerful woman in the Eisenhower administration. 
Luce managed to make her voice heard on the highest levels and to direct the settlement 
in ways she thought best for the United States and its ally Italy.^
 ̂John C. Campbell, Successjul Negotiation: Trieste 1954, An appraisal by the Five 
Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 4.
 ̂Rabel, ix, xii.
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CHAPTER 2
THE BACKGROUND OF THE TRIESTE DISPUTE 
The “Julian March,” or Venezia Giulia, is a territory comprised of the Kanal Valley, 
parts o f Camiola, Trieste, Istria, and Rijeka at the head of the Adriatic Sea.* It was 
bitterly disputed by Italy and Yugoslavia from the time o f World War I, when each 
sought to gain it from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The conflict and the 
depth o f feeling on both sides did not date from 1918, but from centuries before and were 
rooted in the differences between the Italians, heirs o f the Roman and Venetian traditions, 
and the South Slavs, who had peopled the hinterland and pushed down to the sea. For 
centuries, the Italians and Slavs of the Julian region lived side by side in peace, while the
* The Italians call this region Venezia Giulia, as it has been an eastward extension of the 
region once comprising the Republic of Venice (Venezia). The Slavs call it Juljska 
Krajna, or the Julian “March,” a “land o f passage” between two regions of greater wealth. 
Leonard Unger and Kristina Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations (Washington, D. C.: The 
John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990), 1. Both terms, Venezia Giulia and the 
Julian March, exclude the Dalmatian city of Zadar (Zara) and the Dalmatian islands that 
went to Italy in 1920 by the Rapallo Treaty. Venezia Giulia did include ± e  city o f Rijeka 
(Fiume), which went to Italy in 1924, while Julian March includes Venetian Slovenia, 
which became a part o f Italy in 1866. The principal difference between the two terms was 
that Venezia Giulia included Rijeka but excluded Venetian Slovenia, the Julian March 
excluded Rijeka and included Venetian Slovenia. The Julian Region linked the Italian 
plain o f the Po Valley with the Danubian basin. Several low passes between Alpine crests 
in the north and the start of the Dinaric range along the Adriatic in Yugoslavia constitute 
a natural gateway of the great strategic value; whoever held these passes controlled the 
entrance into bodi the Po and Danubian basins. This is the reason why both Italy and 
Austria fought for the Julian Region in the latter part o f the nineteenth century, and later 
Italy and Yugoslavia took up the struggle. Bogdan C. Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954: The 
Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1970), 
3-4, 6.
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great powers were seeking to acquire dominance over the a re a / The nineteenth century, 
however, wimessed a rise in nationalism and ethnic consciousness that transformed the 
territory into a symbol o f national importance and pride and the focus of conflicting 
territorial claims. Within the ethnic mosaic o f the Julian region, factors relating to job 
opportunities, social status and mobility, and political influence made neat and tidy 
national boundaries difficult to draw and rarely satisfactory to anyone. As ethnicity 
became politicized, modem nation states emerged and the territorial problems began.^
The peace settlement following World War 1 in this area was determined neither by 
ethnic factors nor by economics, but by politics. Italy had more political muscle behind 
its claims than did Yugoslavia, despite President Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to get a 
better deal for the latter. The disputes between the great powers were about the frontier 
east o f Trieste and about the mostly Slavic city of Fiume (Rijeka). Italy not only
 ̂After the Slavs appeared on the southern European scene in the fifth century, they 
moved south and settled in the mountainous areas o f the Istrian peninsula and along the 
Dalmatian coast. The Italians peopled the coastal farmlands, commercial and fishing 
towns, and often occupied the town centers or farmed the better lands of their nearby 
estates. The division between these two ethnic groups continued to exist during the 
centuries o f increasingly centralized Austrian rule, as two Slavic ethnic groups, Slovenes 
and Croats, continued to inhabit the outlying areas o f the Julian region while the Italian 
speaking descendants of the earlier Roman inhabitants continued to occupy the cities and 
coastal towns. Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations^ 1-2.
 ̂Campbell, Successjul Negotiation. 4. In the nineteenth century, the Dual Monarchy 
faced the conflicting national aspirations o f its heterogeneous population. Italian 
nationalistic ideals were bom o f the Risorgimento movement; the Yugoslav identity was 
also created and usually described in terms o f “Slovene” or “Croat ” Seeking 
independence from Austro-Hungarian mle for their territories, Italians and Slavs were 
bound to collide, since both groups claimed the entire Julian region. Austria used the 
strategy o f “divide and conquer” and encouraged every attack by Slavs on Italian claims 
to the Julian region and vice versa. Some historians argue that the Italian-Slovene conflict 
never existed until Austria pitted the two nationalities against one another for its own 
political purposes. Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 4.
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demanded the cession of territories identified in the 1915 Treaty o f London/ but also 
claimed its rights to Fiume, which contradicted Wilson’s principle o f “self- 
determination” o f peoples. The irregular pattern o f ethnic distribution made it impossible 
to clearly delineate an Italo-Yugoslav frontier. Nevertheless, Italy was favored in the 
disputes and acquired a large area o f ethnically Yugoslav territory. In 1919, Italy violated 
the treaty by seizing Fiume, and this incident entered the memory o f Slavs as an evidence 
of Italian aggression.^ Yugoslavia signed treaties that fixed a frontier (the Rapallo line 
defined an Italo-Yugoslav border in 1920),^ but this solved the problem only in a legal 
sense. It remained a political problem because the Yugoslavs were not reconciled to the
'* Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 6-7. The London agreement was signed on 
April 26, 1915, promising Italy almost all the Austrian territory except the city of Fiume 
(Rijeka) and parts o f Dalmatia. Besides the South Tyrol and the county of Gorizia- 
Gradisca, Italy would receive Trieste, Istria, and the parts o f Caranthia, Camiola and 
Dalmatia. Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 24.
 ̂On September 19, 1919, Gabriele D’Annunzio, an Italian writer, descended by plane 
upon Rijeka, and seized and held the city. Although the great powers had awarded the 
infant state o f Yugoslavia this territory and port, it was powerless to prevent this de facto 
annexation. Control of Rijeka remained in question during the interwar years, although 
the Rapallo line defined an Italo-Yugoslav border. Unger and Segulja, The Trieste 
Negotiations. 6. Gabriele D’Annunzio refused an order o f the Italian government to 
evacuate Rijeka and his volunteers started an incident by attacking French occupation 
soldiers. His army was organized from young Irredentists, nationalistic army veterans 
with the tacit support of some members o f high Italian military circles. A year after he 
occupied Rijeka, D ’Annunzio took the nearby islands and proclaimed the Italian Regency 
of Quamero. Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 32-33.
® Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations. 7-8. Under the Rapallo treaty Italy 
received the Kanal Valley (including the Tarvisio district) in the north. The border ran 
between the London line and the line of Italian occupation, leaving the entire Julian 
Region to Italy, while Dalmatia went to Yugoslavia, except the city o f Zadar and a few 
islands. Two o f the three main islands in the bay of Rijeka went to Italy. The city of 
Rijeka with a small surrounding territory was made into the state o f Rijeka, whose 
independence was guaranteed by both Italy and Yugoslavia. This treaty failed to satisfy 
either Italian nationalists or Slovenes and Croats. Italian nationalists attacked Count Carlo 
Sforza, the Italian foreign minister, who signed the treaty for Italy, and charged him with 
forfeiting Dalmatia to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs particularly stressed that by the 
Rapallo treaty over a half million Slavs came under Italian rule without guarantee of any 
minority rights. Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 32.
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settlement, and Mussolini’s persecution and denationalization o f the Yugoslav minority 
in Italy further poisoned relations. Mussolini’s totalitarian regime embarked on an 
expansionist foreign policy that sought to revise the peace treaties and place other areas 
in the Mediterranean and Balkans under Italian rule. Italy claimed the entire Dalmatian 
coast, including Trieste, Rijeka, Zadar, Split, and Dubrovnik in its “Mare Nostrum.” 
Fascism brought increasing ethnic violence between Italians and Slavs.^
During World War II, Italy annexed some parts of Yugoslavia, occupied others, and 
supported the fascist Ante Pavelic regime in Croatia.^ These events helped harden the 
determination o f the Yugoslavs at the close o f the war to reverse the territorial decisions 
of 1920-1924 and gain Trieste definitively. With the defeat of the Axis Powers and the 
emergence o f Communism in postwar Europe, the fate of Trieste became linked to a 
broader East-West confrontation. By that time, Italy had become a “co-belligerent” and 
had established good relations with the Western powers, who identified the Communists 
with the victorious Partisan forces. In Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito led the Partisan 
movement that professed national liberation in an antifascist guerrilla war. Tito decided 
to occupy the Julian region with Trieste in reaction to a crescendo of Italian propaganda 
demanding the retention o f the entire Julian region that coupled with allied plans to
 ̂Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 7.
 ̂Campbell, Successjul Negotiation, 6. The Italian sphere included the whole Adriatic 
hinterland, namely Southern Slovenia, Southern Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and Albania. The Italians allowed the Croats to form an independent state, 
and granted Montenegro’s independence, but under Italian occupation. Novak, Trieste, 
1941-1954, 46.
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occupy Trieste. Tito’s troops reached Trieste on May 1, 1945, beginning the “forty days” 
o f occupation.’
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, asserting that “armies on the march would 
solve territorial disputes,” pressed for allied control o f the city and the division of the 
surrounding area into zones o f occupation. Therefore, on May 2, 1945, a New Zealand 
army division arrived in the hope of preventing a fa it accompli, and US and British 
divisions soon joined it.'° The Americans and British issued an ultimatum to Tito 
ordering him to remove his forces from the city or face Allied intervention. Tito, facing 
increased Allied military and political pressure, withdrew his troops from the city and 
accepted a new division o f the Julian region. A line separating the zones o f Allied and 
Yugoslav occupation of former Italian territory was established. The Allies needed
’ Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 7-8; Campbell, Successful Negotiation. 6; 
Paul D. Lensink, “Building Tito’s Separate Road: Yugoslavia and the United States, 
1949-1957 ” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1995), 124. Tito led the National Liberation 
Movement or Partisans who fought for a new communist order in a federative Yugoslav 
republic. In April 1945 Tito threw all available forces into the race for Trieste, while 
leaving in German hands sections of the Slovenian and Croat territory o f Yugoslavia. He 
knew that the Allies gave Italy assurances that they intended to occupy the entire Julian 
region. Later, at diplomatic conferences on the future status of Trieste, the Yugoslav 
representatives always stressed that local Partisans with the help of the Yugoslav Fourth 
Army had occupied the Julian region and Trieste. Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954,48,156- 
157.
Lensink, “Building Tito’s Separate Road,” 125; Great Britain was the nation most 
directly interested in the coming balance o f power in the Mediterranean and Balkans, and 
hence was concerned about the future of Trieste. Until autumn 1944 the British and 
American policy was to occupy the entire Julian region and to postpone the final 
resolution until after the war. However, by fall 1944 the danger o f an extension of 
communist power westward had become greater as the Soviet army rapidly advanced and 
liberated eastern Yugoslavia, where Tito established a communist government. Churchill 
perceived the danger and urged a landing of the British and American forces in Istria 
from where the Allied troops would push northward through the Ljubljana gap to Vienna. 
The United States rejected this proposal, but after the Yalta conference the United States 
agreed with Churchill and accepted the occupation of the Julian region. Novak, Trieste, 
1941-1954, 129, 131.
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Trieste as the essential supply point for their future zones o f occupation in Austria, and to 
hold open the territorial settlement and to save a large Italian city from de facto 
annexation by Yugoslavia. The British and the Americans immediately established an 
Allied Military Government (AMG) to administer Trieste and its line o f communications 
with Italy and, via Italy, with Austria-Zone A. A Yugoslav Military government 
administered the eastern and southern part of the Julian region and Istria’s northwestern 
comer-Zone B. The Yugoslavs were bitter and angry as they sensed finality in this 
“temporary “ decision, and the fashion in which they lost Trieste colored their attitude 
toward a negotiated settlement for years to come. ' *
At the end o f the war in Europe the Council o f Foreign Ministers o f France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union met in London to discuss the terms of 
the projected Italian peace treaty. Regarding such territorial issues as Trieste, their 
mission was to delineate a new Italo-Yugoslav boundary that would leave the fewest 
people under foreign rule and take into account pertinent economic considerations. A 
four-power commission was dispatched to Trieste and its environs in early 1946 to study 
the matter, but each participant proposed a different solution. The Four-power 
commission of experts reached no agreement on recommendations for the location o f the 
frontier because their governments were concerned with bigger issues. Therefore, the 
Paris negotiations failed to yield an agreement on the Italo-Yugoslav boundary. Experts
**Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 7-8; Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 6- 
7; Lensink, “Building Tito’s Separate Road, ” 125.
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proposed four separate lines, of which the “French line”*̂  was accepted. It created a Free 
Territory o f Trieste (FTT) and unhappiness on both sides. Nevertheless, each side 
accepted the peace treaty because it avoided the worst. The parties opted for a 
compromise solution, embodied in a set of special clauses in the Italian peace treaty of 
1947, rather than placing Trieste and surrounding region under Italian or Yugoslav rule: 
neither side would gain the territory nor an UN-appointed governor would administer the 
FTT. In this way Trieste became an international free city and port, a compromise 
required for resolving an impasse in the negotiation o f the Italian peace treaty.'^
Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 243, 246. The French proposal was generally along ethnic 
lines, because French negotiators were instructed to seek compromise and avoid East- 
West confrontations. In proposing an ethnic balance between Italians and Slavs that left 
the minimum number of people under alien rule, the French adhered to the commission’s 
central instructions. That was the reason why their proposal was in the end accepted. The 
Soviets proposed to give Yugoslavia the post and city o f Trieste, a measure that would 
leave an estimated 417,000 Italians on the Yugoslav side of the border. The United States 
and Great Britain stressed economic and geographic considerations. The Americans 
favored Italy and their proposal would have left nearly 371,000 Yugoslavs on the Italian 
side o f the border. This suggested returning Trieste to Italy but ceding much of eastern 
French middle line and the American line, farthest to the east. Unger and Segulja, The 
Trieste Negotiations, 8-9.
The Italian Peace Treaty contained both permanent and provisional statutes of the FTT 
and special stipulations for the Free Port o f Trieste. Its provisions divided the Julian 
region into three sectors:
The Isonzo valley above Goricia, the greater part o f Istria, and the Karst 
plateau ceded to Yugoslavia;
The lower Isonzo valley, including the towns o f Gorizia and Malfalcone, was 
returned to Italy; and
The remainder, compromising the city of Trieste and the environs and the 
coastal region from Duino in the norfti as far as Cittanova in Istria was to 
constitute a Free Territory o f Trieste under a Governor to be appointed by the 
United Nations.
The Council o f Foreign Ministers publicly announced its solution with the following 
stipulations: 1) a governor o f the FTT would be appointed by the Security Council after 
previous consultations with Yugoslavia and Italy; 2) legislative and executive branches of 
the government would be established according to democratic principles and in particular 
through universal suffrage; 3) protection of the rights o f citizens, especially the rights of 
man and his fundamental liberties, would be observed, as would rights regarding religion.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The propensity to solve territorial conflicts by partition became a trend in world affairs 
because of the developing Cold War. Although the territorial demarcation o f the Italo- 
Yugoslav border in the Julian region was based in part on local ethnic and economic 
considerations, it was in the end a compromise to resolve an East-West confrontation in 
which Trieste had become a central issue. The internationalization o f Trieste was a 
typical compromise on the part of the great powers. Giving Trieste to Italy would mean 
exclusive use by the Western bloc o f this important northern Adriatic port, which Russia 
opposed. To assign Trieste to Yugoslavia would bring it under the domain or the Eastern 
bloc, to the dismay of the Western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain. 
Creation of an international territory would give both East and West a chance to use the 
port. Thus, out o f the disputed city and its immediate surroundings emerged a no man’s 
land. Both Yugoslavia and Italy were unhappy with the treaty, but the Great powers 
decided that the peace treaty should go into force, regardless o f Italian or Yugoslav
language, press, instruction, and free access to public office. The decision o f the Council 
assigned most o f the Julian region to Yugoslavia, but the Kanal Valley and Venetian 
Slovenia, claimed by Yugoslavs remained in Italian hands. Italy retained the city of 
Gorizia, but almost the entire territory of Gorizia Province went to Yugoslavia. Italy also 
lost the Istrian western coast and three larger cities; Pula, Rijeka and Zadar, all having an 
Italian majority. Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations. 8-11. Former Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes stated on March 4, 1947 before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations that the settlement involving Trieste “was the most controversial aspect of our 
long negotiations. When we agreed to the internationalization o f this area we were 
determined that it should be genuinely international in character and that the Security 
Council o f the United Nations, which was to assume the responsibility for the integrity 
and the security o f the territory and the protection o f human rights, must have adequate 
powers to discharge this responsibility. It is apparent that the Free Territory will present 
many serious problems, but it must be remembered that we were compelled to decide 
between the internationalization of this Territory or having no agreement at all. The 
Soviets were determined not to leave Trieste as part o f Italy. United States, Great Britain, 
and France were equally determined that Trieste, with its large Italian population, should 
not be given to Yugoslavia.” y4/ncnca/i Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, vol 
1. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), 397-98.
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signatures. The Yugoslavs remained unreconciled to the loss o f  Trieste and felt that the 
Russians, as well as the Western Allies, had betrayed them. The Italians found no reason 
to be grateful to anyone. Hence, both countries had good reason to claim that the four 
powers had imposed the peace treaty o f 1947 on them.'^
The peace treaty was difficult for Italy to accept. It curtailed Italian sovereignty by 
placing limitations on its armed forces, stripped the nation o f all its colonies, and insulted 
Italian pride by making Trieste into a United Nations controlled FTT. Italy accepted the 
peace treaty, but considered it a diktat and began to work for revision before it was 
signed in February 1947. It believed that creation o f the FTT was only a compromise to 
meet Yugoslav demands claiming the entire region. If Yugoslavia were seen as a Soviet 
ally opposed to the West, Italy hoped for Western support to achieve a revision o f the 
peace treaty that would return the FTT to her.*^
*'*Campbell, Successjul Negotiation, 8-10; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations,
11-13; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 247; Dennison I. Rusinow, “What Ever Happened to 
the ‘Trieste Question’? De-fusing a Threat to World Peace,” Southeast Europe Series 2 
(January 1969): 12-13.
Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 278-279. Seldom had a document become outmoded in so 
short time as the treaty signed between Italy and the wartime Allies. The premises on 
which it rested were obsolete by the time the treaty was completed. Its territorial and 
economic clauses were based on the idea that Italy was a defeated enemy state, and on 
the concept o f a Europe dominated by an understanding between the United States, 
Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. Hence, the terms 
o f the treaty disappointed the Italian officials who hoped that their country’s record o f co­
belligerence after 1943 would erase the memory o f Italy’s three years o f aggressive war 
at the side o f Nazi Germany. H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy  (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1965), 148-49. The peace treaty disarmed Italy: it had to 
demilitarize its French and Yugoslav borders, give up most o f its navy, reduce its army to 
250,000 soldiers and its air force to 25,000 men. Italy also renounced the possession of 
offensive weapons such as bombers. The treaty also provided for the reparations of 260 
million dollars to be divided among Yugoslavia, Greece, Ethiopia, and Albania. In 
considering all aspects o f the settlement, the peacemakers could rightly conclude that it 
was tough and reasonable, but that they had not treated Italy with undue harshness. In 
Italy, however, many members o f the constituent assembly agreed with former Prime
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Neither did Yugoslavia renounce its claims to all o f  the FTT. It regarded the latter’s 
creation as an imposed compromise in favor o f Italy and believed that, since the Statute 
had become unworkable, its old claims would be revived and the whole territory would 
become part of a new Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs persistently 
claimed that while Yugoslavia sincerely desired to cooperate with Italy in the nomination 
o f the governor, Italy rejected all proposed candidates. However, Yugoslavia refused to 
agree to any candidate suggested by Italy.
Ultimately, a de facto partition o f the FTT developed, and no power was willing to try 
to change this situation by force. By 1948, a “provisional” arrangement maintaining the 
Anglo-American military government in Zone A and the Yugoslav military government 
in Zone B o f the Free Territory began to look permanent. The Soviet Union and the 
Western powers never agreed on a candidate for the governor o f the ministrate because it 
did not suit the interests o f either bloc that the FTT should actually be free. Therefore, the 
FTT never came into being as a functioning political entity. Dividing Europe into two 
separate economic, political and ideological systems, the FTT borders truly became an 
Iron Curtain. The line separating the Western and Eastern blocs, from Stettin to Trieste, 
ran directly through the FTT and became fatal to any hope o f  its independence. Thus the 
inability to establish a normal East-West economic relationship became a further obstacle
Minister Francesco S. Nitti that it was a “humiliating and odious diktat.” Alexander 
DeConde, H alf Bitter, H a lf Sweet, An Excursion into Italian-American History (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 285-287. The Treaty o f  Peace was always been 
difficult for Italy to accept. It infringed upon Italian sovereignty by placing limitations on 
its armed forces; insulted Italian pride by making Trieste into a UN controlled Free 
Territory, and stripped the nation o f all its colonies. S. Timothy Smith, “From 
Disarmament to Rearmament: The United States and the Revision of the Italian Peace 
Treaty o f 1947, ” Diplomatic History 13 (Fall 1989): 359-382.
Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954,279.
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preventing the formation of the FTT. This negative outcome symbolized the Cold War 
even at that early stage. It also provided further confirmation to Italy and Yugoslavia that 
the line between the two “temporary” Zones A and B of occupation and administration in 
the FTT was a segment o f the line between two enormous aggregates o f power over 
which they had no influence. Efforts toward a bilateral Italo-Yugoslav agreement also 
proved abortive.*’
Shortly after the signing of the Italian peace treaty the United States introduced a new 
policy o f support for “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities” that became to be known as the Truman Doctrine. It marked the beginning of 
the Cold War that determined a larger strategy of containment and committed the United 
States to countering Soviet expansion and to “containing” communism in Europe. It also 
signified a new departure in American foreign policy as it moved the United States into 
Britain’s old role in the Mediterranean. The introduction o f the Marshall Plan in 1947 
was a part of the American policy that helped integrate Western Europe into the US 
controlled economic and political alliance against the Soviets. In 1949 the United States 
signed a military alliance with the Western European countries, known as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. These new 
policies made Italy and the Mediterranean strategically more important than ever to the 
American military planners. Italy became a member of NATO and “one of the keys to
*’ D. Russinow, “What Ever Happened to the ‘Trieste Question,”’ 12-13; Novak, Trieste, 
1941-1954, 280-82.
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peace in Europe as a whole.” Keeping the communists out o f power in Italy became a 
principal objective o f American policy toward that country in the postwar period.’®
In the spring o f 1948, the American, British and French governments, motivated by a 
desire to influence an Italian general election that they feared the Communists might win, 
announced the Tripartite Declaration and their support for a return o f the entire Free 
Territory (including Yugoslav occupied Zone B) to Italy. The proposal helped the 
Christian Democrats to win a significant electoral victory, but in the long run it bound the 
hands o f the Western powers and became an important obstacle to an agreement between 
Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste. It was an empty gesture, because only force could 
deliver Zone B to Italy. It naturally disturbed the Western relations with Yugoslavia, but 
the Allies believed that Western relations with Yugoslavia were hopeless anyway. Hence, 
they thought that there was little to lose in such a move, and at the same time that there 
was a possibility o f some short-term political benefit. Three months later, the Yugoslav- 
Cominform quarrel became public knowledge, and it was no longer in the Western 
interest to challenge and weaken the regime in Belgrade. Therefore, the Yugoslav-
’® DeConde, H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 289-290. After the end o f World War II, and 
particularly after the National Security Council issued its recommendations on Italy in 
NSC 1/1 in 1947, the United States considered Italy strategically important, both as a part 
of Europe and as a part of the Mediterranean world. Its importance was based on its 
position on the edge of the Soviet sphere and on the Western orientation o f its 
government. Throughout the postwar period, the United States was concerned about the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI), the largest outside o f the Soviet sphere. Washington 
feared that if  the PCI were to gain control o f the government, Italy would become a 
totalitarian Communist state like the nations o f Eastern Europe and ally itself with the 
Soviet Union, which would shatter US hopes for the reconstruction o f a stable Western 
Europe. A Communist dominated Italy would also provide the Soviets with the bases that 
“would pose a direct threat to the security o f US communications through the 
Mediterranean to Greece, Turkey, and the Near East oil fields.” When Italy became a 
member o f NATO, military assistance to that nation became a necessity. From the 
beginning, Italy was placed in the top priority group according to the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Smith, “From Disarmament to Rearmament,” 362.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
15
Cominform split fundamentally changed the very basis o f the Trieste problem, and the 
Allies quietly shelved the Tripartite Declaration of March 1948.”
Periodic local crises and abortive diplomatic initiatives characterized the following 
four years. Meanwhile, Cominform pressure and economic need gradually drove the 
Yugoslavs into a closer relationship with the United States and its allies. Toward the end 
of 1949 Tito received aid from the United States and Great Britain in the form of loans, 
gifts and credits, thus improving Yugoslavia’s economic situation and making her 
independent o f Soviet pressures. The Western powers’ desire to keep Yugoslavia outside 
the Soviet bloc improved the Yugoslav international position and its stand on the Trieste 
dispute. In the meantime, the Italian government and pro-Italian forces in Zone A grew 
nervous, fearing that time and American fascination with Tito were working against any 
hope of eventual implementation of the 1948 declaration. Italy was not reconciled to the 
partition and continued to promote the Tripartite Proposal. However, Alcide De Gasperi, 
the Italian prime minister, realized that he could not gain all o f  the FTT and was prepared 
to cede Slovenian and Croatian villages along the Yugoslav border to Yugoslavia, if  the 
major Italian centers went to Italy together with the Slovenian land along the Adriatic
”  D. Rusinow, “What Ever Happened to the Trieste Question,” 13-15; Unger and 
Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 12; Novak, The Trieste 1941-1954,281-83; Rabel, 
Between East and West, 129-30. Two considerations made the eventual settlement o f the 
Trieste dispute more likely. First, without help from Stalin, Tito had no hope o f regaining 
the city o f Trieste for Yugoslavia. Second, without Soviet military, political and financial 
support, Yugoslavia’s relations with the West became much more important. The country 
now had to turn to the West for much needed material and financial support, and the 
Western powers became sympathetic toward Yugoslavia as long as it stayed out o f the 
Soviet orbit. Lensink, “Tito’s Separate Road, ” 126. Eisenhower in his memoirs described 
new American approach toward the Trieste question: “Wanting to keep Tito split from 
the Soviet Union, the United States could no longer, as in 1948, back Italy to the hilt in 
its claim to everything.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate fo r  Change, 1953-1956: The 
White House Years (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 412.
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coast. For De Gasperi this was a maximum concession to the Yugoslavs, but one the 
Yugoslavs would never agree upon. Therefore, according to the Italians, if  the Western 
powers wanted to reach a final solution, they would have to exert pressure solely on 
Yugoslavia.’®
After serious rioting by Italian irredentists broke out in Trieste on March 20, 1952, the 
Trieste issue again became inflamed. This renewed American and British concerns about 
maintaining a stable, pro-NATO government in Italy. Hence, the Italians were able to use 
the incident to exact concessions from the United States and Britain on the administration 
o f Zone A. The talks between the Italian government and Allies led to the London 
agreement and the introduction into the zonal administration o f an Italian “political 
adviser” to the military governor. Although the United States considered these changes 
mostly cosmetic, the actions did represent the first time that the authority o f the AMG 
was diminished. This happened, as in 1948, on the eve o f the Italian election and without 
consulting Belgrade. The Yugoslavs responded with a note of official protest, angry 
speeches and appropriate countermeasures in Zone B, against which the Italians, in turn, 
protested.”
For both sides the Trieste dispute was very important in terms of domestic and foreign 
affairs. For all Italians, especially Italian Christian Democrats, the leading democratic 
pro-American party in Italy, Trieste was a symbol o f national pride. Regaining Trieste 
would mean for Italy increased international significance, and domestic political stability. 
After World War II, the Christian Democratic prime minister De Gasperi, allied closely
Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 353, 381-82.
”  Lensink, “Tito’s Separate Road,” 128; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 17; 
Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, 381; Duncan Wilson, Tito’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 86.
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with the United States and gained prestige as the upholder of Italian Trieste and as an 
astute statesman able to profit from the Italian-American alliance. However, as postwar 
conditions improved, many Italians began to question their dependence on the United 
States. They wondered if De Gasperi’s government had gone too far in adopting 
American suggestions for the country’s domestic and international improvement. Left- 
wing propaganda, often with distortion, exploited these doubts. Therefore, a firm position 
on the Trieste issue and the demand for the Tripartite proposal were the guarantees for 
internal stability. There was a possibility that a continuation o f the status quo (Zone A 
under AMG administration, and Zone B under Yugoslav forces) and the lack of a Trieste 
solution might bring to power in Italy either the extreme right or pro-communist 
elements. Therefore, Italian diplomats exercised great diplomatic activity in Washington 
and London to solicit support for Italian claims and to put pressure on Yugoslavia to 
accept them.^
For the new Yugoslav communist regime, Trieste was also a symbol o f national pride 
and national unity. After the Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union and the international 
isolation, the Yugoslavs began to improve their relations with the Western allies. The 
Trieste dispute was an important issue whose solution also depended upon Yugoslav 
actions. Increasing Yugoslav prestige during this time convinced Tito to stay firm in his 
maximum territorial demands. In that sense the Trieste dispute encouraged support for 
the Tito government from groups that were normally anti-Communist. Tito was able to 
use the Trieste dispute as a rallying point for the nation, appealing to memories o f Italian 
attacks against Slovenes and Croats during the World Wars I and II. After the London
22 Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 383; DeConde, H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 295.
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agreement between Italy, the United States and Great Britain, Tito declared that he would 
not allow under any circumstances the question o f Trieste to be decided without 
Yugoslavia. Therefore, the events in Trieste allowed Tito to make a show o f standing up 
to the West and satisfying his conservative party members on an issue of foreign policy 
where the people o f Yugoslavia as a whole were behind him. Tito had exploited the 
Trieste issue to strengthen his Communist regime.^
In the two years following the London agreement, progress toward solving the Trieste 
dispute slowed. During the period between 1948 and 1953, the problem remained 
essentially non-negotiable. Zone A, which had by far the larger population because it 
included the city, remained under Anglo-American military governance, and a Yugoslav 
military government continued in Zone B. American officials feared that a forced 
solution would provoke a negative public reaction in both Italy and Yugoslavia. Because 
the Yugoslavs and Italians continued to press their maximum demands, all attempts to 
resume their bilateral talks failed.
While the Trieste controversy continued to boil, Tito gained a great foreign policy 
success by signing on February 28, 1953 a “Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation” with 
two NATO members, Greece and Turkey. The following month, Tito visited Great 
Britain. With the increase in their influence, the Yugoslavs understood that time worked 
for them in Trieste and remained satisfied with the status quo since they clearly could 
elicit aid from the West even without compromising on a settlement. In addition, because 
Yugoslavia occupied Zone B, the Yugoslavs knew they could not lose this territory in
“  Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954,^16, 353, 381; Lensink, ‘T ito ’s Separate Road,” 130-131; 
Duncan, Tito’s Yugoslavia, 89-90.
Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 10; Lensink, “Tito’s Separate Road,” 132; Rabel, 
Between East and West. 144.
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any agreement. Yugoslavia, viewed as an essential link in the defense o f  Western Europe, 
continued to receive substantial economic and military aid from the United States. 
Obviously, when it came to Trieste, time was on the Yugoslav side.^
However, the political instability that soon followed in Italy pushed the Trieste dispute 
to the brink o f  open confrontation. The Italian parliamentary elections o f June 1953 gave 
rise to a chain o f events that contributed to a compromise solution to the Trieste problem 
acceptable to both Italy and Yugoslavia. After the October 8 decision, when the United 
States and Britain announced withdrawal of their troops from Zone A and the city o f 
Trieste, tensions escalated between the Italians and Yugoslavs. But unable to proceed 
with the announcement, the United States and Great Britain began negotiations with Italy 
and Yugoslavia. One year later, after secret talks in London a final solution was reached. 
Yugoslavia gained virtually all o f  the Zone B and a sliver o f Zone A and Italy acquired 
the city o f Trieste and almost the entire reminder of Zone A. Both countries were able 
ultimately to agree on the solution permitting each country, with one minor border 
rectification, to annex its zone o f the FTT. Thus, the final agreement, the Memorandum 
of Understanding o f October 5, 1954, settled the Trieste impasse and served as a binding 
agreement for more than thirty years.^®
“  Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 381; Lensink, “Tito’s Separate Road,” 135.
Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 22, 38; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 418; 
Lensink, “Tito’s Separate Road,” 136.
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CHAPTERS
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE TRIESTE DISPUTE 
Historians have studied many aspects o f the Trieste problem, but there has been little 
scholarly analysis of its significance as an issue in postwar East/West relations. With the 
exception o f the crisis o f May 1945, Cold War scholars in the English-speaking world 
have not attempted to examine critically the extensive American and British documentary 
records now available concerning American policy toward Trieste. At the same time, 
much of the Italian and Yugoslav historiography has been narrowly nationalistic or 
ideologically polemical, and it has done little to illuminate Trieste’s role in the Cold 
War.'
Although most English-speaking historians studying postwar American foreign policy 
have alluded to the Trieste dispute, and some have even described it as the first example 
of the Cold War confrontations, there has been no detailed study about the precise role of 
the Trieste crisis in the origins of the Cold War. In the few brief treatments that exist, 
scholars have observed that the Trieste crisis was the first example of “the postwar 
confrontation between East and West.” Denis Rusinow, Vojtech Mastny, and Roberto 
Rabel have generally agreed that the dispute over Trieste was “the first battle o f
' Rabel, Between East and West, viii-ix.
20
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the Cold War” and “an early step on the road to containment.”  ̂Lynn Davis, Hugh 
DeSantis, Gabriel Kolko, and Daniel Yergin have all noted that after May, 1945, the 
Trieste crisis made the United States more suspicious o f the Soviet Union and paved the 
way for the future establishment of the Cold War blocs. They have asserted that after 
May, 1945, Tito’s arrogant attitude and Soviet backing o f  his claims left “a residue of bad 
feelings in the State Department.” The Trieste episode deeply colored the American view 
of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe that saw Yugoslavia as a model o f Soviet plans 
elsewhere. Washington decided to confi’ont Yugoslav intentions to occupy the city of 
Trieste because “in resisting Tito one was resisting Stalin.”^
 ̂Rusinow wrote that “the dispute over Trieste after 1945 was in a real sense the first 
battle of the Cold War.” Rusinow, “What Ever Happened to the ‘Trieste Question?” 2. 
Masmy argued that the first postwar confrontation between East and West was provoked 
by “Yugoslav efforts to grab Venezia Giulia from Italy.” Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road 
to the Cold War: Diplomacy Warfare, and the Politics o f  Communism, 1941-1945 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 282. Rabel, Between East and West; “Prologue 
to Containment: The Truman Administrations’ Response to the Trieste Crisis of May 
\9A5f  Diplomatic History 10 (Spring 1986): 141-160.
 ̂Davis argued that the State Department reacted with increasing firmness to Tito’s 
actions, which made Tito to back down at the end of May 1945. She also stressed that the 
American officials were extremely irritated by Tito’s arrogant attitude and Soviet backing 
of Tito, and “became increasingly unsympathetic to the Yugoslav government and to the 
obvious Soviet intentions to dominate Yugoslavia in the same way as the other states of 
Eastern Europe.” Lyim Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American 
Confrontation over Eastern Europe (Princeton, N. Y.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 
347-48. De Santis argued that “Tito’s action in Trieste was doubtless ‘based on Russian 
guidance,”’ as it established a potentially dangerous Soviet presence in the area. He wrote 
that for “Yugoslavia to serve as a pawn of Moscow’s strategy in southeastern Europe was 
bad enough, but to establish a foodiold for Soviet ideological expansionism in Italy, 
which fell militarily in the Anglo-American sphere, was worse yet. ” Hugh De Santis, The 
Diplomacy o f Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold 
War, 1933-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 149-50. Kolko argued 
that the United States considered that “behind Tito stood Russia, and though American 
economic interests were not the prime concern in Yugoslavia, the State Department saw 
that country as a mode o f  Soviet plans elsewhere in Eastern Europe.” Gabriel Kolko, The 
Politics o f War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: 
Random House, 1968), 414-20. Yergin wrote that the Trieste crisis was “a contest
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American scholars, who have studied the immediate postwar period o f the Cold War, 
also have examined the development o f the United States foreign policy toward 
Yugoslavia in this period. They have focused primarily on the period between 1945-1956 
and on the success of American aid to Yugoslavia after 1949, trying to determine what 
benefits the Untied States gained in return. Nearly all of them have emphasized United 
States policy and its conflict with the Soviet Union and portrayed Yugoslavia as an 
important but minor player. The Trieste dispute has been discussed only when it has had 
implications for American-Yugoslav relations and then only in the most general way. 
However, these studies are valuable overviews o f American-Yugoslav Cold War 
cooperation. They have stressed that after the Trieste crisis was resolved, Yugoslavia, 
while not gaining the city o f Trieste, did receive substantial material compensation ft^om 
the United States. The settlement had important consequences for both the United States 
and Yugoslavia and their future military and economic cooperation.^
For Roberto Rabel, author of one of the two English book-length analyses o f the 
crisis, Trieste was fascinating as an “entangled maze o f conflicting but often overlapping 
national, ideological, social, and economic interests." He is much less interested in the 
Trieste problem itself than in American policy toward Trieste and its changing
between Anglo-American forces and the well-organized Yugoslavian partisans for 
occupation fights and control o f Trieste and the Venezia Guilia hinterland." He said that 
what was o f crucial importance was that the Soviet Union opposed Yugoslavian actions 
as dangerous and provocative adventurism. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins 
o f the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 89- 
91.
* Among significant studies are: Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat, The United 
States. Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); idem, 
“American Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia, 1941-1949” (PhD. diss.. The 
Pennsylvania State University, 1976); Lensink, “Building Tito’s Separate Road; ” Harry 
M. Chase Jr., “American-Yugoslav Relations, 1945-1956; A Study in the Motivation o f 
U.S. Foreign Policy ” (PhD. diss., Syracuse University, 1957).
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significance for American policymakers from 1941-1954. He has used a variety o f 
relevant American documents concerning American policy toward Trieste that opened a 
new chapter in understanding American actions. He argues that the American 
involvement was related to the wartime intervention in Europe and to the subsequent 
unfolding o f the Cold War.^
Rabel traces the United States policy toward the Italo-Yugoslav border conflict 
represented by Trieste from the beginning of World War II through the crisis o f  May 
1945 and then through the early Cold War years to the Stalin-Tito split and the moderate 
US success in the settlement o f 1954. Rabel asserts that the Trieste episode constituted 
one event in the transition from the politics o f World War II to those of the Cold War. It 
was the only event that assumed crisis proportions during the very week in which the 
European war ended, raising the immediate possibility of a military clash between East 
and West. American policymakers were alarmed and recognized the need for urgent 
action, because they had no coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the 
Yugoslavs in Trieste. Rabel examines in detail the actions o f relevant American 
policymakers and their interactions with British officials during the first confrontation of 
the postwar era with a Communist regime. He concludes that the United States secured 
its immediate aims by the application of incremental diplomatic pressure, visibly backed 
by the determination to use military force if  necessary. In the end, the Trieste problem 
was resolved to Washington’s satisfaction. The actions taken by the United States during 
this crisis may be seen as part o f an emerging pattern o f early Cold War policymaking. 
Thus, the Trieste crisis was the first case o f direct East-West confrontation in which the
Rabel, Between East and West, ix, xi, xii.
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Truman administration anticipated the later “development o f the United States basic Cold 
War strategy: containment.”^
Rabel also describes how the State Department officials portrayed the crisis in terms 
of Soviet expansion, depicting Tito as serving merely as a tool of Stalin. Persuaded by 
these arguments. President Truman demanded that the Yugoslavs leave or the United 
States would “throw them out.” Yugoslavia, lacking Soviet support, quickly yielded to 
the threat. Rabel also shows the difficulties often encountered in making policy with 
Great Britain and Italy, the usefulness of the Trieste “pawn” in the Cold War for helping 
to maintain Italy as a stable member of the Western alliance and as a symbol of the Cold 
War. His discussion of the use and manipulation o f Trieste in the Italian elections of 1948 
adds to our understanding o f US-Italian policy and shows how foreign policy became 
trapped in rhetoric that soon became an obstacle for settling the dispute.^
Richard Dinardo explores further the relationship between Great Britain and the 
United States in the Trieste crisis and, in so doing, moves away from a strictly Cold War 
scenario. He argues that the objectives o f the two allies were very different. Whereas the 
British aimed to protect their Mediterranean sphere o f influence and the balance of power 
in Europe from what they perceived to be Soviet encroachment, the Truman 
administration sought to enforce the multilateral, neo-Wilsonian world order envisioned 
by the Americans at Yalta. It was, in fact, Stalin’s cooperation with the West and refusal 
to underwrite Tito that encouraged the President not only to confront the Yugoslavs with 
force but also to resist taking a harder line against the Soviets. Dinardo concludes that the 
Truman administration’s response to the Trieste crisis was less a preview o f Cold War
 ̂Rabel, Between East and West, 52-73; idem, “Prologue to Containment,” 141-60. 
’ ibid.
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containment than an attempt to enforce a peculiarly American vision o f a cooperative 
new world order. In the Trieste crisis the State Department was far more concerned that 
Stalin might be violating the multilateral spirit o f  the Atlantic Charter and the Yalta 
communiqué than that the Soviets might be overstepping their “rightful” sphere.®
Bogdan Novak’s book-length study is still further removed from the Cold War 
framework. Drawing on his own personal experience, he has written a history o f the 
Trieste dispute in terms of ethnic, political and ideological struggles between Italy and 
Yugoslavia over this area. Finished before the declassification o f the relevant Anglo- 
American documents, his work is limited to a narrative history o f the local Italo- 
Yugoslav struggle for control o f the Trieste area and ignores many broader international 
dimensions o f the problem. Novak writes that his “narrative focuses on internal affairs in 
the Julian Region and the FTT, especially as they flared into ethnic conflict accentuated 
by national feeling, and into a clash o f Western and Eastern ideologies. Events o f wider 
international scope enter the account only when they made a signal impact o f the local 
population.” However, his study does provide a valuable detailed account o f the views o f 
the local Yugoslav and Italian population concerning the major events o f the Trieste
. . 9cnsis.
Novak divides the history o f the Julian Region into four distinct phases; Italian 
domination after World War I; Yugoslav ascendancy from 1944 to 1948; the expanding 
crisis and growing Italian assertiveness in the 1950s; and the final settlement o f 1954.
After World War II, Italy and Yugoslavia understood that the Trieste problem had
® Richard Dinardo, “Glimpse o f an Old World Order? Reconsidering the Trieste Crisis o f 
\9A5," Diplomatic History 2 \ (Summer 1997); 365-381.
 ̂Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, xv.
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become a part o f the larger Cold War. Italian and Yugoslav Communists in the Julian 
Region, under orders from Moscow, buried national antagonisms and supported 
annexation to Yugoslavia, while the Italian Communist party pursued a more national 
line in Italy. This phase ended afrer the schism of 1948, when Titoists and Cominformists 
fell out. Cold War imperatives increasingly led the Western powers to support Italy’s 
annexation of the Zone A, but Belgrade’s bargaining power rose after Yugoslavia 
indirectly became a member o f the NATO Pact through its alliance with Greece and 
Turkey. After some particularly serious rioting by Italian nationalists in 1953, which the 
Pella government initiated, according to Novak, the Western powers conducted secret 
negotiations. The final settlement assigned Trieste and Zone A to Italy and Zone B to 
Yugoslavia with minor territorial changes. Novak concludes that the settlement was a 
sacrifice for Slovenes and Italians, but at the same time it brought Italy and Yugoslavia 
into closer political, economic and cultural collaboration. It was a good example of 
friendly coexistence between two countries with different political systems, ideological 
concepts and social structures.
Despite continuing interest on the part o f historians in the Trieste dispute, the last 
phase of the crisis, 1953-54, has been relatively neglected. This period was extraordinary 
in a number o f ways, but historians have not treated it as a separate historiographical 
problem. The intensive, secret negotiations o f 1954 produced, after almost ten years, an 
agreement that not only resolved the deadlock but also ushered in a period of remarkably 
good relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. Because o f these settlements, the polemics 
and the threat of military action disappeared, and the border in the Trieste area became a
10 Idem, Trieste, 1941-1954.
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model for the local cooperation. Historians have studied the negotiations as part of the 
larger picture o f the Trieste dispute, thereby producing no separate scholarly assessment 
o f the negotiations o f 1953-54.
Novak and Rabel have briefly analyzed the settlement o f 1953-54 in the last chapters 
o f their books but only in the broader context of the crisis. Recently, Leonard Unger and 
Kristina Segulja have improved understanding of the diplomatic negotiating process. 
Although a significant scholarly piece that broadens our understanding o f  the last phase 
of the dispute, this book gives only a short overview of the different stages o f the 
negotiations."
Some of the more important points that Unger and Segulja have addressed are the 
Italian peace treaty of February 10, 1947, the Tripartite Declaration o f March 20, 1948, 
and the secret negotiations between January and September, 1954. According to the 
authors, the internationalization o f Trieste was a compromise that was required to resolve 
an impasse in the negotiation o f the Italian peace treaty. The propensity to solve 
territorial conflicts by partition was a result of the “slow crystallization into West and 
East blocs” and the developing Cold War. Although the territorial demarcation o f the 
Italo-Yugoslav border was based in part on local ethic and economic considerations, it 
was in the end, a compromise to resolve an East-West confrontation in which Trieste had 
become a central issue.'’
Criticizing the Tripartite Declaration, the authors have stressed that although the 
declaration helped the Christian Democrats in Italy to secure electoral victory and avoid
"  Rabel, Between East and West, 102-131; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 418-483; Unger, 
Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 1-38.
'’ Unger, Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 1-38.
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the perceived threat o f a communist takeover, it threatened to reduce the chances of 
improved relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. They even argued that the declaration 
cancelled any real prospect o f the realization o f a Free Territory o f Trieste and that the 
Western implementation o f the Tripartite Declaration might have reversed the 
deterioration o f the Yugoslav-Russian alliance and the developing split between Tito and 
Stalin.*’
The authors have emphasized the important role of Llewellyn Thompson, US High 
Commissioner in Vienna, arguing that he possessed the diplomatic skills necessary for 
the successful ending o f the long conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia. At the same time 
they stressed one of the difficulties the negotiators in London had to overcome was the 
considerable pressure exerted on them by Clare Boothe Luce and the pro-Italian lobby 
within American policymaking circles to obtain favorable concessions for Italy. The 
authors concluded that after more than eight months o f intense diplomatic activity, on 
October 5, 1954, the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Yugoslavia signed the 
Memorandum o f Understanding that settled the Trieste impasse and served as a binding 
agreement for more that thirty years.
Although Clare Boothe Luce is briefly mentioned in Unger and Segulja’s book in the 
connection with the Trieste crisis her important role in the crisis is largely overlooked by 
most of the diplomatic treatments. In addition, the works dedicated to Luce’s life and 
career have also largely ignored her role in the Trieste negotiations. To date there is 
neither a critical, scholarly biography o f her nor a book about her diplomatic activities in 
Rome in the final stages o f the negotiations. Alden Hatch and Stephen Shadegg have
*’ Ibid. 
Ibid.
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written the only two biographies and they offer only general and subjective accounts o f 
her achievements as ambassador to Italy. Written with Luce’s assistance, these books are 
highly favorable portraits o f her public career.*’
Hatch has described Clare Luce as “brilliant, yet often foolish; idealistic, yet realistic 
to the verge o f cynicism; tough as a marine sergeant with the mind .. and courage o f a 
man and exceedingly feminine instincts.” He argued that Luce charged herself with three 
tasks as Ambassador to Italy. The first was to further Italian and American friendship, the 
second was to help settle the Trieste problem, and the third was to aid the young 
democratic republic o f Italy to “fight the malignant growth o f communism in the Italian 
body politic.” According to Hatch, Clare Luce succeeded in all three tasks. In the first 
two years o f her mission, the Trieste question was solved. Hatch noted that Luce did not 
take part in the actual negotiations, but that she had a great part in “urging patience, 
courage, and above all, silence, on the Italians” and in sending from Rome suggestions of 
ways out o f particular difficulties which the negotiators encountered in London. When 
the negotiations broke down in late August, she went to President Dwight Eisenhower 
and proposed that he secretly send veteran diplomat Robert Murphy to make his views 
known to the Italians and Yugoslavs. After the successful settlement o f the Trieste 
dispute, Italians praised Luce and crowds saluted her with the cry “La Luce! La Luce!” *® 
Shadegg also expresses admiration for Luce’s life and work, stating that he makes no 
pretense that his book is a critical biography in the commonly accepted meaning. He 
stated that it is impossible to know Luce and to know of her accomplishments and not
*’ Rabel, Between East and West, 195; Alden Hatch, Ambassador Extraordinary: Clare 
Boothe Luce (Henry Holt: New York, 1956); Stephen Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce: A 
Biography (Simon &Schuster: New York, 1970).
*® Hatch, Ambassador Extraordinary, 13, 215, 237-239.
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admire her. For him, she “commands respect and provokes strong emotional reactions.” 
Like Hatch, Shadegg has also concluded that Luce is one o f the most challenging, 
brilliant, intriguing, vexing, and inconsistent women o f our century and “that is what this 
book is all about.”*’
Rabel was the first historian to discuss objectively Luce’s career as American 
ambassador to Italy. He argues that although Luce was the leading female Cold Warrior 
o f her time, a critical, scholarly biography of this significant figure remains to be written. 
In his book, Rabel only briefly mentions Luce’s role in the settling the Trieste dispute, 
but his assessment represents a first and significant beginning o f the objective study of 
her accomplishments in Italy. Rabel has presented primary documents and proved that 
Luce greatly influenced the Trieste negotiations. During the period between 1953 and 
1954, she pressed other leading foreign policy figures such as John Foster Dulles and C.
D. Jackson to accept her opinions about the Communist threat in Italy and to ensure that 
Communist influence in Italy would be combated during her time as American 
ambassador. During the Trieste negotiations, she supported the Italian government and its 
claims that if  the United States did not give Italy the whole Free Territory o f Trieste, or at 
least Zone A with the city o f Trieste, Italy would turn commimist, and communism would 
strengthen its position in Europe.*®
*’ Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce, 7-9.
'* Rabel, Between East and West, 147; United States, Foreign Relations o f  the United 
States, 1952-1954 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1988). In further 
footnotes I will refer to Foreign Relations o f the United States as FRUS.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ANTI-COMMUNISM OF CLARE BOOTHE LUCE 
In order to understand Clare Luce’s influence on the Trieste settlement, it is important 
to study her ideas, especially the ideology o f anti-Communism, and her place within the 
configuration of Cold War power relationships. Clare Luce was married to Henry Luce, 
the wealthy owner and publisher of Time, Life and Fortune magazines, and, according to 
some contemporaries, “the most influential editor in the United States.” They both had a 
conservative, anti-Communist agenda that argued for an aggressive American foreign 
policy toward Soviet Russia even before World War II ended. *
Henry Luce published an essay “The American Century,” in the February 17, 1941, 
issue of Life offered a plan by which America could alter its vision o f itself, its national 
goals and its sense of power in the world. To him, the American frontier now 
encompassed the entire world, which hungered for American food, hope and know-how. 
He argued that during the approaching time o f peace, Christian benevolence and 
progress, the Americans would enrich humanity, and thereby realize their own, divinely 
ordained mission. Luce argued that America should accept the duty and opportunity as 
the most powerful and vital nation to exert upon the world the full impact o f its influence
* Rabel, Between East and West, 147; Blanche W. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, A 
Divided Legacy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.), xv; Robert E. 
Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, A Political Portrait o f  the Man Who Created The American 
Century (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1994), xii.
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
for “such purposes as we see fit and by such means as we see fit.” “America cannot be 
responsible for the good behavior o f the entire world,” Luce admitted, but he added, 
“America is responsible, to herself as well to history, for the world-environment in which 
she lives.” He described America as a world power, whose actions and inactions would 
determine the fate o f democracy and capitalism. He called his country the “Good 
Samaritan,” and demanded that the United States export food, technology, “freedom,” 
“justice” and modem civilization to a world convulsed by tyranny and evil. Henry Luce 
stressed that American culture had already illuminated the path to his new century o f 
immense American internationalism. Throughout the world, people already recognized 
“American jazz, Hollywood films, American slang, American machines, and patented 
products.” Describing the United States as the “powerhouse, from which the ideals spread 
throughout the world,” Luce foresaw an American Century in which the United States 
would hold supreme power. His vision of the Americanization of the world and his ideals 
o f freedom and justice for all people became the public rhapsody o f the postwar period. 
This and other articles influenced change in the American national mood by advocating a 
radical anti-Communist approach to American foreign policy. “Tyrannies may require a 
large amount o f living space, but Freedom requires and will require far greater living 
space,” Luce argued. Time and Life and all his media allies spread his ideas, and anybody 
who thought o f the American Century as imperialist or arrogant was considered a traitor 
or Communist.’
’ Michael J. Hogan ed.. The Ambiguous Legacy: U. S. Foreign Relations in the 
"American Century” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 11-29. Blanche 
Cook argued that Henry Luce called upon the Americans to “consider the 20* century: it 
is ours not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is 
America’s first century as a dominant power in the world.” Responsibility for feeding and
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Henry Luce became increasingly worried about the strength of Soviet power in the 
postwar period. By 1945 he began advocating a harder line toward Russia and Soviet 
Communism. Virtually ignored in 1941, attacks on Soviet Russia took center stage in his 
magazines. He rejected the argument o f some within the Roosevelt administration that 
America had to view Eastern Europe as part o f Russia’s “sphere o f influence.” According 
to Luce, the Soviet Union had greater designs. He accepted “the premise that Russia is 
until the further notice the No. 1 problem for America,” and “we would all be happy if it 
didn’t exist.” The apologies of American progressives notwithstanding, Russia remained 
“a totalitarian country” with designs on the world: “she is ready and willing to pursue a 
dynamic foreign policy in every quarter of the globe.”’
caring for the world would parallel America’s defense of the world, to be achieved by “a 
very tough attitude toward all hostile countries.” Cook emphasized that the features o f the 
American Century did not become clearly distinct until the Eisenhower administration. 
Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, xv-xvii. Boughman pointed out that Luce took issue 
with those fellow interventionists who emphasized an Anglo-American postwar order, 
even a political union between the United States and the British Commonwealth, as he 
argued that the United States was no longer a small state, for whom neutrality was not 
only possible but at times desirable. The success o f the American economic and political 
experiment left the nation with responsibilities it could no longer shirk. At times. Luce 
appeared to be reviving the nineteenth-century argument o f  a “Manifest Destiny,” that 
America was duty-bound to share with the world her exceptional political institutions and 
liberties. There were even references to the “open door” o f trade, and to the need for a 
developed American economy to secure new markets. James L. Boughman, Henry R. 
Luce and the Rise o f the American News Media (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1987), 129- 
158. Herzstein wrote that Luce equated a happy future with American hegemony and he 
fulminated against the sins of 1919, when Americans turned their backs on world power 
and global responsibility. He wanted to bury isolationism, as he spoke o f using the Bill of 
Rights and other constitutional wonders as “our free gift to all peoples.” Herzstein, Henry 
R. Luce, 176-185. Swanberg quoted Luce, who argued that capitalism would succeed 
gloriously if  spread internationally under American auspices. With the war won, the 
world and its riches would be up for grabs. The American century was a capitalist and 
militarist century, and the United States should do anything to take advantage of Asia and 
Africa making profits that would be protected by American military power. W. A. 
Swanberg, Luce and His Empire (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), 180-182.
’ Baughman, Henry R. Luce, 147^8; Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 379,413.
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Clare Luce shared her husband’s ideas about the role o f the United States in the
postwar world. As a Republican congresswoman from Connecticut and prominent public
figure, she both promoted and expanded them. As World War II came to an end she
questioned Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and intensified the attacks on Roosevelt’s
foreign policy toward Soviet Russia. While praising Russia’s war effort, she regarded
Communism, “next to fascism, as the most deadly blight that has ever hit the spirit o f
man.” In a series o f radio addresses delivered between May 31 and July 17, 1945, she
fired powerful salvos in her anti-Communist crusade. Clare Luce spoke in precise, cold
words, and her message was simple: the Communists were murderers and the Russian
people were slaves. Her statements dealt almost exclusively with the perceived
Communist threat to the free world, including the increasing sphere o f Soviet influence in
Europe. She denounced all liberals who wanted to come to terms with the Soviets,
claiming that they were selective in denouncing aggression: they had attacked Nazi
Germany, but remained silent in the face of the Soviet militant actions. She outlined a
program for confrontation in Cold War terms, not just with the Soviets, but also with all
liberals who sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union.^
In her first congressional speech, “America and World Communism,” she argued that
the Soviets controlled directly or indirectly every government in Europe. According to
Luce, they achieved this control with a three-point policy:
By a policy o f fi-atemization with the conquered peoples; By the liquidation o f all anti­
communists. This means that if  people resist communism, whether they are Fascists, 
Monarchists, Socialists, democrats, or Liberals, they are shot, imprisoned, or 
deported.... [And] by a policy o f putting guns, money, and food, which is to say
* Herzstein, Henry R. Luce, 313,378; Swanberg, Luce and His Empire, 245,269; 
Baughman, Henry R. Luce, 147.
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political power, into the hands o f all discontented minority groups which will agree to 
adopt Soviet programs ’
She also stressed that the Americans and Communists were 180 degrees apart on most 
fundamental political concepts. While Americans believed in free press, free speech and 
free worship, the Conuuunists believed that the press should be controlled and pre­
censored, that men should not be allowed to criticize their leaders, and that any religion 
not subject to state control should be liquidated. If the Nazis did not have right to conquer 
the world in the name o f totalitarianism. Luce argued, then the Communists did not have 
right to conquer the world in the name o f “national security.” Since the Moscow 
Communist leaders and their agents outside o f Russia seemed to claim the right to 
communize all o f Europe and all o f Asia by liquidating all non-Communists; work within 
all other countries to overthrow their systems of government by force and murder; and 
morally justify international technique o f terrorization and subversion. Luce asked, “what 
should the United States do about it?” Should the United States accept Communist 
subversion as morally justified because the Soviet Union needed security? The answer 
was undeniably no: since morally. Communism was, according to Luce, in the “red-blood 
red,” the Americans should help their Government use its “great diplomatic power and 
vast military prestige” to help all European and Asiatic states to form true representative 
parliaments and constitutions that would guarantee freedom and democracy. The United 
States should oppose the Soviets vigorously. Luce suggested:
If we want to stay out of war with communism we must not appease communism. And 
we dare not appease communism. This cannot remain two worlds, as it is today-the 
world o f  totalitarianism and the world o f Uberty... as our conflict with Nazi
’ ‘“ America and World Communism,’ Extension of Remarks o f Hon. Clare Boothe Luce 
o f Connecticut, In the House o f Representatives,” Congressional Record. May 31, 1945, 
A 2600-1.
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totalitarianism proved, these worlds are doomed to come into conflict. It must, and 
will be one world sooner or later.®
She predicted that the Soviets would try to conquer Germany for security reasons and 
included in the Congressional Record an article by David J. Dallin titled “Between War 
and Peace.” The article argued that although the war with Germany had ended, the peace 
had not started and the struggle for Germany was ahead. The reason for that was the 
Soviet intention to establish the line from Stettin to Trieste as the Russian sphere. The 
Communist goal for more that twenty seven years had been a “collaboration, alliance, 
and a tight union” with Germany because “Germany is the heart o f Europe,” and 
“capitalist Europe cannot exist if  it loses its heart.” Unfortunately, under the Soviet threat, 
the article complained, the policy o f the Western allies had not yet taken shape and it 
“seems as if  they were muddling along with no program and concept at all. It is neither 
hard nor soft.” If  the United States continued this wavering, it would be too diflcult to 
move forward when Russia had pursued a new unilateral action. The key to safety in 
Europe was in the hands o f the Western allies, and everything depended on their 
willingness to use that opportunity.’
In a series of articles, Clare Luce attacked a foreign policy that tried to avoid any 
cause for ftiction with Soviet Russia as well as “its many good fiiends in this country and 
abroad.” She took issue with those who were predicting enduring Soviet-US fiiendship 
and argued that the United States was “leaning over backwards to avoid giving offense to
® Luce distinguished Russian people from thier leadership and argued: “ It is a 
heartbreaking pity that the heroic but enslaved Russia people-the common men o f 
Russia-are not free to aid us in an effort to enlarge the area o f human freedom. But we 
must understand that the plain people o f Russia in a vast concentration camp, the 
prisoners o f  their own leaders. .. The Russian people are and must continue to be our 
fiiends, for the peace o f the world depends on that fiiendship.” Ibid.
’ “Between War and Peace,” Congressional Record, June 13, 1945, A 2855-56.
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Russia” in its relations with the Soviets in Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Germany, 
Poland, and Czechoslovakia.® The United States did not question in these countries the 
formation o f  new regimes in which American and other democratic representatives took 
no part, even though the Yalta Conference entitled them to do so. Well-known 
Communists or people who were trained in Moscow held all-important cabinet posts. In 
the Eastern European countries the situation was alarming as the Red Army occupied 
entire territories and started the same pattern o f Communist totalitarian subversion. The 
existing political structure was dismantled and replaced by carefully prepared regimes 
declared to be “free” by Moscow but soon to become communized. Their leaders were 
Communists, former members o f the now-dissolved Comintern, and loyal agents o f  the 
Kremlin. These Communist governments bore the name of the United States as one o f  the 
three responsible powers in control. Luce argued. She added, “since we have made no 
contrary representations to our Soviet associate, it must be presumed that we are entirely 
content with these conditions.” She concluded that even this picture “which we here in 
the United States may not consider a very happy one,” should remind all Americans that 
“our name is signed to it as one o f the designers.” Therefore, no Eastern European “is 
permitted to know otherwise than that we are responsible.”’
In October, 1945, Secretary o f State James Byrnes, reporting on the failure o f  the 
London Conference of Foreign Ministers, said o f the US attimde toward Soviet Russia, 
“We are not unduly exacting.” Clare Luce attacked his comment with the words:
® “Leaning Over Backward in Austria,” Ibid., June 13, 1945, A 2857-858; “Leaning Over 
Backward in Hungary,” Ibid., June 23, 1945, A 3026-27; “Leaning Over Backward in 
Yugoslavia,” Ibid., June 25, 1945, A 3059-60; “Leaning Over Backward in 
Czechoslovakia,” Ibid., July 5, 1945, A 3263; “Leaning Over Backward in Zion,” Ibid., 
July 6, 1945, A 3301-03.
’ Ibid., A  2858, A 3027.
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Today, many competent observers o f our foreign policy claim that our failure to be 
firm, precise and clear in our foreign policy expectations toward Russian rearmament 
and territorial and political demands in all quarters o f the globe, will result in an 
increasing drift toward world catastrophe.'
She also included in her speech three articles, which emphasized the dangers to world 
peace in “this policy o f laissez faire,” blaming the current Administration’s foreign policy 
for that situation. They all denounced the Administration’s actions and argued that 
policymakers were not in control o f their policy. They allowed “policies to be made in 
isolated fi-agments, without proper recognition of the fact that our relations with Russia or 
Great Britain are the net result of all decisions which we make that affect them.” The 
result o f wrong policies could only be a major catastrophe for the United States and its 
prestige in the world. ' '
“Not Unduly Exacting,” Congressional Record, November 14, 1945, A 4873-874.
' ' Walter Lippmann wrote the first article in which he argued that the United States could 
not shape its policy the way it did it before and added: “The people o f this country had 
better realize now, before it is too late to do anything about it, how far we have drifted 
into accepting the supremely defeatist idea that, while paying lip service to the 
organization o f peace, we are in fact in a race of rearmaments.... We have drifted into a 
race o f armaments with the Soviet Union, not only in respect to the atomic bomb, and to 
postwar military programs, but no less in respect to what is called power politics-that is to 
say, into a competition for the control o f the weak but strategically important regions that 
lie between the Soviet Union and the United States.” William Philip Simms wrote the 
second article in which he stated that “it had been hoped here that the Red celebration in 
Moscow could lift the pall which o f late has settled more darkly over the international 
situation. Instead, the effect has been the reverse.” Dorothy Thompson wrote the third 
article and she argued that “the reality is that at Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco, and 
Potsdam our political leaders gave away the power that America had built up for the 
cause o f justice, liberty, and peace.” She added that “[u]ni versai military training is not 
for the ‘enforcement o f peace.’ It is asked because there is no peace-in our consciences, 
our minds, our hearts, our policies, our societies. It is asked in firantic hope that the great 
nations, estimating each oüier’s terrifying power and maneuvering against each other’s 
over the moans o f the real ‘peace lovers’-the suffering, sacrificing, believing, hoping, 
and broken-hearted people of the world-will fear to attack each other, lest the result be 
mutual annihilation.” Ibid.
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Time gave prominent coverage to Clare Luce’s observations in the Congressional
Record under the heading “Congresswoman v. Russia” and hailed her warnings against
Soviet domination in Europe;
Connecticut’s Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce has sent many a verbal slingshot at 
Communist Russia. Over the radio and in articles she has poimded away at the thesis 
That Russia, as the strongest power in Europe, is rapidly commtmizing the continent 
In a series o f Congressional Records she discussed all Üie small cotmtries in Russia’s 
orb it detailed the Communist influence in their present Governments.”
Time also noted that the most prominent Russian propagandist David Zaslavsky, in
Pravda magazine called Clare Luce “a Fascist and Goebbels’ unconsoled political
widow.... This lady does not like us. Furthermore she hates us with a passion which is
more African than American in violence. ” He added that she presented a resolution in
Congress decrying the “sins” o f  Yalta and declared in speeches that the Soviet Union
would “swallow China” as well as the Balkans. Another Pravda commentator said that
she had “waged [a] personal little war on Hitler’s side against the Soviet and the
American people.””
Congressman Joseph E. Talbot rose vigorously to her defense saying that in the
Congressional Record Clare Luce gave the results o f her “explorations into Communist
natural history w ith... quiet detachment,” and that a woman should “dare to enter this
forbidden field... filled the editors o f Pravda with fury.” They did not know how to
“meet these facts” and they took “the usual line o f violently abusing the author.” There
was nothing wrong with Mrs. Luce’s assiunption that “her fellow countrymen should
know what their representatives are engaged in doing, so they won’t be surprised when
the accomplished fact burst upon them later.” Talbot concluded that:
”  Time. July 30,1945.
”  Ibid.; Swanberg, Luce and H is Empire, 235-36.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
Mrs. Luce is doing a service to the United States. In fact, it might be added that 
anyone who really is doing a service to the United States today rather than to 
commimist Russia.. is almost certain to be accused o f being a Fascist. To love your 
own country in preference to Moscow is practically treason in the eyes o f  left­
wingers.'^
As Clare Luce continued to warn against the Soviet threat. Time and Life reiterated 
their stance that the Soviets were the United States’ major enemies. Life  declared that 
America and Russia were rivals for power and influence around the world. Wishful 
t h i n k i n g  concerning Soviet-American relations fostered during the World W ar n  had to 
end; “the notion that the peace will spread normally and automatically.. .is a falsehood 
and a delusion. There is neither real peace nor prospect o f it.” In truth, a political and 
diplomatic conflict was already going on between Russia and the Western powers in all 
parts o f  the world. Life declared that if  the Americans wanted real peace, they would have 
to get used to the idea o f living with this conflict, as their diplomats had learned to do. 
“We shall have to work hard and sleeplessly at the tough game o f  power politics and 
diplomacy,” Life  argued. It warned that, “I f  Americans do not wish to make that effort, 
we will all wake up someday to find our allies divided, our prestige gone, and a Russian 
war that could have been prevented threatening the world.””
Life also continued to run signed articles warning readers about Russia. In June 1946, 
Wall Street attorney and Republican foreign policy adviser John Foster Dulles wrote a
Talbot also argued: “Arrangements should be made to publish all o f  Mrs. Luce’s 
articles under one cover, where American citizens may see the whole record. These 
studies o f  the commtmizing o f  so-called liberated Europe have sp e a re d  from time to 
time in the Congressional Record under the general title o f Leaning Over Backward’- a  
phase selected by Mrs. Luce from a statement o f  acting Secretary o f  State Grew. ...How 
far we are leaning over backward has been shown by Mrs. Luce with names, facts, dates, 
figures, and the record o f  one liberated European country after another.” “W hy They 
Hate Mrs. Luce,” Congressional Record, July 17,1946, A 3502.
M ay27, 1946.
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two-part series urging the West to awaken to the prospect o f  a Pax Sovietica. Dulles
argued that the most urgent task o f American statesmanship was to find the policies that
would avert a serious clash with the Soviet Union. The more Soviet policies were studied,
the greater the danger o f such a clash appeared. He wrote:
Soviet leaders assume that peace and security depend upon quickly achieving 
worldwide acceptance o f Soviet political ideology, which suppresses certain personal 
fi’eedoms.. it would be foolish to rest our hope o f peace on any genuine reconciliation 
o f  our faith with that now held by Soviet leadership. The differences are fundamental. 
But peace can prevail if  Soviet leadership will abandon the intolerant methods by 
which they now seek to eradicate those differences... .[S]o long as Soviet policy seeks 
its own security by achieving Pax Sovietica, the United States will be disposed to 
resist all expansive manifestations of Soviet policy.”
By 1946, Time published individual news stories and summaries increasingly
supporting the Cold War. A Time editorial asked “What does Russia want” and answered:
“Russia wants power. Russia wants prestige. Russia wants security.” It also defined the
Communist ideological nature as constantly searching for security by annexing “273,947
square miles since 1939.” The methods were “self-confident, ruthless and capable of
infinite variety fi’om military terror to humanitarian tracts.” Time defended the Marshall
Plan in an article titled “What price peace?” The evidence that Russia wanted to dominate
the world was overwhelming, as Communist ideology argued that the whole world
should adopt its social and economic system. If  the United States wanted to stop
Communism in Europe, Time stressed, it had to invest $15 billion in European political,
economic and social stability. That was not big compared to the potential US bill for
”  Life, June 3 ,10,1946. According to Immerman, in Dulles’s geopolitical framework 
there was also an “Inner Zone” (already under Moscow’s direct jurisdiction) and a 
“Middle Zone” (territory in Eastern Europe and Asia “not yet ripe for incorporation into 
U.S.S.R.” but susceptible to coercion). Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles, Piety, 
Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, Delaware: A Scholarly 
Resources Inc., 1999), 29.
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World War Ill-at least 350 billion dollars. Time concluded that “peace between the U.S. 
and Russia is probable as long as the U.S. stays out in front.”'̂
Through the postwar years, both Clare and Henry Luce developed their ideology of 
anti-Communism and, during the 1950s, continued the anti-Communist crusade against 
Soviet Russia. Clare Luce helped in founding “Common Cause," the first American 
organization to fight Communism on a global scale. One o f her fiiends commented, 
“Clare's penetrating understanding of communism, her knowledge o f American 
institutions and politics, and the dynamic thinking she gave to Common Cause were 
extraordinary." As early as 1946, Common Cause established contact with the strongest 
anti-Communist underground in Russia. Here, her personal fiiendship with virtually all 
the most important exiles from Communist tyranny in Europe proved useful. In 1949 she 
helped to bring all the heads o f the govemments-in-exile together to lay the groundwork
Time. April 1, 1946, July 21, 1947. In the article “What does Russia want?” Time wrote 
that Russia “views capitalist-and socialist-nations with suspicion colored by the 
communist Party’s own conspiratorial background. Russia, therefore, maintains the 
biggest army in the world (at least 6,(XX).0(X) men). She would like to keep her won 
sphere o f irriXuence isolated from the rest of the world, and has already broken most of 
eastern Europe’s economic and cultural ties with the West.... Russia’s economic power is 
expanding into the vacuums left by the shattered industries and trading spheres of 
Germany and Japan. Her social system, while it challenges centuries of Western progress, 
has an undoubted qrpeal for millions.” Ibid., April 1 ,1946. In the article “What price 
peace?” among other dungs Time wrote: “[T]he leaders o f another country-Russia-want 
to dominate the worid. It is certain that they do, or are some nervous Americans just 
imagining things? The evidence of Russia’s intention is overwhelming. It is stronger than 
the evidence of German and Japanese intentions in 1937. Communist leaders subscribe to 
a philosophy diat says the whole world must adopt their social and economic system, and 
the intemationai soviet shall be the human race.’ The communist philosophy says, 
further, diat good men should work like beavers to bring about this world victory of 
Communism.” Ibid., July 21,1947.
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for the Free Europe Committee. Interestingly, under her influence. Common Cause called
for the return of Trieste to Italy as early as 1947.'*
Since Clare and Henry Luce were ideologically in agreement on both domestic and
foreign politics, in the 1952 national elections they supported the Republican Party and
Dwight Eisenhower’s candidacy for president against the Democratic nominee. Governor
Adlai E. Stevenson. Time and Life influenced millions to vote Republican, and Clare
Luce made over 40 campaign speeches for Eisenhower. After the Republicans won the
election. President Eisenhower, according to some sources, paid his debt to the Luces by
nominating Clare Luce as ambassador to Rome. She accepted this position on the
condition that Henry Luce help her.'’
On February 16,1953, Time praised President Eisenhower’s decision to nominate
Clare Luce as “first woman ever q»pointed to a top U S Embassy, and the first woman
ambassador ever appointed to Rome from any nation. ” Time also glorified her previous
political work saying;
In her first campaign she showed a sureness of political touch and a flair for the 
dramatic political phase which delighted her audiences and got her elected.. and in 
1944 reelected... As the war neared its end, she was one o f the first to give clear 
public warning of the struggle that lay ahead.. ..[S]he decided not to run for reelection 
in 1946.... [T]he prospects of an Eisenhower campaign brought her back into politics, 
and began stamping for his nomination because he is the one living symbol of U.S. 
determination to defend itself and Western civilization against the political and 
military forces of Communism.̂ "
Time concluded that the news of her appointment brought statements of approval from 
her associates fiom Congress and from the Italian press. Time even cited an article fiom
" Hatch, Ambassador Extraordinary. 186-87.
Ann Miller Morin, Her Excellency. An Oral Histwy o f American Women 
Ambassadors. (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), 31-32.
“  Time. February 16,1953
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the New York Times that argued that, while Italy was “a crucial spot in the cold war, a 
testing place o f  American policy,” Clare Luce, with “ten year’s experience in American 
politics, an unusual knowledge o f Italy.. and the confidence o f  the Administration, a 
matter o f  great interest to the Italians,” was well equipped to confront her new task. The 
article concluded: “as a pioneer in the upper reaches o f diplomacy she is likely to rise to 
one o f  the biggest challenges ever offered to a woman.”^'
During Luce’s ambassadorship, Italy became one o f the major challenges for the 
United States policy in Europe and one o f her major concerns. Although she did not have 
diplomatic experience before she became the ambassador, her strong anti-Com m unism 
and good connections in the State Department afforded her access to the most important 
leaders in Washington and enabled her to pressure them to find a solution favorable to the 
Italians. Gastone Guidotti, head of the Italian foreign ministry political section, described 
Luce’s power and influence: “Mrs. Luce is the most important ambassador you have ever 
had here because she is a member of your Politburo. If  there is anything we really want 
done, we persuade her-she circumvents the State Department and telephones the White 
House. Time and Life are more valuable to us than experience.”^̂  Diplomats often have 
very little actual power, their job being to cany out the policies o f their home 
govenunents while carefully avoiding interference in the internal affairs of their host 
governments. This was not the case with Luce as she went far beyond her diplomatic 
duties.^^
Ibid.
22 Cyrus L. Sulzberger, A Long Row o f Candles. Memoirs and Diaries (1934-1954) 
(Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 983.
Joseph Lyons, Clare Boothe Luce (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1989), 94.
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CHAPTERS
THE TRIESTE CRISIS OF 1953 
Clare Luce upon arriving in Rome immersed herself in Italian politics and caused 
much controversy during the 1953 election campaign. In becoming deeply, directly and 
publicly involved in Italian politics, she ignored the National Security Council’s (NSC) 
edict regarding plausible government deniability. She warned that US economic aid to 
Italy would continue only if  the coalition led by the Christian Democrats won. Such 
intervention was not unprecedented. In 1948, American officials armounced that if 
Italians voted a Communist regime into power, they would automatically dissociate Italy 
“from all benefits o f the European Recovery Program.” ' However, this time the same 
American rhetoric and intervention stimulated a strong negative reaction, because the 
Italian voters cared more about domestic issues than about Cold War policy. A New York 
TYmes journalist reported that the majority o f Italians “were interested only in supporting 
the party that might be most helpful to them personally.” A Italian local official noted: 
“Generally speaking, our people could not care less for the Atlantic pact, the European
' Rabel, Between East and West. 147; DeConde, H alf Bitter. H a lf Sweet. 294, 319. 
Swanberg argued that the earlier ambassadors in Italy, James Dunn and Ellsworth 
Bunker, had let it be known in discreet and gentle terms that a Communist victory would 
diminish or stop the flow of funds. This was the sort o f suggestion that had to be made 
with tact concerning American aid “rather than the twisting o f  the Italian arm, or leg.” 
Mrs. Luce’s record o f strident anti-communism and the opinion o f some friends that tact 
was a quality unknown to her raised the question of whether she was equipped to get 
maximum political mileage out o f  American aid to Italy. Swanberg, Luce and His 
Empire, 343.
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Defense Community, ‘American imperialism,’ the East-West struggle, democracy versus 
tyranny.”^
Because o f the Soviet proposals for peace, many Italians envisioned the possibility of 
an intemationai détente and they argued that should this happen there would be no real 
need for intensive rearmament or for close military association with the United States and 
the other Western powers. This thinking was in accord with that o f the Communist Party, 
which fiercely opposed Alcide De Gasperi’s commitment to the European Defense 
Community (EDC) agreement that was “designed to be supranational in character, 
consisting o f common institutions, common armed forces and a common budget.” The 
Communists and other parties o f the left criticized De Gasperi’s close ties to America and 
accused his government o f being subservient. The parties o f the right also blamed the 
government for showing weakness in its foreign policy, pointing to the still unsettled 
Trieste dispute. Overall, most Italians continued to show that they were as loyal as ever to 
the Atlantic alliance and to close ties with the United States, but at the same time that 
they were far less worried about communism than their American critics.^
Some American officials were aware of this new situation and suggested a policy that 
would be more acceptable to the Italians. In 1952 the former American ambassador to 
Italy, James Dunn, proposed a different course of the American policy for the “national 
elections little more than a year away.” Since the Italian government felt the need to 
“demonstrate its independence in [the] intemationai field,” and particularly regarding
 ̂DeConde, H alf Bitter, H a lf Sweet, 319; New York Times, June 8, 1953. In the following 
pages I will often abbreviate title for the Nevj York Times as Times: all citations are from 
Section 1.
 ̂DeConde, H alf Bitter, H a lf Sweet, 318-19; “European Defense Community, Report of 
the Conference for the Organization o f a European Defense Community to die North 
Atlantic Council,” 19* February 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, 5:230-50.
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relations with the United States, Dunn urged the American leadership to patiently 
encourage democratic forces, because it “is more necessary than ever and if  wisely 
exercised [it] will be welcomed.” He emphasized that public criticism of conditions in 
Italy by US officials in any branch o f the government “will simply make matters worse.” 
He argued that the United States “must also recognize [the] tendency to transfer 
responsibility for troubles to others, even to us,” and must be “patient” and influence 
policies only in private. Dunn concluded that we “must plan our actions both in public 
and private in support o f democratic political parties with a view to assuring their success 
in elections regardless o f whether we are satisfied with their composition or with all their 
policies.”^
These suggestions did not modify the tactics that Clare Luce used to persuade Italians 
to vote for the Center coalition as she continued to worry about the elections’ outcome 
and a Christian Democratic victory. She informed the State Department that the election 
campaign lacked a sense o f excitement and novelty. The Italian government did not have 
a concrete domestic political program for the future, “largely because there is no general
 ̂Dunn argued that the situation in Italy “has elements o f real danger and political 
stability.. depending as it does on work o f one man De Gasperi [who] can no longer be 
taken for granted in our calculations.” He also stated that the “astonishing economic 
recovery o f Italy has concealed [the] relatively much slower progress in psychological 
and moral recovery. The stimulating effect o f Gen Eisenhower’s appointment in Europe 
and vigorous start which was given to rearmament for common defense has virtually 
petered out.... [The m]agnitude of [the] long-range problem o f unemployment and of 
population in relation to productive capacity and resources intensifies [the] sense of 
discouragement. Some hope is seen in [the] potentialities o f  tackling these problems in 
[the] larger framework o f  developing European unity but progress in this is still too slow 
to have substantial economic effect in [the] next few years.... All parties increasingly rely 
on [a] nationalist appeal as [a] measure o f genuine self-assertion and to distract from 
internal difficulties. Long years of dependence on [the] US relationship, combined with 
insistent attacks o f [the] left and right for ‘subservience’ to US, is having its effect.” “The 
Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Department of State,” January 31, 1952, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 6:1565-1569.
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agreement on domestic politics within [the] CD Party or [the] Center Coalition.” At the 
same time, she emphasized that the Christian Democrats’ accomplishments in terms of 
recovery, stability, public works and reform were strongly before the Italian public.^ In 
order to secure the De Gasperi government’s majority in the elections. Luce publicly 
promised more American economic aid and threatened to cut all benefits if  the election 
outcome was not favorable to the United States. On May 27, 1953, the New York Times 
wrote that Ambassador Luce informed Premier De Gasperi that “an additional 
$22,000,000 o f economic aid had been assigned to Italy.” The Times believed that “the 
assurance that Italy continues to receive a notable share o f American aid... will not be 
lost upon the Italian voters.” Two days later. Luce implied that the United States would 
apply economic sanctions if the Italians elected a government o f the Left. She warned 
Italians “the United States aid would be cut if Italy should become the victim o f either 
left-wing or right-wing totalitarianism.” The Times believed that this statement “is certain 
to be full of political consequences,” and it would probably raise criticism that “Luce is 
interfering in internal Italian affairs.” Still, the Times deemed it useful to point out to 
every Italian “how far reaching the results of his vote might be.” Luce’s first political
 ̂Luce argued that “there is also [a] lack of [a] concrete domestic political program o f 
government for [the] future,...[t]here will probably be [a] mild CD recovery fi’om I95I- 
1952 partly because o f greater turnout, less blank ballots, [but the] fact [is that] these are 
political rather than local elections, and [the] prestige [of] De Gasperi as contrasted to 
[the] lightweights and shabby alternatives offered by [the] Right. [The e]mbassy 
continues to believe [that the] Center parties will out-poll [the] opposition by rather [a] 
slim margin and obtain [a] premium in [the] Chamber. .. In [the] Senate notwithstanding 
strong rightist candidates in [the] south Center will probably also win [the] majority at 
least with help [of] six Senators for-life and [the] distortion o f [the] voting system which 
favors [the] CD party . ” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State, ” 
Junes, \953, FRUS. 1952-1954,6A606-S.
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speech was not only the articulation o f the United States’ basic policy but also an attack
on the Soviet Union’s peace overtures:
The new tactic of the Soviets holds considerable dangers for the free world. It is nicely 
calculated to throw us o ff guard, to persuade us that the need for our new-found unity 
has lessened, to encourage and create divisions among our allies, to allay the sense of 
urgency that has produced such remarkable achievements, to foster neutralism and, 
above all, to encourage all extremists o f left and right to assault and weaken the 
integrity o f their own governments... for future totalitarian power.^
Luce promised direct and indirect American economic aid, “as long as the threat o f
aggression remains,” and said that the Eisenhower administration “would make every
possible effort to help Italy’s pressing problems of overpopulation and consequent
unemployment.” However, even some Italians known for their friendliness to the United
States resented Luce’s threats. They began to mistrust the close association with the
Untied States, since the relationship carried with it the obligation o f rearmament and gave
the Americans the opportunity to interfere in Italian domestic affairs.^
Because many Italians resented the American demands and became overly critical,
tending to overlook the economic assistance they received from the United States, Luce’s
efforts probably hindered the Italian government at the polls in the June 7, 1953 national
elections. The Center coalition won a clear majority in the Senate, but obtained just under
50 percent of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, the Center parties failed to
receive the 65 percent o f the seats in the Chamber they would have had under the new
 ̂New York Times, May 27, 29, 1953.
’ New York Times May 27, 1953; DeConde, H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 319. Cook argued 
that although Luce failed to obtain decisive victories for the Christian Democrats, her 
activities resulted in as yet classified sums of money and other kinds o f support for future 
election efforts to block a coalition of Italy’s socialist and communist leaders. It is known 
that Luce’s recommendations for “covert” aid involved requests not only for aid directly 
to the Christian Democrats, but for a variety of measures that resulted in increased 
unemployment and isolation o f Communist unionists. Records o f  her meetings with Fiat 
are now available fium Italian sources. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 193-94.
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electoral law had they won a majority o f the popular vote * Despite this setback. De 
Gasperi tried to organize his eighth ministry and introduced his new government’s 
program, stressing that Italy intended above all to fulfill its commitments under the 
Atlantic pact, and in return expected help in solving the Trieste dispute. The New York 
Times quoted the Italian magazine Esteri, “which usually reflected the opinion o f the 
foreign ministry [that] ratification o f the European Defense Community treaty will be the 
first manifestation o f the Atlantic pact policy to be taken up by the Parliament.” It further 
stated that the “city o f  Trieste and its territory must be returned to Italy,” and blamed the 
election results on the Soviet peace moves, which were “exploited for the election 
purposes by the Italian Socialists and Communists.” Esteri asserted that the right-wing 
parties opposing the Center coalition exploited the fact “that the three-power declaration 
o f 1948 whereby the United States, Britain and France advocated the return to Italy o f
* Rabel, Between East and West. 248; “Editorial Note”, FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1608; The 
New York Times reported that the Christian Democrats emerged from the elections once 
again as by far the strongest party in Italy; “The Right-Wing Socialists, Liberals and 
Republicans, who are allied with with the Christian Democrats, showed more weakness 
than expected.... The extreme Left-Wing parties again proved their ability to control 
about a third o f the Italian voters. Their strength has increased in the last five years, but 
not rapidly.” New York Times, June 10, 1953. The result o f the election was that no one 
emerged as the victor. In some respects, the campaign was a repetition o f that o f 1948: 
the church. Catholic Action, and the American Embassy repeated their veiled 
admonitions. But the voters remained apathetic, and it came as a surprise when an 
unprecedented 93 percent o f the electorate went to polls. Hughes, The United States and 
Italy, 198. Before the June election De Gasperi suggested “interesting but provocative 
proposal ” that any alliance o f parties winning a clear 50 percent o f the votes should 
receive extra 15 percent in the allocation of parliamentary seats. Mainly the Left 
criticized this proposal, which was eventually adopted, but when the elections were held 
in June there were many defections from Christian Democracy and De Gasperi’s 
coalition failed by a few thousand votes to secure the necessary 50 percent. Instead of 
winning a bonus o f  extra seats he lost much o f  the support he already possessed and this 
brought his career to a close. Denis Mack Smith, Modem Italy, A Political History (Ann 
Arbor: The University o f Michigan Press, 1997), 437.
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Trieste had been followed by no practical results.” A foreign ministry spokesperson
expressed the same opinion;
[The] Italian aspirations where Trieste is concerned are shared by all Italians and by 
all Italian parties. The result of the elections cannot be said to have weakened the 
government in the matter o f Trieste, but rather to have strengthened it because they 
showed that on this subject substantial unanimity exists among the Italians.’
After the Western powers invited Yugoslavia to send a mission to Washington for
military conversations, the Italian Government stated its belief that this move “might kill
any hope o f solving the Trieste problem.” De Gasperi himself warned the Western
powers that “the crisis in Italy’s relations with the West was approaching if  something
effective was not done in the near future to get [the] Trieste problem out o f way.” De
Gasperi’s strong stand on Trieste and his criticism of the Western powers’ policies
toward Italian demands came too late to help him win the confidence o f the parliament.
On July 28, his government coalition fell and he resigned.
’ New York Times June 16, 19,1953. The New York Times stated that, according to Esteri, 
the only acceptable solution for the Trieste problem was: “one founded on ‘irrefutable 
ethnic data.’” The Times further wrote: “The city of Trieste and its territory must be 
returned to Italy to lay the foundation for political, economic and military collaboration 
between Italy and Yugoslavia.” Ibid., June 16, 1953.
New York Times July 19, 22, 1953. The Times wrote: “It was charged in Rome today 
that the United States, Britain and France seemed to be doing everything possible to 
make it difficult for Italy to remain in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
continue a policy of European integration.” Ibid., July 19, 1953. A day later the Times 
reported again the Italian stand about the military talks between Yugoslavia and the 
Western allies: “It was felt here that the State Department had missed the whole point of 
the Italian protests. What the Italians fear is not that decisions contrary to their interests 
will be taken in Washington, but that increased military aid and the heightened prestige 
resulting from the invitation to Washington will make the Yugoslavs even more 
intractable than they had been hitherto and cause them to stiffen their stand on Trieste.” 
Ibid., July 22, 1953. There are many documents that discuss possible military 
conversations between Yugoslavia and Western powers in Washington. Some o f them 
are: “The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson),” June 11, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 8:1355-57; “National Intelligence Estimate,” June 26, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:1357-59; “Memorandum by Adlai E. Stevenson to the Ambassador in Austria
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Since De Gasperi involved himself directly in the foreign policy that brought Italy 
closer to the United States than at any time in the past, his fall marked a turning point in 
the history o f Italian-American relations. Depending on whether one was Italian or 
American, the reaction to De Gasperi’s fall was notably different. Most Italians were 
happy, some were actually jubilant, and far fewer as worried as their allies. They 
expressed their pleasure over De Gasperi’s departure, believing that Italian democracy 
would show itself strong enough to function without a father figure to guide it. The myth 
of De Gasperi s indispensability disappeared, and Italy was on its own; its national life 
would no longer be dependent on the attitude o f a powerful ally. Italians wanted to end 
American tutelage, but not American friendship. ' '
Contrary to the Italians, the Americans were upset and an atmosphere o f gloom settled 
over the American Embassy: an air of stem disquiet reigned, as the staff speculated on 
the uncertain future o f the alliance they had nourished. Americans concluded that the 
elections demonstrated an increase in the number of Italians who preferred communism 
to democracy. Americans were also alarmed with this outcome because they had based 
their policy toward Italy on the idea o f keeping it within the Western orbit and o f 
checking the growth of communism within Italy. Some critics thought that the United 
States had spent its money in Italy in vain. They blamed the Italian government for not 
putting into effect plans for improving conditions among its people and thereby stopping 
the spread o f communism. Some people even criticized Clare Luce for her efforts to
(Thompson),” July 10, 1953, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:1362-64. During the crisis over Trieste 
in the fkll o f 1953, plans to follow up on the tripartite military talks with Yugoslavia, held 
in Washington during August 24-28, 1953, were in abeyance. “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 
1952-1954, 8:1364-65.
"  DeConde, H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 320; Hughes, The United States and Italy, 201.
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influence the Italian elections and her first political speech in Milan on May 28, 1953, 
was held responsible for the heavy losses of the Center coalition.'^ But Time strongly 
defended Clare Luce and her statements as positive and not unusual because she only 
wanted to make sure that “every Italian voter understood where the US, which has given 
Italy $3 billion in aid since war’s end, takes its stand.”
The National Security Council discussed the problems in Italy in its two meetings. On 
Jime 9, the 149* NSC briefly referred to the domestic political situation in Italy.
President Eisenhower said, “If some free world country, such as Italy, were actually to 
elect a Commimist govenunent, " he did not see how we could do anything to prevent its 
exercise o f power. On July 30, the 157* NSC discussed the reasons for De Gasperi’s fall 
and blamed the failure of the Christian Democrats to meet the needs of the lower income 
groups. The NSC concluded that the Italian electoral law, which had received the name 
“swindle law” during the campaign, the increasing discontent among many classes o f the 
population, the recent Russian peace offensive, and uncertainty over American policy 
also played a role in the elections.'^
Although the Trieste dispute was not part o f the discussion. President Eisenhower 
mentioned it saying that the United States would have helped De Gasperi in the elections
Rabel, Between East and West. 147-48; Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 192-93; 
DeConde, H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 319. In the interview that Luce gave to Ann Morin in 
1986 about her policies in Italy, she stated that she never wanted to press her own view 
on anyone. She also said; “I was content to let everyone figure it out the way they wanted 
to at the time. ” Morin, Her Excellency, 35. Shadegg stated that the polls in Italy had 
shown that the De Gasperi government was in serious trouble before Luce came to Italy, 
and that the Embassy staff itself felt that the belated US “hint ” might well have prevented 
the loss o f even more seats. De Gasperi himself remarked that he doubted that the new 
ambassador’s warning changed a single Italian vote. Shadegg. Clare Boothe Luce, 243.
Time June 8, 1953.
“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1608, 6:1623-24.
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“if  we could have made a firm commitment on Trieste, but this was impossible because 
o f Yugoslavia.” And he pointed out that he could not understand why the Trieste question 
was so important and why it “aroused emotions in Italy quite out o f proportion.” '^
Clare Luce had a completely different opinion about the Trieste dispute and its 
importance for the elections’ outcome. She attributed the election loss solely to the failure 
o f the United States, Britain, and France to implement the 1948 Tripartite Declaration on 
Trieste that would have give Italy the whole FTT. Before the June elections. Luce 
thought that the Trieste problem was not the decisive issue that would influence the 
elections. She claimed that the Trieste issue had not “caught fire” as an instrument o f the 
Rightist propaganda and that De Gasperi government had “continuously maintained [the] 
tactical offensive.” However, after De Gasperi’s fall, she blamed it all on Trieste and 
began to work hard to persuade the State Department and other officials to pursue a 
solution favorable to Italy.
As a “political” ambassador. Luce had good connections in the State Department and 
an easy access to President Eisenhower and other important politicians in Washington.
She frequently contacted C. D. Jackson, John Foster Dulles and other prominent political 
figures within the Republican administration, warning them about the communist threat 
in Italy. Since Jackson and Dulles were very powerful Cold Warriors who had direct
“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:241; “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 157* 
Meeting of the National Security Council,” July 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1624.
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State,” June 3, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 6:1607; Rabel, Between East and West, 148.
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contact with President Eisenhower, often giving him advice about different foreign policy 
decisions. Luce was able to influence the decision-making process at the highest level.
That John Foster Dulles, the Secretary o f State, was Eisenhower’s preeminent foreign 
policy advisor until his death in May 1959 was never in question. Eisenhower entrusted 
Dulles with great power and influence, and although the president reserved final 
decisions for himself, he always consulted Dulles first. Dulles never tried to bypass or in 
any other way trespass on Eisenhower’s authority. As president and secretary o f state, 
they cultivated a relationship based on mutual respect and trust. They conferred 
frequently, in person or over the phone, and regularly exchanged telegrams. Eisenhower 
said that Dulles “never made a serious pronouncement, agreement or proposal without 
complete and exhaustive consultation with me in advance and, of course my approval.” '*
Dulles was only one o f many Cold Warriors and advisors who influenced decisions 
during Eisenhower’s presidency. C. D. Jackson, a former vice president and senior 
executive in Henry Luce’s Time-Life organization, became Eisenhower’s first special 
assistant for psychological warfare. The more Eisenhower’s commitment to 
psychological warfare exerted a profound influence on the overall direction of his foreign 
policy, the more powerful Jackson became. Although Eisenhower included all of his key 
defense and economic advisers in the broader national security strategy, he reserved a 
special place for Cold Warriors such as Jackson. Eisenhower usually received fresh ideas 
and perspectives, from Jackson, and other psychological warfare advisors. Even though
Rabel, Between East and West. 147; Swanberg, Luce and His Empire, 370; DeConde, 
H alf Bitter. H alf Sweet, 321.
'* Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 151; Immerman, John Foster Dulles, 46-47.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
Jackson left the White House in 1954, he continued to advise Eisenhower on both a
formal and informal basis throughout his presidency.'’
High-level politicians expressed concern about the situation in Italy after Clare Luce
started to write her reports warning of the communist danger and its ostensible threat the
overall American policy in Europe. Despite her warnings, the State Department and the
President were focused on Korea and did not do much about the situation in Italy. In
summer 1953, the Korean peace talks stopped and there was a great possibility that the
war would continue. The Republican administration tried to calm Korean affairs as
Eisenhower had promised in the election campaign. After secret negotiations through
India, both sides signed a truce and the war finally stopped. With the end o f the Korean
crisis, Washington turned greater attention to Trieste and Italo-Yugoslav relations.^
In the meantime. Luce continued to send her “forceful” reports to the officials in
Washington. After De Gasperi’s fall. Luce defended her Milan speech in a letter she
wrote to C. D. Jackson and later in the interviews she gave to journalists. She pointed out
that the Communists had made only insignificant references to these remarks in the
electoral campaign and that only certain elements o f the Monarchist party had referred to
them, particularly the neo-Fascist party. She also said;
Our friends here have been a bit disturbed about [the] allegations in the press at home 
that one o f the “principal” reasons why the center coalition did not win over 50% of 
the vote was a passage in my speech.... [T]hese remarks were taken out o f context and 
distorted.... What I actually said was: ‘But if though it cannot happen the Italian 
people should fall unhappy victim to the wiles o f totalitarianism, totalitarianism o f the 
right and the left, there would follow logically and tragically grave consequences for
'’ Rabel, Between East and West, 147; Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower, 177; Kenneth 
A. Osgood, “From Before Substance: Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the 
Enemy,” Diplomatic History 24 (Summer 2000), 405-433.
Walter LaFeber, The American Age, United States Foreign Policy at Home and 
Abroad, 1750 to the Present, 2"** ed. (New York: W. W, Norton & Company, 1994), 543.
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this intimate and warm cooperation we now enjoy.
“This is o f course,” she pointed out to Jackson, “a fundamental premise o f American
policy.” She expressed hope that “we will win thru here in Italy because we must,” and
expressed satisfaction that Henry Luce “has updated you [Jackson] already to this point.”
She also wrote a seventeen-page memorandum, which Jackson praised as “superb,” about
the recent Italian election. He passed it on to the President, who deemed it “very
interesting and extremely well expressed.” Jackson told the President that Clare Luce’s
memorandum was “an excellent job, and very interesting reading as well.”^
Luce also sent her analyses o f the new situation in Italy to Secretary o f State Dulles.
To make sure that her suggestions were going to be read. Luce advised Jackson to give
her memorandum to the President as well. Luce argued that the United States’ failure to
honor the 1948 Tripartite Declaration on Trieste and its support o f Tito for strategic
reasons had been used by both the Communists and the Right to reduce the Center
coalition’s margin o f victory. Her letter also echoed Christian Democrat De Gasperi s
opinion that an unfavorable American stance on Trieste contributed to his election losses:
[T]he issue o f Trieste would certainly have been the decisive issue of the 
campaign...[but] Italy may yet be lost on the Trieste question. [De Gasperi’s] 
government required him to maintain that his Trieste policy was firmly based on the 
tripartite declaration.^
Luce also said that there was no suggestion among the reliable press operators that 
“What 1 said ‘hurt,’ and amusingly enough 1 received today a letter from Milan Chamber 
o f  Commerce to whom the speech was delivered, saying that most o f its 600 members 
approved o f it thoroughly.” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Special Assistant to 
the President (Jackson), ” June 18, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954,6:1612-13.
^  Ibid.; Jackson wrote to Luce: “Again, sincerest congratulations on a wonderful job, and 
needless to say 1 am always delighted to read such material.” “The Special Assistant to 
the President (Jackson) to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce),” July 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 6:1622.
^  “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” June 21, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 6:1614-16.
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Luce asserted that “if this analysis o f the lessons o f this election is correct, and if  we 
do ‘nothing about it,’ we risk imperiling our whole policy in Europe.” In this way. Luce 
proposed a policy that was impossible to implement. She did not realize that there was a 
great problem with honoring the Tripartite proposal, and that ± e  United States and Great 
Britain could not give Zone B to Italy since it was under Yugoslav control. Luce failed to 
take into consideration that, as long as the Italian government had an uncompromising 
attitude regarding the Tripartite Declaration, all bilateral discussions and active 
negotiations would end in failure. '̂*
Luce informed Jackson that failure to find a solution to Trieste would also influence 
US domestic politics. She emphasized that “Democrats could rightly claim that 
Republican policy was appeasing totalitarian dictatorship, selling Democracy down the 
river to the Commies, ” and she explained that they would have a right to attack her and
The memorandum that commented on Luce’s analysis of the recent Italian elections 
among other things stated that “[t]he great lesson of this election is that Italy is now 
slowly and steadily moving toward Kremlin...[therefore] [w]e must continue to express 
officially and publicly the correct view that De Gasperi’s party won the battle against 
communism, while striving to eradicate the contradictions in our foreign policy which 
resulted in such a close shave for his party.” “Memorandum by Walter K. Scott and 
Edward G. Platt o f the Executive Secretariat to the Secretary o f State,” June 25, 1953, 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1618-20; Unger, Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 17. According 
to Rabel, Tripartite Proposal was “a blatantly opportunistic plot to gain a short-term 
advantage in the Cold War.. it proved to be unnecessary and costly liability in the long 
run...it limited American freedom of action.” Rabel, Between East and West, 129-30. 
British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, also commented on the Tripartite Proposal in his 
memoirs saying that on March 20 the United Kingdom, France and the United States 
suggested that the whole of the Free Territory of Trieste, including Zone B, should go to 
Italy. As expected, the Tripartite Declaration was highly popular in Italy and contributed 
to a sweeping victory won by the Christian Democrats a month later, but “Juridicially it 
did not mean so much, because any revision [of the Italian peace treaty] required the 
agreement of Soviet Russia, which would not be forthcoming. Later events cast doubts on 
the wisdom o f the Western initiative. In the most tangled diplomatic problems it seldom 
pays to snatch a short-term advantage, especially if this limits... maneuver, as in this 
instance. ” Anthony Eden, The Memoirs o f  Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1960), 199.
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the policy she represented if  the administration lost Italy for NATO. She also told Cyrus
Sulzberger, the prominent New York Times foreign correspondent:
If Italy goes Communist, not only it will be disaster for the United States, but it will be 
an incredible political defeat for the Republican Party. It would make the loss of China 
look small by comparison. The loss o f Italy would have a profound effect on 
Americans of Italian decent and on Catholics in the United States.^^
To prevent that from happening. Luce proposed a change o f  three major contradictions
in American foreign policy toward Italy: Trieste, immigration and trade.^^ She argued
that the United States’ task in Italy would become more difficult because the Italians
were increasingly aware o f these contradictions. The Communists would make greater
gains in the future by emphasizing poverty and unemployment and they would stress the
Luce asked Jackson: “Do we then only know how to pursue dollar diplomacy? Must 
we always lose in the intemationai field the minute sheer diplomacy is put to the test? If 
that is true, we may do better frankly to abandon world leadership and revert to isolation 
which will make much less strain on the purse of our people, and the brains of their 
leaders.” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President’s Special Assistant 
(Jackson),” September 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:265-66; Sulzberger, A Long Row o f  
Candles, 977.
Luce argued that if either of the first two issues had been resolved in favor of Italy, De 
Gasperi would easily have gained a 50.1 percent majority. “Memorandum by Walter K. 
Scott and Edward G. Platt o f the Executive Secretariat to the Secretary of State,” June 25, 
1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1618-20. DeConde wrote that the Italians hoped for many 
concessions that American policymakers found difficult to grant. The Italian leaders 
hoped a higher quota for their people, and they objected to tariff barriers that prevented 
some of Italy’s characteristic products from freely entering the United States. At the same 
time, these tariffs hampered the operation of Italy’s own policy o f liberalizing trade, 
making it difficult for it to pay her own way. Italy bad a constant dollar deficit, which 
represented a dependence on the United States that many Italians questioned, especially 
as conditions improved. The Italians also objected to American immigration policies. The 
immigration law from 1952 eliminated race as a barrier to admittance, but did not balance 
the laws' damage to relations with many countries that felt its sting. In December 1953, 
the United States eased some o f its immigration restrictions and decided to admit, for a 
limited time, special quotas of immigrants. For Italy, this meant 60,000 persons per year, 
with an additional 10,000 allocated for Trieste. For the Italians this was still not enough, 
as DeConde concluded, “in relation to the applications for entry that poured into 
American agencies, the Italians who now reached the United States were few.” DeConde, 
H alf Bitter, H alf Sweet, 301, 317-18.
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fact that “America has curtailed aid for ‘normal and peaceful’ aspects o f [the] Italian 
economy, but has stepped up aid for all ‘military and warlike’ efforts.” In addition. Luce 
complained that “Battle Act implementation which precluded Italy from trading 
‘normally’ with the Soviet Bloc, coupled with the difficulties in trading with America.” 
Therefore, Luce pressured the State Department to find a diplomatic solution to Trieste, 
as well as a legislative solution to immigration and trade, “otherwise our investments in 
Italy may prove to have been in vain.”^̂
Luce also argued that controversies over the American policy would in the future 
destroy all pro-American and pro-NATO forces in Europe. Instead, “the peaceful, co­
existence, non-partisanship parties” would rise. She explained that American foreign 
policy between 1945-1948 largely coincided with the Italian basic self-interest. There 
was little criticism o f American foreign policy in Italy during that period, but for many 
Europeans, including Italians, a divergence o f interest began to manifest itself. This 
became especially obvious when “Italy became aware of US ‘unwillingness to honor the 
Tripartite Declaration,’ while giving increasing aid and support to Tito, the Yugoslav, the 
historic national enemy, and to Tito, the Communist, the avowed common’ ideological 
enemy.” Luce wrote that public opinion in Italy was not willing to abandon NATO, EDC, 
and European integration policies, but thought that these institutions should be a more 
responsive instrument to Italian defense concepts and less an “American show.” She 
claimed further that Italian public opinion was aware of the contradictions between 
America’s interventionist military policies and its isolationist economic policies, between 
America’s ideological war against communism and totalitarianism and its support o f  the
“Memorandum by Walter K. Scott and Edward G. Platt o f the Executive Secretariat to 
the Secretary o f State,” June 25, 1953, FRUS. I952-I954, 6:1618-20.
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Communist dictator Tito, “the most consistently hated man in Italy,” and between 
America’s frequent assertion that it stood for moral leadership and its “refusal” to honor 
the Tripartite Agreement. Luce concluded, “If all, or part o f these things could be 
accomplished, American popularity would be greatly restored.” *̂
Luce seriously questioned the Eisenhower administration’s policy of supporting Tito. 
She wrote that if  the Pentagon continued to be fascinated with Yugoslav divisions, the 
United States could lose Italy without which Yugoslavia could not long be supplied in 
battle. The United States needed its own foreign policy rather than following the British, 
who consistently supported Tito and tried to turn him into a West-European style 
socialist. Luce argued that on moral and spiritual grounds, no one could choose Tito, the 
Communist dictator, over a still democratic Italy. She also believed that “our failure since 
1948, to settle a question which we have increasingly helped to complicate by our aid and 
support to Tito, has fortified the view in many chanceries that we are amateurs in 
diplomacy.” The State Department had not helped Italy sufficiently while assisting Tito’s 
regime in Belgrade.^’
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” August 7, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 6:1624-29.
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f  State,” June 21, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 6:1615-16; “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President’s Special 
Assistant (Jackson),” September 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:265. According to the 
Times the Western observers were fascinated with the Yugoslav troops: “In carrying this 
project [military maneuvers], the Yugoslav troops according to virtually everyone o f the 
attending foreign observers displayed efficient use o f weapons, good morale and 
exceedingly good training, while the officers appeared to have organized the 
demonstration to the very last detail.” New York Times, September 24, 1953. “Field 
Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief o f Britain’s Imperial General Staff, said today 
Yugoslavia had the ‘makings o f a powerful modem army’ and Maj. Gen. Charles Palmer, 
Chief o f  Staff o f the United States Army field forces, declared the Yugoslav Army was 
handling well the heavy American equipment o f  guns, trucks and tanks it was receiving 
in aid.” Ibid., September 26, 1953.
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Luce’s criticism o f the American policy toward Italy was echoed in Time, which 
argued that the failure to implement the 1948 declaration resulted in De Gasperi s fall, as 
“the Premier fully expected the promise to be kept.” Since the Western powers were 
unable to do that, “Italy may refuse to join EDC, and may even withdraw from NATO, a 
step that would knock the foundations from under US strategy for a united, anti- 
Communist Western Europe. ” Time stated that the Western powers could no longer 
pretend that the Trieste problem would “simply blow away if no one looked.” Their 
strategy regarding the Trieste issue hurt De Gasperi in the last elections, as the Italians 
understood that the Western pledge in 1948 was “no more than a cynical campaign trick.” 
Although the Trieste problem was not the only reason the De Gasperi Government fell,
“a favorable solution could be enough to forestall De Gasperi’s fall, and Italy’s drift from 
the West.” Time asserted that since Tito needed more economic and military aid, the 
ingredients for the Trieste settlement existed “if  Western diplomats find the will and the 
imagination” to cope with the problem.^”
Despite Time's arguments, American policymakers understood that the American 
national interest dictated helping both Italy and Yugoslavia economically and militarily. 
The goal of American foreign policy was to assist both countries in order to secure 
Europe against the Soviet Union. Some American policymakers argued that free world 
security depended on a united Europe, and a communist Yugoslavia oriented toward the 
West made the continent much safer. Continued assistance to Yugoslavia was part o f an 
overall strategy o f creating a strong collective security system against Soviet aggression 
in all parts o f the world, including southeastern Europe. The establishment o f this
30 Time, August 3, 1953.
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important link in this part o f Europe was the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement?^ 
Therefore, it was in the United States’ direct interest to foster “the development of 
friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Italy.” The United States also understood that 
Tito recognized that he could not “expect from the West military and other guarantees he 
requires without reaching some form o f modus vivendi with Italy.” Also, American 
officials were aware that Tito desired an early Trieste solution, but the one that “will not 
lead directly to his downfall,” and thought that the direct Italo-Yugoslav negotiations 
without American interference would bring a lasting solution.^^
Nevertheless, during the summer o f 1953 Italy entered a prolonged period of political 
and ministerial instability. Following an unsuccessful attempt by Attilio Piccioni to form 
a government, another Christian Democrat, Giuseppe Pella, organized one on August 15. 
The Pella government was sworn in on August 17 and received votes o f confidence in the 
Senate on August 23 and in the Chamber on August 24. Pella publicly stated that he 
considered his government a transitional one, “a mere stop gap,” and that he would “run a
For the short term, the United States policy toward Yugoslavia was to still support 
Yugoslavia’s independence. Aid and other forms o f assistance would continue to that 
end. For the long run, the United States would encourage “political and economic 
liberalization” within Yugoslavia. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat, 121-22, 136; “The Acting 
Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy,” May 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1349-53; 
“National Intelligence Estimate,” June 26, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1357-59.
Walter Bedell Smith argued that “ [i]n his efforts to maintain a middle position 
between East and West, and whatever his own ideological aspirations may be, Tito has 
been plagued by all o f the traditions Yugoslav and Balkan foreign policy problems, 
including that posed by past and possibly present Italian aspirations in the Balkans. While 
the external manifestations are admittedly different due to the differing political systems, 
the ‘Italian problem’ is as politically important to Tito as the ‘Trieste problem’ is to the 
Italian Government. Were Tito to yield to what the Yugoslavs consider Italian efforts to 
regain a foothold in the Balkans, and particularly were he to do so under ostensible 
Western pressure, his posture as a Yugoslav patriot, and as the leader o f a ‘national 
communist’ ideology able to hold its own between East and West, would be destroyed.” 
“The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy,” May 25, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 
1954. 8:1349-53.
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quiet caretaker government until the budget was passed.”^̂  Commenting on the new
cabinet, the New York Times said, “Signor Pella has always been a firm supporter o f the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, though. ..he has repeatedly insisted that rearmament 
efforts should not be so great as to bring about a danger of inflation.” The Times also 
cited Pella’s program speech in which he emphasized his loyalty to NATO and firm 
position “in the defense o f Italian interests in Trieste.” In his speech in the Senate, Pella 
made clear that Italy would not ratify EDC until France had done so. He thanked “the 
United States for post-war aid, without which Italian economic reconstruction would not 
been possible,” but stressed that Italy expected from its partners in NATO “help in 
arriving at a satisfactory solution o f the Trieste problems.” '̂*
The position o f Pella’s government was weak and depended on right-wing support 
that would last as long as he satisfied their nationalistic ambitions. Therefore, Pella took 
an uncompromising stand on the FTT. Strongly worded rhetoric on the Trieste dispute 
poured out o f Italy, and in the following months the Yugoslavs responded to the Italians 
with equally strong statements. Arguing that Trieste had “an absolute priority over all 
other Italian foreign matters,” the Pella government pressured the United States and 
Britain to support Italy by continuing to refuse to ratify the EDC treaty. Also toward the 
end o f August, a crisis developed over Trieste that raised the possibility o f a direct 
military confrontation between Italy and Yugoslavia. On August 28, the Yugoslav 
newspaper Politika called a speech by Prime Minister Pella “fresh proof o f  Italy’s
“Editorial Note, ” FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1630. Time wrote: “He [Pella] got the 
benevolent neutrality o f Saragat’s Socialists on the left and the monarchist’s votes on the 
right, and thus won for his government a vote of confidence in the Senate and a 
surprising 100-vote majority in the Lower House. ” Time, September 7, 1953.
New York Times. August 17, 20, 23, 1953.
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unchanged, negative attitude” toward the solution o f the Trieste question. The Yugoslav 
semi-official news agency Yugopress published this report arguing that as a result of the 
Italian policy, many Yugoslavs had become convinced that Yugoslavia’s attitude on the 
question should be “seriously re-examined.” The Italian leaders chose to interpret this 
Yugoslav reaction as a threat to aimex Zone B and responded by sending troops to the 
frontier o f the FTT. Prime Minister Pella threatened that Italy would attempt to occupy 
Zone A, and if the United States and Britain did not accept this move, he would resign, 
thereby jeopardizing Italy’s position in NATO. From the perspective o f the West, which 
still awaited Italian ratification o f the EDC, this was a problematic turn o f  events.^®
Time magazine reported that because of these events “Pella cancelled his plans for a 
vacation, summoned the diplomatic representatives of the US, Britain and France to tell 
them that Italy would not ‘stand idly by.’” This Yugoslav move. Time asserted, was “a 
new campaign to best Italy in the postwar struggle for control of the beautiful old port 
city and the 287-square-mile Free Territory of Trieste that surrounds it.” Time criticized 
the official Yugoslav newspaper Borba for writing that “Italy is completely disqualified 
as a partner to whom it is worth making concessions.” According to Time, while Trieste 
was chiefly an issue of pride and internal prestige with Tito, to Italians it was an issue of 
deep and emotional nationalism, the one that “unites all Italians except the Communists 
(and even many of them).” ®̂
Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954. 419; New York Times, August 30,1953; “Editorial Note,” 
FRUS. 1952-1954,6:1630; “Editorial Noie," FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:242-43; Rabel, 
Between East and West. 148.
Time, September 7, 14, 1953. On September 7, Time declared that “the Yugoslav news 
agency announced that because o f ‘the unconstructive attitude o f Rome,’ Tito’s 
government was in a mood to do something about Trieste. This might mean that Tito
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The New York Times reported that the Italian measures, described in the official 
circles as “precautionary,” were the result o f the publication by the Yugopress news 
agency “of what was taken to be in Rome a semi-official hint.” Although some Italian 
officials thought that the Yugoslav report was only “a trial balloon,” Pella “decided that it 
was unwise to take any chances,” and that it was necessary to show the Yugoslavs that 
“Italy would react most energetically to any move against any part of the Free Territory.” 
He also stated that the report by Yugopress was not the only “threatening symptom” that 
Italy had seen in recent weeks, but that “speeches and newspaper articles” also caused 
uneasiness in Italy. A day later the Times reported from Belgrade that the Yugoslavs 
denied they intended to annex Zone B and declared, “that the aimouncement o f an 
impeding revision in Trieste policy had been misinterpreted.” They accused the Italians 
o f seeking “to create a ‘war atmosphere,’” described the Italian press comments as “a 
deliberate provocation,” and threatened to bring the problem before the “intemationai 
forum” if Italy did not cease “her alleged demonstrations at the Yugoslav frontier
A State Department spokesman, according to the Times, expressed the official United 
States stand that there appeared to be “small prospect of armed conflict over the disputed 
area.” The spokesperson stated that there was every confidence that “the two disputing
plans to annex the Yugoslav occupied zone B o f the Free Territory o f Trieste, in which 
Italy was staked out sizable claims.” Ibid., September 7, 1953.
New York Times, August 30, 31, September 2, 1953. The Times wrote: “The Belgrade 
radio accused Italy and the United States-British command of purposely infiltrating’ 
Italian border areas with [the] Italians to ‘denationalize’ them o f their Slovene 
character. .. These military measures [Italian troop movements] ...were the ‘post-war 
culmination o f the hostile policy toward the Federal People’s Republic o f Yugoslavia that 
has been conducted for a long time by this (Italian) government.’” Ibid., September 2, 
1953.
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governments would work out their difficulties through deliberation and compromise.”^̂  
However, the New York Times perceived the events o f the Trieste dispute differently than 
the officials in Washington. The Times foreign correspondent Cyrus Sulzberger argued 
that recent events revealed the frailty of the Western alliance. He explained: “defensively, 
the Southeast European area is o f vast importance to [western] Allied planning. It 
controls access to the Danube Valley, the Turkish Straits, the Monastir Gap pass into 
Greece and Ljubljana Gap entrance to Italy.” Because Italian-Yugoslav relations had 
gone from bad to worse, “the political state o f the Atlantic alliance’s Eastern flank is by 
no means on a parity with its proper military potential.” For this situation he blamed the 
Western powers, as they promised Italy all of the FTT but were not able “to do anything 
about it.” The Italians warned about their doubtful support o f NATO if  Pella fell and 
some other party came to power, and according to Sulzberger, “this is a gloomy, but not 
illogical prospect.” The article also stated that every power interested directly in the 
Trieste dispute “finds it currently more convenient to keep that subject’s embarrassing 
skeleton locked firmly in the Council cupboard.” ®̂
Luce monitored this new situation. Her perceptions o f the seriousness o f the crisis 
were heightened by a meeting with Pella in which the prime minister told her that the 
“settlement o f Trieste question overshadows any other problem in Italian policy.” By 
chance. Secretary of State Dulles stated in a press conference on the same day that the 
United States was exploring alternative policies on Trieste. He also said that he was
“Department spokesman declined to comment on the allegation broadcast over a 
Yugoslav radio that the United States, and British military authorities in Trieste were 
helping Italy get what she wanted. Neither was there comment on Italian charges that 
Marshal Tito, President o f Yugoslavia, planned to aimex the Zone o f Trieste he 
occupies.” New York Times, September 1, 1953.
New York Times, September, 3, 1953.
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open-minded about the different possibilities, “although none o f them has yet been made 
official.” He explained that the United States “did not put the 1948 declaration in the 
class o f  laws o f  the Medes and Persians, which stand forever.” His statement served to 
“throw the Italian foreign Ministry into confusion” and caused a furor in Italy
Despite their optimistic interpretation o f Dulles’s words, official circles, according to 
the New York Times, felt that “they have been dealt a tremendous blow.” Although they 
understood that it was perhaps unintentional, they were bitter that it came from the 
Untied States “on whose support they thought they could count.” They deemed this 
treatment “completely undeserved” because Italy was always loyal to the United States, 
always followed its lead and never made any trouble. The official stand was reflected in 
the Italian newspapers that wrote, “Italy has kept her commitments for world freedom.
She considers them graven in stone like the laws o f [the] Medes and Persians. She has a
New York Times, September 4, 1953. Luce wrote that “Pella stated that he could agree 
to any foreign policy measure facilities agreements, [the] EDC, NATO commitments et 
cetera if satisfactory settlement were reached concerning Trieste. If  it is not settled, [the] 
US will experience ‘the daily fatigue and frustration’ of dealing with problems of mutual 
interest.” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” September 4, 
1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:248-50. In another telegram Luce reported her conversation 
with the Italian Under Secretary Benvenutti in which he pointed out that “[the] 
consequences o f [the] statement if  unclarified and uncorrected would be as follows: (a) 
incitement of Tito to proclaim on Sunday he was following realistic lead o f [the] USA in 
making new claims in [the] Trieste question; (b) consequent heightening o f Trieste 
tension; (c) solidifying o f anti-American, anti-Western sentiment in Italy, which could 
result in: (1) [the] abandonment o f pro-Western, pro-NATO Italian foreign policy, (2) 
rapid growth o f  power of extremist political elements in Italy, (3) [the] fall o f [the] Pella 
Government when Parliament reassembles. . .He urgently pleaded for immediate 
favorable clarification by [the] Secretary o f his statement, in direction o f [the] reiteration 
of adherence to [the] ‘spirit o f  tripartite declaration,’ especially [the] fundamental 
principles concerning [the] ethnical and historical claims o f Italy. ” Luce concluded that 
the “[p]lain fact o f [the] matter is that none of above estimates o f  Italian public reaction is 
greatly exaggerated and that failure (a) to clarify [the] Secretary’s statement immediately, 
(b) seek rapid solution o f [the] question, ” would damage current American policy in 
Europe. “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f  State, ” September 4,
1953, FRUS, I952-I954, 8:250-52.
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right to remind her friends that their commitments also must be unalterable.” Some “more 
hysterical” newspapers went so far to make comparisons between Italy’s and 
Yugoslavia’s military strength as though war between the two was imminent.^*
Time reported that recent events could cause Italy to boycott NATO. It wrote that 
Dulles’s statement took place “at the most indelicate moment possible,” and quoted 
Rome’s conservative II Tempo, which wrote, “This sets off irreparably from the U. S. a 
block o f 47 million inhabitants of one o f the most civilized countries in the world...and 
opens the rosiest horizons for Malenkov and Togliatti.” Time as usual criticized 
American policy toward Trieste, warning that “unless the Western powers replace their 
lassitude and ineptitude about Trieste with some diplomacy, they stand in great danger of 
losing Italy as a firm friend and cold-war ally.”^̂
The Italian Foreign Office informed Luce that failure to clarify the Secretary’s 
statement would heighten tension over Trieste, increase anti-American sentiment in Italy, 
and possibly trigger the fall o f the Pella government. Luce accepted this “estimate of 
Italian public reaction.” She warned the State Department that failure to find a “rapid 
solution o f the question, will result in great harm to USA-Italian relations and prolong 
tension that will endanger not only the hiture o f a moderate pro-American government in 
Italy, but might crack wide open NATO system in Europe.”^̂
Desperate to get some action. Luce sought to use her high-level contacts in the 
Eisenhower administration. She first personally telephoned Dulles telling him how 
serious the Trieste situation was, and then wrote a few days later her understanding of the
New York Times, September 5,1953. 
Time, September 14, 1953.
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State,” September 4, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:250-52.
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current situation to the State Department and to Jackson. Luce emphasized that the 
danger in Rome was not exaggerated and expressed the wish that Dulles would have “a 
good look at it himself.” She successfully prompted Dulles to reassure the Italians that 
the American policy o f returning Trieste to Italy had not changed. Dulles publicly 
stressed to Mario Luciolli, minister and charge d ’affaires o f the Rome diplomatic 
mission, “the cordial friendship, allegiance and solidarity o f the democratic nations.”^  
The New York Times wrote that the atmosphere between Italy and the United States 
improved after Luce’s long conversation with Pella. The Times also believed that Luce 
gave Pella the text o f the remarks on the Trieste situation and “was able to assure Signor 
Pella that the Italian deductions drawn from them were exaggerated and that no 
fundamental change in United States policy on Trieste has taken place.”^̂
Luce continued to write to the State Department proposing policies that should 
demonstrate Italy’s importance to the United States. She indicated that the least the 
United States government could do for Italy was to allow it to annex Zone A. She 
concluded that this “current situation regarding Trieste may logically develop in such 
manner...[so] that [the] Italian Government could accept a Zone A-Zone B split without 
imposing upon us [the] necessity o f  supporting further Italian claims.”^  Luce ar̂ v̂-cd for 
a solution that was realistic. She comprehended that the division o f the zones, and the 
return of Zone A to Italy would strengthen Pella’s government and put it on an equal 
basis with the Yugoslavs. This suggests that Luce understood that the best solution for
** “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary o f 
State, ” September 5, 1953, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:258-59; Rabel, Between East and West, 
148; New York Times, September 6, 1953.
New York Times, September 6, 1953.
^  “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” September 5, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:262-63.
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the Trieste problem was zonal division o f the FTT, not the Tripartite Declaration. 
Although, this was a realistic proposal, the way it was put in place produced a serious 
crisis that threatened to become an armed conflict rather than the possibility for direct 
negotiations.
In the meantime, Yugoslavia rejected proposals for plebiscite and division along 
current zonal lines.'*  ̂The Yugoslavs stated that they had no need to annex Zone B 
because they were already there. They proposed internationalization of the city o f Trieste 
and cession to Yugoslavia o f all the FTT around the port city. Tito, on September 6, 
explicitly stated that: “Pella is wrong if  he believes that he is going to achieve something 
in this w ay.. possibly grab Zone A. We can frankly say before the whole world ‘no’, we 
will not allow the occupation o f Zone A.” ®̂ Italian circles believed that Tito’s speech was 
“intemperate and extremely intransigent and that this has made direct negotiations 
extremely difficult if not impossible.” The Italians hoped that at least the recent events 
had awakened the Western powers “to the explosive nature o f the question and taught 
them that they must bestir themselves to get it out o f the way as soon as possible.” The 
Italians also argued that with this stand, Tito proved what they had been saying for years: 
that he behaved in Zone B o f the FTT not as an administrator, but as a “master.” The
New York Times. September 14, 29, 1953. The Times reported that “Yugoslavia 
formally rejected today a proposal by Italy for a plebiscite. . ..In replying to the Italian 
note, the Yugoslavs stressed they could not consider a plebiscite unless concrete 
measures were undertaken to ameliorate ‘ denationalization ’ o f the Trieste area caused by 
the alleged discrimination against the Slovenes and the Croats.” Ibid., September 29, 
1953; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 427.
“Editorial Note,” FRC/5. 1952-1954, 8:263.
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Italian press o f  all political opinions also criticized violently the Yugoslav stand using 
words like “overbearing” and “insolent.” ’̂
Tito ridiculed and denounced the Italian Government in Rome. He stated that his 
speech responded to “the Italian plans to prepare for the annexation of Zone A and [their 
intention] to see what Yugoslavia would do about it.” Italians were warned that 
Yugoslavia was “not going to send troops to the border but Yugoslav troops can get there 
‘in due time’ if  necessary.” Tito explained the reasons Yugoslavia was alert to the Italian 
moves. Yugoslavia had had “bad experiences” with the West on the Trieste dispute as 
result o f the 1948 United States-British-French declaration “calling for restoration of the 
entire Free Territory to Italy and the London agreement of 1951 by which Italy joined in 
administering Zone A. ” He called on the Western powers to “be objective, and not pour 
oil on fire.”®°
Despite these Yugoslav warnings. Luce continued to write in favor of the Italian side 
and as the Trieste situation “progressively worsened, ” she explained to Jackson in detail 
why an adverse outcome o f the Trieste question for Italy would also be a moral, 
diplomatic, strategic and political blow for the United States. She believed that there 
could be a solution to Trieste by which the United States would lose neither Italy’s pro- 
American government nor the help of Yugoslavia’s divisions in case o f war with the 
Soviets. The United States had to act fast and find a solution acceptable for both 
countries. Although, Luce stated that it was possible for the United States to satisfy both 
countries, her proposal to Jackson was one-sided. She emphasized only the importance o f
New York Times, September 8, 1953.
50 New York Times. September 14, 1953.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
Italy, and underestimated the value o f Yugoslavia for the United States. Among other 
things she wrote:
The loss o f Italian friendship for the U.S. which must inevitably follow an adverse 
decision for Italy on Trieste, would divest Eisenhower’s foreign policy of much moral 
coherence. .. To win a weak Italy in 1948 with a promise we refüse to live up 
to,.. .[and] to lose a stronger Italy in 1953, when as is now happening the chips are 
being put down.^*
In another memorandum Luce wrote to Jackson, she appended an intriguing note for
Eisenhower’s information. She penned this note in June after the Italian elections but had
not sent it, she said, because “the Korean pot was boiling, and I felt it was one thing more
to harass the President. I wish I had sent it.” Luce believed her evaluation in verse was
now even more valid and she wrote that her estimate was:
A brief if  unorthoxically phrased estimate o f the situation in Italy, based on the 
assumption that nothing ever will be done to bring about a satisfactory solution to the 
Trieste question:
For the want o f Trieste, an Issue was lost.
For the want of and Issue, the Election was lost.
For the want o f the Election, DeGasperi was lost.
For the want o f DeGasperi, his NATO policies were lost.
For the want of his NATO policies, Italy was lost.
For the want o f Italy, Europe was lost.
For the want o f Europe, America.. .?
And all for the want o f a two-penny town.^^
This assessment was “extreme and somewhat farfetched” even given the assumption 
that ambassadors tend to sympathize with the interests o f the country where they are 
serving. Still, Luce’s admonitions did have some impact in Washington. In late
^'Luce argued that “however great a case the Pentagon can make for Tito’s divisions in 
the event o f war with the Kremlin, a greater case can be made for the wisdom o f not 
letting Italy check out of NATO. ” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President’s 
f e c ia l  Assistant (Jackson),” September 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:264-66.
 ̂ “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President’s Special Assistant (Jackson),” June 
30, 1953, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:267.
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September, as Italo-Yugoslav tensions remained high, Jackson passed on Luce’s message
and a memorandum to the president backing her arguments:
I am sure that you agree that the solution o f the Trieste problem rates the very highest 
priority. The situation, which in 1948 was soluble very easily, has already steadily 
deteriorated since then and is going to deteriorate still further as the months go by .... 
Necessary, as it is to remain on working terms with Tito, I doubt if by any stretch of 
the imagination a Trieste solution which didn’t give Tito everything he had asked for 
would drive him back into the arms o f Moscow or into war with Italy.... I personally 
don’t think that the prospect o f Tito's temporary anger and /or threats stocks up against 
the prospect o f losing Italy, which is very conceivable if  the Trieste solution does not 
include giving Italy Zone A, including the town o f Trieste.^^
Jackson noted that high-level policymakers appreciated the urgency o f the situation, 
and he suggested that the President discuss the matter with Dulles and set a deadline for 
the State Department to bring about a solution. Jackson included a copy o f Luce’s poem 
in the memorandum. Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that a short verse o f Clare Boothe 
Luce "may have been a little overdrawn, but it held considerable truth.” He passed on the 
memorandum to the Secretary of State querying, "what are we doing about the Trieste 
affair? Ever since I returned to Europe in January o f ‘5 0 ,1 have been expecting some 
kind of solution within the month.” Dulles replied that “we are pushing this vigorously 
and I would not yet give up hope that it may be settled ‘within the month.’”®'*
“Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant (Jackson) to the President,” 
September 29, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:281; Rabel, Between East and West, 149-50.
“The President to the Secretary of State,” September 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
8:282. In another memorandum on October 1, 1953, Dulles replied to the President 
Eisenhower saying, “As I think I said to you orally, it [Trieste] may be settled within the 
month.’ I say this with more hope since this is the first day of the month.” October 1, 
1953, FRUS 1952-1954, 8:282. The Secretary expressed on October 1, 1953, his personal 
concern over the Trieste crisis and the real need to take a constructive step at this point. 
During the secret consultations in Washington Dulles mentioned that “the President also 
had been following this problem and only the other day had addressed a personal note to 
the Secretary about it.” Dulles also quoted the permanent remarks of the President 
concerning “the urgency o f action toward resolving this disturbing and critical Trieste 
problem.” “Memorandum o f Conversation, by the Director o f the Office o f Western
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After writing to the President, Jackson assured Luce that he agreed with her 
assessments o f September 7 and promised to introduce her ideas “into the labyrinth 
immediately.” He also said that Luce’s “Estimate” from June 30 was going to be “an 
invaluable ally.” According to Jackson, the problem with the Trieste crisis was more 
administrative than political, because all the top people agreed with the urgency of the 
problem. But it was difficult to translate that into whole-hearted actions at lower levels. 
Jackson optimistically promised to do everything he could to remind the others o f the 
urgency o f the Trieste problem and to settle the crisis within the next ninety days.®®
The American policymakers had good reason to be optimistic about the Trieste 
dispute. State Department officials had been consulting the British throughout September 
and were now proposing to London a variant of the plan for a Zone A-Zone B division 
that the British themselves had advocated since 1952. After British foreign minister 
Anthony Eden visited Tito in Belgrade, he reported that Tito and Edvard Kardelj, the 
Yugoslav vice-premier, “both agreed that they would acquiesce in the permanency of the 
present division between zones provided that it was pressed upon them by others. Tito
European Affairs (Byington),” October 1, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:283-85; 
Eisenhower, Mandate fo r  Change, 409.
® Jackson also wrote to Luce: “It’s absolutely fantastic the way we have managed to get 
ourselves stuck with all the wrong words and images. Being for peace, we continue to use 
‘war’ and ‘warfare’ in connection with all our activities, psychological and other;... As to 
Trieste, I couldn’t agree with you more. This whole sorry, long-drawn-out, downhill 
performance is a perfect illustration o f routine thinking by a lot o f people who will go to 
any lengths in order to avoid facing up to a problem. It is strictly out o f the ‘let the dust 
settle’ department, in spite o f the fact that even a double-yoke egghead should know by 
now that the dust never settles by itself, but invariably develops into a twister.... I will do 
everything I possibly can to remind the others o f this fact forcefully and frequently.”
“The President’s Special Assistant (Jackson) to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce), ” October 
2, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:288-89.
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would not and could not volunteer this solution.”®̂ Eden had the impression that if  it 
appeared to the Yugoslav public to be forced on Yugoslavia, Tito would accept the 
division o f the FTT along current boundaries. The State Department followed Eden’s 
advice that in order to resolve this situation the division o f the FTT and “vigorous 
intervention” was essential. Despite objections from both the American and the British 
embassies in Belgrade, the State Department believed such a move was necessitated by 
the persistent failure o f the Italo-Yuguslav negotiations and by the recent tensions. Dulles 
wrote to Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary o f State for European Affairs, that the 
President endorsed a Zone A-Zone B solution and suggested “the possibility be explored 
that we might get Yugoslavia and Italy to agree upon some form of arbitration by the US- 
UK-France, and perhaps Western Germany, with the knowledge of both sides in advance 
that a Zone A-Zone B system would be adopted.” Eisenhower expressed his preference 
for some form of partition of the FTT in the conversation with Secretary Dulles. 
Eisenhower, however, felt that it would be impossible to amend the Italian peace treaty of 
1947 to achieve partition because the Soviet Union would block such an amendment. He 
recalled that it had seemed at that time that the solution o f the Trieste issue lay in some 
informal device to recognize and make permanent the existing boundaries between Zone 
A and B.®’
®* Eden, Full Circle, 201.
®’ “Memorandum by the Secretary o f State to the Assistant Secretary o f State for 
European Affairs (Merchant),” September 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954,8:267-68; 
Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 413. Eden wrote: “These discussions with the 
Yugoslavs convinced me that if there was ever to be a solution o f the Trieste problem, it 
would have to be imposed, after being carefully prepared. Neither side could take the 
political risk of accepting a proposal from the other. But if  the United States and the 
United Kingdom were to declare that they regarded the zonal boundary as permanent and 
hand over the administration of Zone A to Italy, there was a chance that the shock would
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In her telegram to the State Department, Luce reported her conversation with Pella 
and again emphasized that the solution o f the Trieste question was necessary for the 
future o f Italy’s Atlantic policy. Pella believed that the question had to be resolved “in 
accordance with the premises and principle o f the March 20 declaration,” and “on an 
equal basis” by which he meant total occupation o f Zone A. Luce argued that the Italian 
occupation o f Zone A must precede any future conference that the allied powers 
organized between Italy and Yugoslavia. The failure to find a quick solution would create 
intense difficulties for Pella in Parliament, and possibly lead toward an anti-Allied policy 
that would deleteriously affect the entire Western system. The State Department replied 
to Luce that a series o f steps had been considered to acquire for Italy the “equality” Pella 
so strongly desired. The State Department expressed its entire agreement with Luce’s 
views regarding the urgency o f putting the plan into action. These documents, as well as 
later interviews from major participants, reveal that Luce strongly influenced subsequent 
events and that her role in the Trieste issue was crucial.®^
On September 11, Dulles suggested a preliminary proposal for the solution of the 
Trieste problem, by the beginning o f October, it became the final one. Dulles explained 
that the present tensions created a situation in which a solution to the Trieste issue might
eventually produce a reluctant agreement between the two protagonists. ” Eden, Full 
Circle, 202-3,205.
®* “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” September 9, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:270-72. The Department of State wrote to Luce that “a series of 
steps was being considered designed to accomplish for Italy the ‘equality,’...[t]he 
Department suggested that Luce, at her discretion, discuss in utmost secrecy with Pella 
the fact that the Department was considering a way in which Italy could be given equality 
with Yugoslavia in the Trieste matter.” Ibid. Thompson, American negotiator, said in 
1971 that Luce was instrumental in getting the process started. He said: “that was really 
almost her only role, but it was important one.” Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 24-25, 
36-37.
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be achieved along Zone A and B lines. This solution could “relieve [the] US, UK, and
France of present embarrassing responsibilities and commitments, and ultimately pave
the way for that collaboration in mutual defense for the portion o f Europe which... is
essential in common interest o f West.” Dulles suggested that the Department’s thinking
was conditioned on one hand by Italian suggestions that under certain circumstances that
government could live with a de facto  Zone A-B solution. On the other hand, he implied
that the United States believed that
a) [the] recent Tito position [was] made primarily for bargaining purposes, b) [the] 
single most important factor in Yugoslav foreign policy today is [the] necessity [to] 
progress further with military cooperation with [the] West,...[and] c) Tito [is] still 
basically willing to settle for [a] Zone A-B solution.®’
All o f these reasons suggested that a solution was possible and once Tito annexed 
Zone B, the US and UK would infonn Pella that the United States and Great Britain 
would turn over administration of Zone A to Italy. Dulles also believed that this action 
should be a US and UK responsibility and that both countries should move bilaterally 
without the French “until such point as it would prove useful to include them.” This 
suggestion was problematic and later created a crisis, because Dulles was only predicting 
how the Yugoslavs would react without including them in the talks and plans about the 
division o f the FTT.^
®’ “The Secretary o f State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, ” September 11, 1953, 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:273-77.
^  Dulles pointed out in his telegram to the Embassy that “it is impractical to propose 
agreed partition to Yugoslavia at this time, that turning over Zone A to [the] Italians [is] 
highly dangerous and that [the] internationalization [of the] entire FTT [is the] best 
terrain to explore.” He continued: “We must take into account that internationalization 
would never, under any circumstances, be accepted by the Italians. We also regard it as 
impractical and dangerous. Moreover, the history o f [the] secret negotiations between 
[the] Yugoslavs and [the] Italians has always indicated that Tito would settle for a Zone 
A- Zone B division. .. It is believed that [the] plan outlined... avoids [the] risk
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Although Luce wanted the division of the FTT, she was not yet satisfied with the
Secretary’s solution. She urged the State Department to include in the final proposal a
statement noting the “provisional” character o f the US and UK action. Luce noted that
Pella emphasized “repeatedly [the] need for some [kind of] provisional character in our
proposals that would make it possible for him to accept without being open to [the]
charge that he had agreed in advance on a Zone A-Zone B settlement.” In another
telegram. Luce stressed to the Department o f State that:
We will now be imposing on [a] Pella definitive flat de facto  Zone A-B solution which 
...DeGasperi has consistently refused and Pella has publicly announced he will never 
accept. When [the] contents of official demarche become known they will be 
denounced by all parties here and there will follow [a] loss o f prestige for [the] Pella 
government... [The] Embassy feels [the] imposition o f this now plainly definite 
official plan will have painful consequences to our basic interest vis-à-vis Italy.
While Clare Luce was pressuring the State Department to solve the Trieste impasse,
Italian and Yugoslav officials were publicly and unsuccessfully proposing different
solutions. The Yugoslavs rejected the Italian proposal for a plebiscite in the FTT that
“would decide whether the area should go to either country.” They also rejected not only
a five-power conference to discuss a plebiscite but also “any international conference on
the Trieste dispute.” The Yugoslavs informed the Western powers of their “desire to
envisioned by Belgrade and should be given a trial as [the] most promising constructive 
step at this juncture in a situation which is steadily deteriorating. ” Ibid. There followed 
two weeks o f intensive discussions involving the British and United States Governments 
and their respective representatives in Rome and Belgrade. In general, the United States 
officials continued to believe it possible to guide Italy and Yugoslavia into each aimexing 
a zone. The British ofGcials, while basically in agreement with the plan, were more 
skeptical o f the chances for success. “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:279-80; 
Rabel, Between East and West, 150-51.
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f  State,” October 7, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 8:296-97; “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” 
October 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:297-98; “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the 
Department o f State,” October 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:299-300.
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bring Austria into the administration o f the port city o f Trieste under the 
internationalization plan,” and in that way, “introduced a new factor in the current 
dispute.” They also proposed new bilateral talks with Italy on the Trieste dispute. The 
vice president and former foreign minister Edvard Kardelj said, “It was not too late for 
such talks.” He pointed out that Yugoslavia would “prefer a direct Yugoslav-Italian 
agreement” to other processes for reaching an accord. Then he referred to the Tripartite 
declaration from 1948 and warned, “those in Rome must realize that no one has and no 
one can have the means to force Yugoslavia to accept a foreign dictate.”^̂  Italian official 
circles “saw no possible basis of an Italian-Yugoslav understanding on Trieste in the 
speech delivered by Kardelj.” They understood his offer more as “an effort to confuse the 
Trieste issue than as an honest effort to negotiate,” and were determined not to enter into 
the negotiations on the basis that Kardelj outlined.^®
During September, there was no indication that Italy and Yugoslavia could find a 
satisfactory solution without Western interference. Some Italian newspapers began to 
speculate that “a new British plan for the partition o f the Trieste Free Territory is under 
discussion in Western capitals.” The New York Times reported from an “unimpeachable 
Italian source” that it would be a matter of hours until “a joint United States-British- 
French step may furnish the basis for a solution o f the Trieste problem.” The source 
revealed that the three powers would place Italy on terms o f complete equality with 
Yugoslavia “by giving her precisely the same position in Zone A o f the Free Territory of 
Trieste as Yugoslavia has in Zone B.” This source also suggested that this proposal was 
originally made by Clare Luce and stated, “the British were cold on the plan at first and it
New York Times, September 14,23,26,29,30, and October 5, 1953. 
New York Times, October 6, 1953.
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was only Mrs. Luce’s insistence that kept her suggestion from being discarded. Finally 
the plan was accepted by France and then by Britain.” The State Department officials 
rejected this report and responded that “there had been no decision on any settlement 
proposal.” They explained the recent consultations with the British and French as 
preparing “the ground for direct negotiations between the Italian and Yugoslav 
Governments.”^
However, the British and Americans had secretly agreed, after long consideration o f 
tactics and timing at the highest Government levels, to present Italy and Yugoslavia with 
a fa it accompli by declaring that they had decided to withdraw their troops from Zone A 
and to allow Italy to take control o f the area. On October 8, the United States and British 
governments announced publicly that the city o f Trieste and the entire Zone A would be 
incorporated into Italy, as “the only practicable method o f breaking the impasse between 
Italy and Yugoslavia on this question.” They did not mention Zone B, nor did the allies 
attempt to allay predictable Yugoslav concerns regarding, for instance, protection o f the 
Slav minority in Zone A or safeguards for Yugoslav economic interests in Trieste. One of 
the announcement’s weakest points was American and British failure to declare the 
finality o f the settlement.®®
Nevertheless, from the Washington’s perspective the solution appeared very 
promising. On October 8 the President himself stressed the issue’s broader geopolitical 
and strategic implications; “Today... the British and American governments made public 
a previously agreed upon position with respect to Trieste.” Secretary Dulles in a telegram
^  New York Times. October 7, 1953.
®® “Editorial Note.” FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:302-3; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954,428-29; 
Rabel, Between East and West, 150; Unger, Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 19-20; 
Eden, Full Circle, 205.
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to Luce expressed his gratitude for “the skillful way in which you have handled the 
delicate and important program for Trieste.” Dulles believed that the first reactions 
indicated that the operation would be successful and “we hope and believe that your 
handling o f the matters will enhance our prestige in Italy.” Luce thanked the Secretary for 
his message and replied, “The consequences o f your Trieste decision must inevitably 
create difficulties elsewhere but 1 believe they will be overcome and be compensated for 
by increasing Italian cooperation with your European policies as the result o f a great 
improvement in Italian-American relations.”®®
The New York Times commented that the US and British announcement was in direct 
contradiction to information made available earlier by the State Department. It 
complained that “both at a public news conference and in answer to private inquiries. 
United States officials disclaimed any knowledge o f an impending decision on Trieste.” 
Nevertheless, it reported the reasons for the announcement and the different reactions in 
Italy and Yugoslavia. The Times wrote that the United States and Britain thought their 
action would “contribute to the stabilization o f a situation which has disturbed the Italo- 
Yugoslav relations during recent years.” Several factors were seen as contributing to the 
announcement: “A threat loomed that the Italian parliament might refuse to ratify the 
EDC unless assured of an acceptable solution to the Trieste dispute; .. and if a decision 
does ‘stabilize’ Italian-Yugoslav relations, as officials said it would, a conspicuously
®® “Editorial Note, ” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:303-4; Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 414; 
Rabel, Between East and West, 150-51. Before the official announcement was made. 
Luce informed Pella “that he shortly might receive a proposal that the United States 
Government hoped would help to bring about a solution o f the Trieste problem. ” New 
York Times, October 8, 1953.
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weak link in the chain of Western defense could be strengthened.” A secondary factor 
was also noted: “Britain’s desire to move those [3,000] troops elsewhere.”®’
The Italians, who could regain Zone A without having to renounce formally their 
claims to Zone B, greeted the step with joy and the Italian Foreign Ministry praised the 
“loyal attitude” of the United States and Britain. Premier Pella and his Cabinet 
“expressed satisfaction over the developments and announced its intention of continuing 
to ‘defend Italian rights’ in Zone B of the Free Territory, which Yugoslavia occupies.” 
The Italians believed that the announcement opened “a new phase in Italy’s efforts to 
regain Zone B which Italy regards as her rightful territory.” They considered the return o f 
Zone A to Italy as “the first payment on the debt the United States, Britain and France 
contracted in 1948.” Thus, they stressed publicly the “provisional” nature of this 
settlement as a first step in implementing the Tripartite Proposal. Some Italian 
newspapers, according to the Times, “expressed gratitude to the United States and 
Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, to whom authorship o f the Allied plan is generally 
attributed. ” Some o f them, like Corriere della Serra o f Milan claimed, “Perhaps never in 
the whole history has a great nation owed so much to so small, fragile and gentle a 
woman.” Premier Pella also thanked the United States for the Trieste move and even 
proposed a mixed committee to work out details of how Trieste and Zone A “were to 
change over from Allied to Italian administration.”®̂
To Yugoslavia, the announcement came as a great surprise and was received with 
anger and dismay. It sparked mass demonstrations in Belgrade against the United States
®’ New York Times, October 8, 9, 1953. 
®® New York Times, October 9, 11, 1953.
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and Britain. The Yugoslavs sent troops to Zone B and to the Italian frontier.®’ The 
Yugoslavs were outraged that they had not been consulted and demanded that the 
decision on Trieste be reversed. The Yugoslav government stated that it “would fight the 
decision in the United Nations and protest to the United States and Britain.” The 
Yugoslavs argued that the American and British decision was a “violation of the Italian 
peace treaty of 1947, and warned that the move would increase tension between Italy and 
Yugoslavia and that Belgrade would not bear the ‘historical responsibility’” for that.
They also stated that the announcement was a unilateral decision that “would merely 
encourage Italian imperialism.” The Times reported that crowds of the Yugoslav 
demonstrators “smashed windows at the United States and British embassies and the 
Italian Legation,” and that communist leaders organized parades “composed largely o f 
youths, some policemen, and soldiers, and many children.” They “were singing songs in 
praise o f Marshal Tito and shouting patriotic slogans, including Trieste is ours.’”’°
The Yugoslav reaction derived from the wounded pride o f Tito and the Yugoslav 
people. The Yugoslavs regarded these unilateral decisions as an inheritance o f the 
imperialistic policy o f the great powers, which had been determining the destiny o f 
smaller nations without consulting them. Moreover, they were more hurt because the 
settlement was not final and did not say anything about the future o f Zone B and the 
protection of the Slovenian minority in Zone A. In his speech at Leskovac on October 10, 
Tito pointed out these factors and reaffirmed his previous position declaring, “he would
®’ Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954, 430. On October 10, “Yugoslavia moved armed 
reinforcements into Zone B ” but their numbers “was not disclosed.” The Times also 
stated that “Under the occupation agreement Yugoslavia was allowed to have 5,000 
troops in Zone B, but it has been estimated that her forces there were not at full strength.’ 
New York Times, October I I , 1953.
New York Times, October 10, I I , 1953.
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regard any entry by [the] Italian troops into Zone A as an act o f aggression against 
Yugoslavia.” Tito made clear that the moment Italy entered Zone A, Yugoslavia would 
follow, and warned that he would “use every means to protect [the] Yugoslav rights, 
‘including armed forces.’” He also said that the Yugoslav patience had come to an end 
and that the nation “was going into action.” If the Allies did not accept his demands, “that 
means that they do not want our friendship, that they do not respect our interests but that 
they want to satisfy Italian imperialism.” As far as the Yugoslav dependence on the 
Western aid was concerned, he emphasized, “his people had their pride,” and although 
they were grateful for it, they could not sell their “blood-soaked ” country for aid. Tito 
vowed to “refuse aid if this is the situation,” and proclaimed to the West: ’Here we are 
with an outstretched hand if you want a proud nation for a fnend. This act has thrown 
doubts in our hearts. Correct it before it is too late, otherwise it may never be 
corrected.””
Tito asserted that the Italian leaders under fascism “were “not much worse’ than the 
present leaders in Rome.” Several times he referred to the Italian aggression of the past 
and related it to Pella’s assurance to parliament that Italy’s claims on Zone B would not 
be renounced. In his other speech in Skoplje Tito declared, “Today they [the Italians] 
want Istria and Trieste. Their hands are too short. Today there is another Yugoslavia, 
which has the strength and energy to oppose Italian expansionism.” And he repeated that 
at the moment an Italian soldier put his foot in Zone A, ‘“we will enter it.”’^
”  “‘Editorial Note, ” FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:303-4; New York Times. October 11, 1953; 
Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 433; RjiAiel, Between East and West, 151.
New York Times, October 11, 12, 1953; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 432.
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The New York Times sharply criticized all sides involved in the conflict. Tito was 
castigated for denouncing the American and British decision because he “began to 
reverse his bargaining position, and raised his price considerably.” The previous year, the 
Times argued, Tito had reached a private agreement with the British foreign minister 
Anthony Eden “on temporary Italian rule o f Zone A and was eager to get a commitment 
from Britain to defend Yugoslavia if that communist country should be attacked by the 
Soviet Union or its satellites.” According to the British sources, Tito was realistic then, 
but after the Italian June elections, the New York Times continued, he changed his 
position and wanted the internationalization of the FTT on a permanent basis.”
The Times also criticized the way the Americans and British handled the October 8 
decision. It reported that some diplomats “thought it was a mistake for the United States 
to imply, as it has been doing, that the present ‘settlement’ was a brainchild of Mrs. Clare 
Boothe Luce.” The Times argued that this mistake had temporarily increased her 
popularity, but there would be an adverse reaction “when the Italians realize that the plan 
will ultimately mean effective partition o f the Free Territory, with Zone B remaining 
Yugoslav.” The method and timing were “unfortunate,” as was the Western failure “to 
give Yugoslavia explicit guarantees that Rome would never again be permitted to take an 
active interest in Albania,” Yugoslavia’s southern neighbor. The Times argued that 
despite Italy’s formal renunciation of any claims in Albania in a 1947 peace treaty, it was 
“an open secret that Italy’s secret service have retained Albanian contacts.” And what
73 Ibid., October 9, 1953.
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was for the Times even more disturbing in the whole Trieste dispute was “to observe both
Yugoslavia and Italy claiming Trieste when neither can support the city.”’'*
As the situation grew increasingly dangerous, there was a chance that Anglo-
American forces might be involved in a new military conflict. The Italian and Yugoslav
armies faced each other, with about fifty thousand soldiers lined up along the border. The
Trieste pot was boiling, to use Luce’s metaphor. The Italian official circles had “a serious
view of the situation,” and Rome pointed out that “if Marshal Tito means what he says,
war is likely to break out in Zone A if the Italians take it over in accordance with
decisions of Washington and London. ” However, they still believed that the Western
powers would not allow Tito “to start a private war of his own against Italy.”’® Most
American policymakers doubted that Yugoslavia would employ force in the dispute over
the transfer o f Zone A to Italy, although they were aware that the “Yugoslav Communist
leaders have never been prepared to sacrifice major political objectives for [an] economic
advantage.” They also understood that because of his strong stand on the Trieste dispute,
Tito received unanimous support “from his worst enemies” for the first time since he
came to power, and created an “extraordinary outburst of anti-Western feeling.” Some
analysts urged that the United States aid could be cut off if  Tito did not “demonstrate
self-control,” because “Yugoslavia needs the United States more than it needs her.” They
emphasized Yugoslav responsibility for future American-Yugoslav relations arguing that
the Yugoslav leaders would determine whether they want
To sacrifice their long-range political objectives in the Balkans for the economic, 
financial, military and political support they have been receiving from the United
’'* Ibid., October, 17, 1953.
’® Ibid., October 12, 1953; Rabel, Between East and West. 151; Novak, Trieste. 1941- 
1954. 434.
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States government or whether they are to sacrifice American support and go it alone 
as best as they can...in pursuing the principal objectives in their foreign policy.’®
Because o f the possibility o f armed conflict, the Anglo-American powers decided not
to withdraw their troops from Zone A. Interestingly enough, the United States and Britain
faced the very situation they had hoped to avoid by issuing their statement of October 8.
Dulles believed that the United States and the United Kingdom had taken an action they
considered to be acceptable to Yugoslavia and designed to solve a troublesome problem.
Nevertheless, the October crisis forced the US and British to come up with a solution that
set in motion the process leading to a final settlement through a negotiated compromise.”
One o f the direct consequences o f the October 8 decision that the United States and
Britain had to face immediately was the Soviet protest against the announcement.
Moreover, on October 12, the Soviets sent a note to the governments o f the United States
and Britain that further complicated the matters. According to the note, the October 8
decision represented “a gross violation of the conditions o f the peace treaty with Italy
relating to the setting up o f a Free Territory of Trieste.” The Soviets also said that the
partition o f the FTT was “incompatible with the tasks of maintaining peace and security
and can provoke only new complications in that part o f Europe.” They concluded, “the
facts show that the latest violation by the Governments o f [the] U. S. and Britain o f the
peace treaty with Italy inevitably leads to increased fiiction in international relations,”
and argued that the entire responsibility for the consequence o f this “flagrant” violation
rested on the United States and Britain.’  ̂The Soviet Union raised the Trieste question in
the United Nations Security Council by demanding the establishment o f the FTT as
’® New York Times October 13, 14, 16, 1953. 
”  Rabel, Between East and West, 152.
78 Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954,433-34; New York Times, October 13, 14, 1953.
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specified in the permanent statute, but this time they posed as governor a Swiss candidate 
whom Britain had originally nominated in 1947. Despite their differences, the Italian and 
Yugoslav governments had one thing in common: “they both opposed the establishment 
o f an FTT.” Hence, the Western powers could represent both interested states by refusing 
the Soviet proposal and postponing the discussion in the United Nations.”
On October 12 the Yugoslavs called for a four-power conference involving the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Yugoslavia to consider the Trieste matter. The 
Western powers were pleased with the Yugoslav proposal to convene a four-power 
conference, and most American policymakers agreed that it was better to proceed with 
plans to arrange a conference than to refer the matter to the United Nations. Secretary 
Dulles said that seeking a United Nation solution was an undesirable alternative to be 
used only as a last resort “to save our own faces were we to admit defeat.
Several obstacles stood in the way o f serious four power discussions on the future of 
the FTT. Yugoslavia responded that it would participate only if  the announcement of
”  Rabel, Between East and West, 153; New York Times. October 14, 1953.
Rabel, Between East and West, 152-53. In a memorandum Durward Sandifer wrote to 
Dulles, he stated that “In recent years the subject o f Trieste has been handled outside the 
United Nations, rather than in it, and we have for various reasons allowed the solution 
envisaged in the Italian Peace Treaty of the Free Territory o f Trieste to fall into 
abeyance.” “Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary o f State for United Nations 
Affairs (Sandifer) to the Secretary o f State,” October 26, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:327- 
28. In a memorandum of October 28 to Merchant, Secretary Dulles said he had seen text 
commenting on the possibility o f bringing the Trieste matter to the United Nations. The 
Secretary noted that he disapproved o f this course o f action, but he said it was “barely 
possible that there would be merit in suggesting a peace observation commission in 
Trieste which would report on the use o f force in violation o f Article 2.” Dulles stated his 
assumption that the Soviet Union would veto such a proposal in the Security Council 
unless it were a member of the commission, which was something the United States 
could not permit. On November 4, when the Trieste issue was to be discussed in the 
Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France supported a motion 
by Columbia to postpone debate on the issue again. Only the Soviet Union voted against 
this motion. Ibid., 8:328.
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October 8 was not carried o u t/ ' Italy accepted the proposal for the conference but added 
two conditions. It insisted that the announcement o f October 8 had to be put into effect 
before any conference could take place, and it sought to include France in the conference. 
Pella explained that Italy was willing to participate in a five-power conference if  it were 
“placed on a footing of perfect equality with Yugoslavia.” That could be achieved only 
by “handling over the administration of Zone A to Italy or by Yugoslav withdrawal from 
Zone B.” If  the United States and Britain decided not to proceed with the October 8 
decision, that would be an “unparalleled mistake” and would be exploited by parties of 
the extreme left and right, making it impossible to ratify the EDC treaty. Pella even 
threatened to resign if  the Western powers “attempt to appease Marshal Tito.”*’ Despite 
these objections, the Western powers insisted that Italy and Yugoslavia join the United 
States, Britain and France in a five-power conference “to explore the possibilities o f a 
compromise solution of the Trieste problem.” For the Italians this was proof that “three 
foreign ministers clearly show that they have allowed themselves to be frightened by the 
threatening speeches of Marshal Tito.” They argued that the allies would not carry out 
their declaration for October 8, because the question when Italian troops would move into 
Zone A was still “up in the air.” Commenting on this situation Time wrote, “it was not 
Tito’s threats that worried Italian leaders so much as the possibility that the Western 
powers would be influenced into delaying or even altering their decision.”*’
As the weeks passed with no action taken on the October 8 decision, Italian public 
opinion turned anti-American and anti-British. Again, Luce engaged herself in alarming
*' New York Times, October 16, 18,1953.
*’ Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 434; New York Times, October 19,20, 1953. 
*’ New York Times, October 20, 1953; Time, November 2, 1953.
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Washington officials about the Trieste situation. According to Luce, the Anglo-American 
delay was perceived as an “attempt to by-pass the implementation o f the October 8 
decision, in order to save Tito’s face.” Luce confronted Dulles: “I cannot believe that the 
U.S. seriously intends to back-pack, weasel, welch, renege or since the Department 
prefers the euphemism to - ‘finesse’ its decision to proceed with the transfer (however 
slowly) o f Zone A . . .  What price [has] Tito’s face if America loses face in the eyes of 
whole Europe?” Dulles replied that she could count on his strong support while praising 
the fine work that she was doing in Rome “to help resolve the impasse that has arisen.”
He also wrote that he was confident that “we shall see our way through this 
successfully.”*̂
On October 20, Dulles declared that the Untied States and Britain would honor their 
decision to turn over Zone A o f Trieste to Italy, but that there was “no timetable for 
withdrawing occupation forces, and no date has been set either for beginning an 
evacuation.” Dulles also emphasized, “it was a common view that a five power 
conference on Trieste could be ‘useful step in putting the Trieste matter into its proper 
perspective.’” He repeated that Italy would take part in the conference only “on condition 
of parity with Yugoslavia.” Because the United States had to build up a solid defense 
against communism in all o f southern Europe, Dulles concluded, the Trieste dispute 
between Italy and Yugoslavia, which affected these plans, had to be settled as soon as 
possible.*®
*̂  “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Secretary o f State,” October 27, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 8:329-31; “The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce),” 
November 19, 1953, FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1639.
*®Wew York Times, October 21, 1953.
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That was also the conclusion o f the 167* NSC meeting and o f  the Memorandum of 
conversation from October 22. Eisenhower described the importance o f the solution in 
terms of the European political and military situation. He said that this area in Southern 
Europe represented the American weak flank and that any present defense o f Italy itself 
was made extremely difficult. He pointed out “it was this European situation and the 
defense problem that caused us to make this desperate effort to get these countries on the 
same side o f the fence. Our only hope in getting them together rested on a solution o f this 
Trieste problem.”®® The New York Times commented in the same tone that the Trieste 
problem “is continuing to produce nothing but trouble for everyone concerned,” because 
the EDO in Italy was not yet ratified.®^
Luce was aware o f these factors and sent a memorandum to the President providing a 
number o f recommendations regarding the United States policy toward Italy, but without 
explaining what Italy would do itself to change the current situation. Luce considered the 
situation in Italy “in a state o f acute crisis,” and indicated that urgent sums of monetary 
aid were needed to give the center parties time to reform their ranks, regain prestige, and 
initiate vote-getting programs. Given the lack of Italian resources, “/to democratic 
economic measures ...can be counted on to stop the growth of the Cominform Left.” Luce
®® “After the meeting it was agreed between the Secretary o f State, the Secretary o f 
Defense and Admiral Radford that a small group would go the London immediately to 
commence the military discussions with the British and that in the meanwhile the 
Department o f State would begin preliminary discussion with the British and French 
about “our plan for a five-power conference, subject to the determination in London 
whether a formula could be defined for the turnover of civil administration in Zone A to 
Italy.” “Memorandum o f Conversation, by the Director o f the Office o f  Western 
European Affairs (Byington),” October 22, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:322-25; 
“Memorandum o f Discussion at the 167* Meeting o f the National Security Council 
(Extract),” October 22, 1953,2:1750-52.
®̂ New York Times, November 5, 1953.
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also believed that “[n]o overt economic measures which the U. S. Congress can take-
unless the sums are vast-can long delay it, either.” Since 1945, she continued, the United
States had given more than three billion dollars in aid to Italy, and although “this overt
aid has rehabilitated Italy... it has not stopped the march o f Communism.” Therefore, the
only solution was to implement October 8 decision:
US-UK delay in implementing the October 8* decision...now threatens to destroy all 
these calculated effects o f this delaying action. The Trieste issue has begun to backfire 
on Pella...If the US and UK renege on the October 8* decision, or chisel or stall too 
long in implementing it, Pella’s government will crumble, the prestige o f the CD Party 
may be damaged beyond repair, and US world leadership in Italy will be repudiated.®
Eisenhower replied to Luce, generally agreeing with her proposals and stating, “We
have no intention of weaseling on our October eight decision on Trieste.... However, I
think the State Department is moving as rapidly as it can to correct the current situation.”
The President also pointed out that “it would also be useful to know what kind of
pressure we should put on these governments to do something themselves” because “a
great burden of responsibility rests upon the leaders in those countries [Italy].. so must
they try to mold public opinion instead o f merely pleading existing public opinion as an
®® “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President,” November 3, 1953, enclosed 
“Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy (Luce),” November 3, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 6:1631, 6:1631-34. Luce also wrote to Alfred M. Gruenther, the Supreme Allied 
Military Commander in Europe, about the Communist threat in Italy. Luce pointed out 
that “dangerous underestimation and oversimplification has already led to too much 
wishful thinking, lethargy and indifference. . .I cannot help but feel that the time has now 
come for NATO to take the lead in urging the governments to put their houses in order by 
actively opposing their communist parties.” “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Gruenther),” December 11, 1953, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 6:1642-44. Eisenhower pointed out that Luce sent him “a complete and analytical 
statement o f the situation faced by Italy.” She urged that all the measures the United 
States could take to help halt the political appeal of Communism and strengthen the 
Center parties and she “placed the implementation partial or complete of our October 8 
decision to withdraw from Trieste as first priority.” Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, 
415.
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excuse for inaction.” Homer Byington, the Director o f the Office o f Western European 
Affairs, in his letter to Livingston Merchant, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, agreed with Luce’s estimate, but at the same time stated that the 
October 8 decision “is not a matter that depends only on us.... We must necessarily 
consider what we can do immediately to encourage the democratic elements in Italy to 
stand up for themselves.”®̂
On November 6 anti-British riots broke out in Trieste, resulting in the British use of 
firearms and in dozens of injured Italians. The Trieste riots caused anti-British 
demonstrations in the major Italian cities where the mobs demanded the retreat of the 
British general Sir John Winterton, commander of the Allied military forces, and the 
immediate execution o f the October 8 decision. These riots caused the United States to 
decide to continue the Allied occupation o f Trieste “considerably longer than the two 
Allied Governments originally had intended.” They also caused a split among the pro- 
Italian parties and groups in Trieste, but what was more important they “cut the ground
®’ President Eisenhower attached a copy o f his letter to Under Secretary of State, Smith, 
the same one he wrote to Luce, in which he stated, “as you can see, this unnecessary long 
letter to Mrs. Luce has really one purpose. That purpose is to get over to her in 
roundabout fashion that it would be a good thing to analyze and specify what Italy could 
do herself as well as to point out what we must to in the situation, I think it would be 
wrong to try to get such a thing done by direct instruction, but I would hope that she 
would get the point in this letter.” “The President to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce),” 
November 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1634-37. Byington wrote to Merchant: “As 
regards [to] current issues the Ambassador certainly is correct in her conclusion that 
failure to implement either partially or completely the October 8 decision will result in 
the fall o f  the present Pella Government. We must work our way through this matter 
successfully or face serious consequences not only in Italy, but in our entire European 
policy.” “Memorandum by the Director o f the Office o f Western European Affairs 
(Byington) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant),” 
November 12, 1953, FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1637-39.
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from under Signor Pella’s feet,” and allowed the opposition to successfully attack his 
government.
Luce’s reaction to the events, according to the New York Times, again favored the
Italians. She conferred with Pella in efforts to find the minimum basis for the conference
and declared in a speech:
I hope 1 may be permitted not as an Ambassador o f the United States but as a friend of 
Italy and as one who like many of you has known profound sadness to express my 
emotion at the great grief that has stricken in this tragic way the city so very dear to all 
Italian hearts.’ *
Time reported: “Last week the unresolved Trieste problem flared up in bloody 
demonstrations,” because there was “a widespread fear among Italians that the U. S. and 
Britain might renege on their Zone A promise, as they had failed to deliver on their 1948 
declaration.” Also, “because of the ugly threats made by the communist Tito, who 
already holds Zone B, ” the October 8 decision had not been carried out. The universal 
Italian view was that “Trieste is, and of right ought to be Italian,” a feeling shared by “old 
and young, by men and women o f all parties, by Italians o f all social circumstances. ”
Time blamed the West for the “continuing failure to make good on its promise to Italy.
The Western allies were convinced after the riots that the Trieste problem needed an 
urgent solution. In the meantime Luce continued to write her reports in favor of the 
Western action and implementation o f the October 8 decision. She argued that the 
“Trieste question” accounted for the Pella government’s instability, indicating the 
possibility that Pella’s government might lose strength, as his monarchist support was 
getting weaker. She went so far as to ask the members o f her staff “to prepare a
Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 438,442; New York Times, November, 7, 8, 10, 1953. 
’ * New York Times, November 7, 1953.
Time, November 16, 1953.
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confidential study on the implications to the United States if  a communist or fellow 
traveler should ever receive an important office in a future Italian cabinet.”’^
During November the Western powers managed to lessen tensions between Italy and 
Yugoslavia and on December 5 both states agreed to recall their troops from the border 
completing the withdrawal by December 20. The most important current problem for the 
United States and Britain was finding an acceptable framework within which the Italo- 
Yugoslav negotiations could be held. As the year drew to its close, it was obvious that 
Dulles’s optimistic estimate that the problem might be resolved within the month would 
not come true.’^
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” November 30, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1640-42; New York Times, December 20, 1953.
94 Rabel, Between East and West, 153; New York Times, December 6, 1953.
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CHAPTER 6
THE TRIESTE NEGOTIATIONS OF 1954 
After Italy and Yugoslavia rejected several proposals by the United States and Britain 
in December, 1953, the Western powers decided to prepare a new strategy for organizing 
future negotiations, one that would produce a successful compromise settlement. The 
origins o f the plan came from Julius Holmes, Director o f the Bureau for European 
Affairs, who recommended to Dulles the following three-step approach to the Trieste 
question:
1. A final tripartite demarche would be made to Tito in an effort to obtain Yugoslav 
agreement to attend a preliminary meeting;... 2. [I]f Tito’s reply turned [out] to be 
negative and final, then a tripartite approach to the Italian Government [would be 
made] to ascertain its final position on a preliminary five-power Ambassadors’ 
meeting without conditions, as had been proposed by Eden; and 3. [I] f  both of these 
efforts proved unsuccessful, the United States would then propose [to] the British 
that they have direct United States-United Kingdom negotiations with Yugoslavia 
before carrying out any further implementation of the October 8 decision.
The main idea was to get Yugoslavia and Italy to agree to an unconditional five-
power conference, but if they refused to do so, the United States and Britain would
jointly invite the Yugoslav government to meet in Washington or London. As the United
* “Editorial Note, ” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:347; “The Council o f Embassy in Yugoslavia 
(Wallner) to Julius C. Holmes of the Bureau o f European Affairs,” December 22, 1953, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:352-56.
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States, Britain and Yugoslavia were the three occupying powers in Trieste, they would 
discuss possible solutions to the Trieste question secretly without Italy.^
Since both Yugoslavia and Italy refused the unconditional five-power meeting, the 
United States and Britain decided to implement the third phase o f Holmes’s plan. After 
some discussion, they agreed early in 1954 that negotiations would be conducted in 
London. The State Department preferred to hold the talks in Washington, where it 
believed there was a better chance for secrecy, and where an agreement would be easier 
to be presented to the Italian government than one worked out in London. The British 
agreed with this preference. However, Yugoslavia indicated its preference for London for 
reasons of proximity and travel and because it believed that the Yugoslav ambassador in 
London was better informed on the Trieste issue than the Yugoslav ambassador in 
Washington.^
After London was chosen as the site for the talks, it was agreed that the negotiations 
would be conducted on the ambassadorial level, in three consecutive stages and in 
absolute secrecy. This plan intended to diminish the influence o f the many domestic 
pressures in both Italy and Yugoslavia that were impeding significant discussions 
between the two governments. Vladimir Velebit was the Yugoslav ambassador in London
^ “EditorialNote,” FRUS, 1952-1954. 8:357.
 ̂Preparations for the conference on Trieste between the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Yugoslavia began almost immediately after the Yugoslav Government’s 
acceptance of the idea on January 11. “Editorial Note,” FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:365-67. 
Riddleberger informed the State Department about the Yugoslav expectation in terms of 
negotiations saying: “[The] Yugoslav Government understands necessity for secrecy, and 
we agreed on some answer.. .[The] Yugoslav Government understands beyond any doubt 
that purpose o f [the] proposed meeting is not to establish basis for four or five-power 
negotiations but to establish realistic basis for [the] settlement.” “The Ambassador in 
Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department o f State,” January 11, 1954, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:363-65.
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chosen to speak for his country. Llewellyn Thompson, American ambassador to Austria, 
and Geoffrey W. Harrison, Assistant Under Secretary o f State in the British Foreign 
Office, were to represent their governments and pressure first Yugoslavia and then Italy 
for a compromise solution. Thompson and Harrison planned to work out a formula, 
essentially a Trieste settlement, on a tripartite basis-between the administrating states of 
the FTT, Britain and the United States (in Zone A) and Yugoslavia (in Zone B). In the 
next stage, the British and US governments would present the proposal to Italy, after 
which Italy would negotiate that proposal with the two Western powers. In the final stage 
the British and Americans would act as intermediaries between Yugoslavia and Italy in 
order to settle any remaining differences.'*
Italy and Yugoslavia accepted the three stages o f negotiations and agreed that the 
tripartite meetings would be conducted daily and kept informal without agreed-upon 
minutes. The United States, Britain and Yugoslavia also agreed that the Italians would
'* Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations. 22. Each side chose its best people to 
represent it in the negotiations. Thompson was an experienced diplomat as he held 
diplomatic posts in Colombo, Geneva, and Moscow before acting as an adviser to the 
Secretary o f State at a wide range o f the international meetings, including the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945, the Berlin Conference in 1945 and the Council o f Foreign 
Ministers in London in 1945. He participated in the negotiations on the Italian peace 
treaty, where the Trieste was discussed and settled by a compromise: the FTT, which did 
not work. During his two periods of service as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, his 
remarkable diplomatic intelligence and skills became well known. Harrison was known 
as “consummate diplomat,” who assumed the task o f representing his government while 
serving as Assistant Undersecretary at the Foreign Office. He kept his Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden currently informed o f the course o f the talks but the day-to-day 
responsibility rested with Harrison, who exercised it with competence and finesse. 
Velebit was prominent figure in Yugoslav regime as he served in Marshal Tito’s 
government during and after the war. He organized the new Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
and undertook important negotiations with the Soviet Union before the break with Stalin 
in 1948. He served briefly as Yugoslavia’s Ambassador in Rome in the early 1950s. 
During the 1954 Trieste negotiations, he was Ambassador to Great Britain, and his 
private residence in London served as the locale for the bulk o f  the conversation with 
Thompson and Harrison. Campbell, Successful Negotiation. 23-24,45, 76-77.
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not be informed o f the initial discussion until there was full agreement about something 
worth discussing. All parties hoped to make it feasible to explore all solutions by strictly 
limiting the number o f participants, allowing no publicity, and proceeding with a 
maximum o f informality. These tactics proved successful and after nine months 
negotiations brought about a final settlement that resolved the Trieste conflict.^
Later interviews of the representatives involved in the negotiations indicate that 
Thompson had by far the leading role on the American side o f the enterprise. Secretary 
Dulles followed the negotiations but not in detail, approving the broad strategy and 
backing Thompson on his chosen tactics. It seemed that Clare Luce, and James 
Riddleberger, ambassadors in Rome and Belgrade, “did well in their supporting roles.” 
However, Luce was not only “instrumental in getting the process started,” she was also 
very active and greatly involved in the negotiations as she continuously pressured the 
State Department to come up with a solution satisfactory to the Italians. Throughout the 
negotiations, she urged the Washington policymakers to find a prompt solution to the 
Trieste problem and blamed the Yugoslavs for prolonging the talks with their maximum 
demands. Luce continually argued that the long and uncertain negotiations on Trieste 
endangered the United States policy in Europe as it created an unstable political situation 
in Italy that became an easy target for the communists.®
Before the first phase of the negotiations started on February 2, Luce went to 
Washington for consultations about the current situation in Italy and the upcoming talks. 
Luce was concerned about the possible failure of the Trieste negotiations and the political 
consequences it would bring to Italy. Hence, she suggested ways in which the talks with
 ̂Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 23. 
® Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 24.
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the Yugoslavs should be conducted and the steps the United States should take “should
no agreement result from our secret talks with the Yugoslavs.” In giving her observations
on the Trieste issue. Luce pointed out the importance of the American tactics in dealing
with the Yugoslavs. She thought the United States’ “greatest chance o f success in such a
meeting would probably be gained by limiting the initial discussion to those points on
which there was general agreement.”
According to Luce, the United States and Britain should discuss the city of Trieste
because the Yugoslavs had “already conceded [it] to be an ‘Italian city.’” She continued:
This would encompass provisions for giving the Yugoslavs access to the port and 
certain economic and trade rights, etc. From the port, discussion should proceed to the 
necessity o f the Italians having land access to the city. This would involve the 
delineation of the coastal strip between the city of Trieste and the Italian frontier. Only 
when agreement had been reached on these two points would the matter o f Italian 
minorities in Zone B and Slovene minorities in Zone A be taken up.^
Luce summarized the importance o f the Trieste question to Italy arguing that “the
October 8 decision was the source o f Pella’s prestige and was [the] principal factor
enabling the formation of his government.” She again emphasized that “ a favorable
solution of the Trieste issue within a reasonable period of time would be very helpful to
the center government, but a decision a year from now would have few advantages as far
as Italy is concerned.” If the talks failed, “the implementation o f the October 8 decision”
would be the only solution. This time Luce did not argue for a “dramatic and sudden
move,” but slow action that would give “the Italians one position in the administration at
a time.” She concluded, “there could be no Italian ratification o f the EDC until the Trieste
’ “Memorandum o f Conversation, by David G. Nes of the Office o f Western European 
Affairs,” January 4, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:358-59.
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problem was settled,” as “every week of delay weakened Italy’s position within NATO 
and her ability and willingness to cooperate in Western defense.”®
The New York Times gave significant coverage to the Washington consultations, 
reporting that Luce was “home” for the first time since taking up her post and on that 
occasion she conferred with the key diplomatic, defense and intelligence officials in 
Washington. She consulted with Secretary Dulles privately and then they “ were joined 
by other Government officials for a two-hour discussion.” At the press conference. Luce 
emphasized, “Trieste was not discussed,” describing the meeting as a very satisfactory 
one that enabled “a full discussion and look at Italy’s many, many problems.” Since the 
most important officials participated in the meeting, the Times concluded that this “gave 
Mrs. Luce’s report an unusual dimension,” because “rarely do diplomats returning for 
consultation encounter such a reception. The State Department officials were inclined to 
belittle the exceptional aspect o f the meeting, however, maintaining that, by meeting all 
the officials at once, the Ambassador would not have to see them individually.”
Regarding the reasons Luce came home, the Times commented, “the concern with the 
feebleness o f  the Italian government under Premier Pella is one factor that gives 
importance to Mrs. Luce’s return to Washington.” The United States assumed that Pella 
would strengthen his coalition by “reshuffling some o f his cabinet posts.”’
Pella indeed tried to strengthen his Cabinet, but the opposition within his Christian 
Democratic party forced his resignation on January 5. This alarmed Luce. The Times 
reported that “because of the Italian Government crisis. Luce will return to her post ahead 
of schedule.” The Times stated that there was concern among US officials that Pella’s
®Ibid.
New York Times, January 3, 1954.
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resignation and the possibility o f the upcoming elections might strengthen the
Communists in Italy. The recent Italian political, economic and military weakness could
also have a broad implications on the United States European policy as “the political
crisis in Italy jeopardizes not only the proposed European Defense Community but a
potential alternative to the strategic concept of that plan." A weak, unstable or unfriendly
Italy could endanger “the building [of] the periphery strategy around the sea and air
power based on the periphery o f Europe and its fringing islands," as well as the whole
Mediterranean policy. The Times predicted.
The year 1954 may well wimess an enforced revision o f  many o f our major past 
politico-military policies in Europe. Our diplomatic skill will be tested to the utmost 
as the struggle for the world continues, with major battles looming on political and 
economic fronts, battles that will determine the outcome o f our attempts to create 
military strength in Europe.
For the United States, Italy was still the most important member o f NATO, because 
“she is the link between the Southeast Command of Greece and Turkey... directly 
bordered with Yugoslavia.” According to the Times, the United States policy to terminate 
“the Trieste argument, develop friendship between Yugoslavia and Italy, and induce Italy 
to join [the] Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks,” was unrealistic. The recent Italian crisis “is 
slipping rapidly into a slough,” because there was no indication that “a firm middle-of- 
the-road Government” would soon come to power.**
The Eisenhower administration became disturbed “about the trend o f events in the 
Italian peninsula,” as the Communists were “working hard for the control o f Italy,” and 
appeared “within striking distance of controlling the Italian Parliament now.” The New 
York Times wrote that in order to resist communism in Italy, the United States had
*° Ibid., January 7, 8, 10, 1954.
** Ibid., January 7, 1954.
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decided to implement “a tougher policy to prod Italy toward sterner measures against the 
growing power o f her Communist party.” The Times emphasized that Luce was 
authorized to advise the new Italian Government, “when it is formed,” about the planned 
US changes. The United States’ threatening announcements to cease “placing military 
contracts in Conununist dominated Italian factories” provoked the Communists to attack 
Luce with “unusual virulence.” The Communist newspaper Unita, according to the 
Times, “referred to Luce as an ‘old lady’ and said that she was ‘bundled off to Italy’ as 
far as the Cabinet crisis developed.” She was accused of “interfering in internal Italian 
affairs and o f dictating the Government’s plans and policies.” Palmiro Togliatti, the 
leader of the Communist Party, declared that Luce was “a jinx who brought bad luck 
upon all persons with whom she came in contact” and also claimed that her Milan speech 
“brought bad luck to the Christian Democratic party, which was defeated.” *̂
According to the New York Times, the Communists attacked not only Luce, but also 
Aminatore Fanfani, former Interior Minister in Pella’s cabinet, who formed a new 
government on January 19. Premier Fanfani declared war on communism “in the speech 
in which he presented his program and his cabinet.” The Communist press accused 
Fanfani o f receiving “orders from the State Department,” citing the fact that on the same 
day that Luce returned from Washington, “Premier Fanfani was charged with forming a 
new government.” The Times stressed that since the Communists attacked the new 
government on “the last day o f debate in the Chamber o f Deputies on whether to give
Ibid., January 13, 14, 30, 1954. Time conunented that “after a U.S. visit. Ambassador 
Clare Boothe Luce brought with her the State Department’s resolve to press the Italian 
government to intensify curbs on Reds.. ..What the hue and cry is about: the Ambassador 
is empowered to negotiate arrangements which will keep [the] U.S. offshore procurement 
contracts out o f [the] factories dominated by [the] Communist unions.” Time, January 25, 
1954.
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Premier Fanfani and his Government a vote o f confidence,” the Communist approach 
helped the rapid decline of “Premier Fanfani’s stock.” Although De Gasperi defended 
Fanfani and “spoke eloquently and passionately in his favor,” pointing out that “Fanfani’s 
program was better than the one he himself submitted to the Parliament when he was 
defeated last July,” Fanfani’s govenunent was unable to attain a vote of confidence in the 
Chamber and collapsed on January 30, after eleven days in office.'^
The Italian cabinet crisis, which “aroused fresh concern over the prospect o f new 
delays in the Trieste dispute and the ratification o f the EDC treaty,” was finally solved 
when Mario Scelba, former De Gasperi Interior Minister constituted a new government. 
Before Scelba’s government was approved (by the Senate on February 26 and by the 
Chamber o f Deputies on March 10), Luce “discussed for two hours problems o f  interest 
to the United States and Italy” with Scelba. The Times reported that this “was considered 
unusual because he [Scelba] has not yet obtained a vote o f confidence in the Chamber o f 
Deputies,” but the Times explained, “Ambassador Luce intended her call purely as a visit 
of courtesy” and the discussion o f political problems was unplanned.*^ The Times stated, 
“it is understood that the Italian government had not departed fi’om its intention of 
submitting the treaty [EDC] to Parliament for ratification.” It was also obvious that 
Scelba “expects the United States and other Western powers to do something about 
Trieste,” as his position would become “untenable if he threw away what [the] Italians 
consider his best card to force prompt consideration of Trieste and than remained empty 
handed where Trieste itself is concerned.” In his program, presented on February 18,
Ibid., January, 30, 31, 1954; “Editorial Note, ” FRUS. 1952-1954. 8:361.
The Times stated that “Ambassador Luce had not called on an Italian Premier since she 
saw Premier Giuseppe Pella last December. Many questions had piled up since then. ” 
New York Times. March 4, 1954; “Editorial Note, ” FRUS. 1952-1954. 6:1650.
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Scelba took a moderate stand on the Trieste issue and supported a solution acceptable to 
both parties that would bring an end to the old controversy and open new possibilities for 
friendly cooperation between Italy and Yugoslavia. By this means De Gasperi’s 
obsession with the Tripartite proposal and Pella’s military pressures were replaced with a 
new realistic approach that helped facilitate the ultimate solution to the Trieste problem.'^ 
While this two month long internal crisis was going on in Italy, the first phase o f  the 
secret Trieste negotiations between the United States, Britain and Yugoslavia took place 
in London. The representatives o f the three delegations, Harrison, Thompson, and 
Velebit, made general introductory statements on February 2, with Thompson and 
Harrison on one side and the Yugoslav representative Velebit on the other. Thompson 
was instructed by the State Department to put the Trieste issue in the larger perspective of 
collective security with a “package deal” as the starting point for the talks with the 
Yugoslavs. As Walter Bedell Smith, acting Secretary o f State, suggested to Thompson, 
for the United States the Trieste issue was not only an Italo-Yugoslav local problem but 
also one of “the political, military, and economic health o f a key area which will have 
great significance for all of the free world and for the world-wide effort to throw back 
Soviet expansion.” Smith indicated, “the benefits o f a successful settlement would be 
very great,” would demonstrate “unity among countries o f the free world... and would 
have more profound significance in the eyes o f the Kremlin than in the area of 
Yugoslavia and Italy.” Smith suggested to Thompson that “we are therefore seeking a 
‘package deal’ which would put Italo-Yugoslav relations on a permanently sound 
basis.. and would enable both parties to accept sacrifices in a Trieste settlement that
New York Times. February 13, 1954; Novak, Trieste. 1941-1954. 452-53.
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neither could accept if the deal were narrowly confined to the Trieste problem.” Smith 
indicated that the United States desired a territorial settlement based upon an “ethnic line 
which will give the Italians a continuous coastal strip including Capodistria, Isola, and 
Pirano . and [the] Yugoslavs should have a suitable area in the port for their exclusive 
use with secure access to it.” '®
Within this general approach, Thompson was to press Yugoslavia to settle the Trieste 
dispute. To strengthen his persuasive powers he was authorized to remind the Yugoslavs 
that when Foreign Secretary Eden visited Belgrade in 1952, Tito was prepared to accept a 
territorial solution consistent with the existing zonal boundary. He could also remind the 
Yugoslavs that if a negotiated solution were not forthcoming the United States and 
Britain would have to go back to the October 8 announcement that gave Italy Zone A and 
city o f Trieste. Although the American proposals called for territorial losses for both Italy 
and Yugoslavia, they advocated modifications of the existing zonal division. Italy would 
be granted a small coastal strip in Zone B, including all its major cities and ports; and 
Yugoslavia would have a suitable port area and secure access to it. Such a partition o f the 
FTT was more favorable to Italy than the division along existing zonal lines. In an 
interview in November 1971, Thompson characterized these instructions as “hopeless” 
since they did not give him room to negotiate with the Yugoslavs. Thompson understood 
that the Yugoslavs would never accept this pro-Italian proposal, and he persuaded the 
State Department to allow him to propose a permanent frontier based on existing zonal 
boundaries.'^
'® “The Acting Secretary o f State to the Ambassador in Austria (Thompson),” January 28, 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:368-71; Rabel, Between East and West, 154-56;
Campbell, Successful Negotiations, 26.
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As the talks began, the Yugoslavs rejected the idea that the general interest in the 
security o f the region required them to compromise on Trieste. On the contrary, Velebit 
asserted that the Yugoslav rights were clear and unchallengeable. He started “with long 
statements o f their [Yugoslav] claims” o f virtually all o f the FTT for Yugoslavia, 
including the city of Trieste, rejecting even the zonal division. Later Velebit explained 
that the south Slavs considered the real ethnic boundary between Yugoslavia and Italy to 
be “as it had remained practically unchanged for about a thousand years, on the River 
Soca [Isonzo]. And any encroachment from one side or the other side could and should 
be considered as a thorn in the body o f  the other ethnic unit.” Velebit explained fruther 
the Yugoslav stand:
We were convinced we had lost Trieste in 1945. We knew we had lost Trieste when 
the British got American support to drive us out of the town. We had suffered twelve 
thousand casualties in the surroundings of Trieste and in Trieste itself in order to be 
there first, because we thought, and I am still o f that conviction, that whoever is in the 
possession o f certain territory has a 99% chance o f keeping it; it is a fact o f history.*®
According to the interview Velebit gave in 1972, demanding the whole FTT in the
beginning o f  the negotiations was an understandable tactic because the Yugoslavs “had to
fire off the so-called baroud d ’honneur.” Velebit also said that he had instructions from
his government to demand the whole FTT and that he had to “put forward all the
arguments—economic, geographical, military, everything.” The whole first week Velebit
tried to present the full Yugoslav case, and he was certain that Thompson and Harrison
also understood that it was “a method o f  letting off steam.” They recognized the
Yugoslav maximum demands were “polemical and quite clearly for the record,” but they
*® Unger, Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 26; Campbell, Successful Negotiations, 26, 
83-4.
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reminded Velebit that they came together to find a solution acceptable to both Italy and 
Yugoslavia.*’
Since a first week o f negotiations brought no progress on the Trieste issue, James 
Bonbright, the Acting Secretary o f  State for European Affairs, sent a memorandum to 
Smith, the acting Secretary o f State, discussing the progress o f  the talks in London. 
Bonbright stated that the Yugoslavs “intended only to reach agreement in principle, 
leaving substantive details to be negotiated with the Italians,” and not to compromise 
their negotiating position. He also stressed that the Yugoslavs made the first, concrete 
proposals at the fifth meeting (February 8) when Velebit suggested “an internationally 
guaranteed autonomous status for the city of Trieste, [the] compensation for undefined 
Yugoslav economic loses apparently since 1922, the whole Zone B, and presumably the 
balance o f Zone A, to go to Yugoslavia.” Bonbright concluded that Velebit was “trying it 
on for size and the talks have not yet produced a basis for real negotiation.” ’̂
Thompson was more optimistic than Bonbright because he thought that the Yugoslavs 
wanted the agreement and believed that “we can succeed provided we can agree on some 
reasonable outlet to the Gulf o f Trieste.” He persuaded the Yugoslavs that the United 
States’ “interest is in this settlement of this problem derived from the wider issues at 
stake and not just some maneuver in an Italian game.” At the beginning o f March, 
Thompson still argued that the solution to the Trieste crisis could be found but 
complained to the Counselor o f  the Embassy in Yugoslavia Woodruff Wallner, “after
*’ “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:372-73; Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 26, 
94-95; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 26-7.
“Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
(Bonbright) to the Acting Secretary of State,” February 10, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 
8:373-74.
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five weeks o f negotiation they are still asking for us to settle virtually every question they 
have ever had at issue with the Italians in their favor, as well as sticking on an impossible 
territorial solution.” *̂ Wallner replied to Thompson that he “got plenty o f atmosphere” 
about Yugoslav expectations o f the talks in London when he attended a party the 
Yugoslavs organized for Chiefs o f Mission in Belgrade. “In the usual aggressive 
Yugoslav way,” Wallner wrote, “they all professed great disappointment at the way the 
talks were going and discouragement as to the possibility o f a settlement emerging.” The 
Yugoslavs blamed Thompson and Harrison for not understanding “that marshal Tito 
simply could not accept something which could not be demonstrated as an improvement 
over the October 8 decision.” The Yugoslav position was that “whereas Tito must have 
something better than October 8, the Italians can take something less since there was 
dancing in the streets of Rome.” However, Wallner stated, “underneath this clamor,” 
there was worry and real desire from the Yugoslavs to find the solution “if not at London, 
at least in the near future.” He also said that it was obvious that Tito could not accept 
something that could not look better to “party and public opinion than our announcement 
o f the 8*.”^̂
The US officials realized that although the Yugoslavs pushed for the maximum 
demands, they wanted an “amicable settlement of this [Trieste] problem.” When 
Ambassador Vladimir Popovic met President Eisenhower in Washington, he expressed
“The Chief United States Negotiator in London (Thompson) to the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary o f State for European Affairs (Bonbright),” February 16, 1954, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:374-75; “The Chief United States Negotiator in London (Thompson) to the 
Counselor o f Embassy in Yugoslavia (Wallner),” March 8, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
8:377-78.
“  “The Counselor o f Embassy in Yugoslavia (Wallner) to the Chief United States 
Negotiator in London (Thompson),” March 9, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:378-79.
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the Yugoslav desire to have “friendship and cooperation” with Italy, but stressed that “the 
stumbling block” between Italy and Yugoslavia “had been the difficult Trieste question.” 
He said, however, that he was ‘“more hopeful’ than ever for the settlement o f the long­
standing Trieste dispute.”^  At the news conference Ambassador Popovic said that his 
government “would make a ‘great effort’ to bring about a settlement and improve 
relations with Italy. ” Popovic argued that one basis for his “new hopefulness on a Trieste 
solution” was based on “the modesty o f Yugoslavia’s demands.” He said, “I assure you 
that all we want from the Free Territory of Zone A is a few Slovene villages, which are o f 
little consequence to Italy. Indeed, for Italy they are more of a liability than an asset.” He 
also gave “assurances from Marshal Tito, Yugoslav President, that Belgrade would 
continue its ‘policy of cooperation and friendship with the United States and other 
Western powers.’” '̂*
Velebit demonstrated Yugoslav willingness to find a Trieste compromise after he, 
Thompson and Harrison began the private discussions in London that increasingly 
centered on specific territorial, economic, and political aspects of the possible settlement. 
Regarding the territorial aspect, the initial Yugoslav position was that Yugoslavia should 
receive a strip o f land from the coast to Bassovizza in Zone A (territory on the Karst 
plateau above and behind the city, to the north and northeast), without offering any
^  At the meeting Eisenhower said to Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popovic that 
“solving the Trieste problem is vital. If that could occur, he said, we would have a solid 
defense ring, starting with Turkey and Greece, and carried forward without a break 
through Italy. ” He also said that this “would be a tremendous deterrent to Soviet 
aggression and would thus have great stabilizing influence on the world situation.” 
“Memorandum o f Conversation, by the Chief o f Protocol (Simmons),” March 11, 1954, 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:380-81.
The Times stated that “The Ambassador also made it clear that another development 
contributing to his more hopeful outlook was the realization that ‘the October 8 decision 
cannot be implemented, and was an erroneous one ” New York Times, March 12, 1954.
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territorial adjustments to Italy in Zone B. In a lengthy meeting on March 17, however,
Velebit accepted a US-UK counterproposal on the territorial question, which was part of
the following package proposal the three Ambassadors submitted to their respective
governments for approval. The counterproposal among other things stated:
Yugoslavia [is] to receive the Bassovizza strip in Zone A, Italy [is] to benefit fi'om a 
rectification o f the zonal boundary in her favor in the Muggia peninsula; Italy and 
Yugoslavia [are] to conclude a minority statute on the basis o f reciprocity; the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and perhaps France, [are] to issue a declaration of 
non-support o f fiuther territorial claims; the United Kingdom and the United States 
[are] to attempt to obtain fi’om Italy agreement to conclude within several months a 
lump-sum settlement o f outstanding financial and economic question,... and to explore 
with Italy the possibility o f autonomy in Zone A, by which the Yugoslav Government 
meant a large measure o f local government which would make it possible for the 
Trieste administration to work out an arrangement which would insure full use o f the 
city and the port.^^
Yugoslavia abandoned the idea o f reciprocal concessions after Thompson and 
Harrison stressed their proposal granting Yugoslavia Slovene areas in the hinterland of 
Zone A in return for ceding to Italy an Italian enclave comprising Koper, Izola and Piran 
in Zone B. Velebit pressed for the Yugoslav port south of Trieste, including Zaule, 
Servola, and Muggia (Milje), essentially suburbs o f Trieste. The Yugoslavs did not want 
to give up the port, arguing that the area around Trieste was heavily populated by 
Slovenes and, thus, Yugoslavia had a need to develop a port “for the immediate 
hinterland.” ®̂
After discussing all o f the conditions, Velebit said that the Yugoslav Government 
wished to go to its maximum position before the United States and Britain presented the 
package to Italy. Thompson pointed out that he could not insist “upon many o f  the
^  Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations. 28; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, J952-1954,
8:382-83.
26 Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, Ibid.
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Yugoslav conditions or even reach a firm decision about some o f them until the Italians
had been consulted.” He informed the State Department that he was optimistic
Yugoslavia would agree to the Muggia peninsula rectification and, if  Yugoslavia
accepted, he asked whether the State Department considered it worthwhile to explore
with Velebit which conditions Yugoslavia would drop if  Italy agreed to the Bassovizza
proposal. He also stressed that negotiations could not proceed unless the United States
gave “a rough indication of the magnitude o f the economic aid.” The State Department
replied to Thompson that it was “most gratified at the encouraging progress reports.” It
also expressed its approval of the proposal for the settlement that Thompson outlined and
indicated that it would support the proposal with the Italians.^^
However, Luce, who was informed about the Yugoslav proposals, argued that Italy
would never accept these Yugoslav conditions. In her letter to Dulles, Luce emphasized:
Any plan such as Tito’s present one, which called not only for [the] Italian sacrifices 
in Zone A and none by Yugoslavia in Zone B, but also for heavy reparations to a 
Communist govenunent, plus millions of U.S. dollars to Tito to help him build a 
railroad and port in competition to Trieste would completely shatter whatever morale 
the Italian Foreign Office has left. The whole thing would strike the Italians as a most 
astounding result o f ‘[the] U.S. pressure on Tito.’
She said that “in Italian eyes it would constitute final proof that against our twice- 
given word we have chosen for Yugoslavia.... [T]his would further undermine the pro- 
West parties o f Italy and build up the prestige of the Fascists and pro-Cominformists who 
have been able to monopolize increasingly the ‘patriotic attitude’ on the Trieste 
question.” Luce proposed inviting “the Italians to go through the same exercise’ the 
Yugoslavs have gone through with our US-UK London team o f experts... [This would
“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954. 8:383.
“The Ambassador In Italy (Luce) to the Secretary o f  State, ” March 18, 1954, FRUS,
1952-1954, 8:383-89.
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show] US-UK willingness to examine the attitudes o f both sides patiently and fairly.” 
Luce concluded that failure to implement the October 8 decision would “bring down [the] 
Italian government, further weaken the NATO structure, damage the chances o f passing 
[the] EDC beyond repair, and advance the fortunes o f the Kremlin Left here,” and “if  the 
Communists continue to gain.. .either the stage will be set fo r  an eventual Communist 
coup d ’etat or civil war in Italy.
Dulles generally agreed with Luce and argued that “basis for settlement now under 
consideration seems to accord closely with your views as I understand them and is in its 
territorial aspects very close to Oct. 8.” He also expressed the view that Velebit “seems to 
have accepted only lip service to autonomy,” and that since the free port of Trieste was 
already in existence, there was no question of a “Yugoslav proposal for anything 
different.” Dulles also explained his opinion that “the best hope [for] avoiding [the] spiral 
[of] unfortunate developments with which Italy is threatened is [the] earliest possible 
solution [of the] Trieste problem, on [the] basis [of] meeting [the] reasonable Italian 
requirements and at same time without alienating [the] Yugos.” Dulles optimistically 
concluded:
It seems to me the proposal on which we are now working is so close to Oct. 8 with 
only minor deviations which each could claim for face[-]saving purposes that it would 
be a great misfortune not to proceed. It ought to be a political achievement for the
Luce concluded her long report by saying: ‘T know how deeply you are occupied with 
the cruel problems o f Korea, hido-China, Berlin and France. But when I reflect on where 
our present Trieste policy may lead us, I can’t help but wonder whether it is not 
altogether possible that Italy could be the power keg o f world War HI. ...And once again, 
with our failure to implement October 8*, the day o f reckoning comes on apace. Half o f 
Communists in Europe are right here in Italy now. And their numbers are growing. What 
are we expected to stop them with here, if  not Trieste? This is the question that cannot 
safely remain unanswered much longer.” Ibid., 8:383-89.
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Italian Govt, to get the Italian flag flying again over Trieste, which after all is the heart 
o f the matter.^’
Even though Secretary Dulles was hopeful, discouragement about a prompt Trieste
settlement grew among the American officials. According to Dillon, the American
ambassador in France, there were significant differences between the newly proposed
Trieste settlement and the October 8 announcement;
[The] Current conditions in which [the] present settlement is proposed as [the] basis of 
negotiations with [the] Yugoslavs not only deprives [the] Italians of [the] initial 
territorial parity promised by October 8, thereby curtailing greatly their negotiating 
advantage but gives them no assurances that territorial parity will ever be forthcoming 
if  [the] London negotiations fail, which may be all too likely.^*
Dillon reminded the State Department, “if  actual negotiations begun on [the] current
settlement in London do fail, then [the] US, UK and Italian Governments will be given
all the blame by Italian public opinion.” The London talks would be seen in Italy as a
“US, UK, Yugoslav trap sprung on [the] Italians,” in order to avoid the October 8
decision, impose the Yugoslav settlement and then blame the Italians for being
“unreasonable” in not accepting it. This would lead Italian public opinion to view
Scelba’s negotiation o f the Yugoslav proposals as a betrayal o f Italian interests. Hence,
Dillon proposed a policy for the successful outcome o f the matter: first, the United States
should invite the Italians to London in order to “take [the] Italian Government off hook of
being accused of accepting negotiations without any assurances on October 8;” second,
the US should decide what its policy would be if  the London talks with the Italians “come
to nothing conclusive or acceptable.” In that case, the United States should have a
30 T he Secretary o f State to the embassy in France,” March 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
8:389-90.
“The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department o f State,” March 25, 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:391-92.
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date line for implementing October 8 “if  our solution should not prove acceptable to 
either government.” Dillon concluded that the United States and Britain should be ready 
to offer to both governments an “either-or” choice on the Trieste question.^^
Long and tough bargaining with the Yugoslavs ensued with little progress, and United 
States officials worried about the Italian ratification o f  the EDC, arguing that the 
prospects for Italian ratification could be damaged if  satisfactory progress was not made 
on Trieste. The NSC’s meeting on March 25 reiterated that Italy was very valuable to the 
United States, because of its “central position ” in the NATO front line o f defense. “As a 
base area for naval and air forces, Italy holds a commanding position over the western 
and central Mediterranean and flanks the Balkan countries. ” A communist “take-over of 
Italy might well destroy the whole NATO strategy,” therefore, “the United States 
preferably in concert with its principal Allies, should be prepared to take the strongest 
possible [position] extending [it] to the use of military power. ” The United States policy, 
o f the preceding five years in seeking to integrate Yugoslavia into Western alignment 
without reaching a settlement on Trieste, had placed severe strains upon “our relations 
with Italy.” The problem was that the Italians thought the US policy had improved 
Yugoslavia’s bargaining position and diminished its readiness to agree to a compromise 
solution on Trieste. This situation delayed parliamentary consideration o f the EDC and 
negotiations on NATO facilities in Italy for US use. Therefore, an early Trieste solution, 
that was acceptable to the Italians, would be an important factor in maintaining 
confidence in any Christian Democratic government and would be essential to the 
achievement o f  Italo-Yugoslav defense collaboration. The conclusion o f the meeting was
32 Ibid.
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that the United States should “continue its efforts to bring an early solution o f the Trieste
problem" and seek to persuade the Italian government that “it is in the interest o f Italy to
ratify [the] EDC promptly.”^̂
The Italian position on the ratification of the EDC treaty agreed with the American
stand as Scelba’s government proved after coming to power. Scelba placed the question
o f ratification of the EDC treaty “at the top” o f his government’s legislative program. The
New York Times concluded “that Parliament soon after voting confidence in the
government, will receive the treaty for ratificationT he Times commented that, while
ratification might take “some months" to accomplish, the general impression was that
“the treaty will be ratified.” Later, however, Scelba tied the ratification of the treaty to a
successful Trieste settlement. The New York Times reported in March that Scelba warned
that delay in the solution o f the Trieste problem “made Italy’s ratification o f the EDC
treaty ‘more difficult.’" Scelba also expressed his government’s desire to maintain
peaceful relations with all nations
The problem of the Free Territory o f Trieste, which today renders our dealings with 
our Yugoslav neighbors precarious while there are plenty o f good reasons for stable 
and fhiitful relations, should not even represent a problem because right and justice 
are in Italy’s favor.^^
Scelba concluded that “the delay of a just solution of this problem is a factor of 
weakness for the Italian democracy and makes more difficult Italy’s intention to 
participate actively in the policy o f European defense and integration." He also wrote to
“Draft Statement o f Policy Proposed by the Planning Board o f the National Security 
Council," March 12, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954^ 6:1656-60; “Memorandum by the 
Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Stuff (Radford) to the Secretary o f  Defense (Wilson)," 
March 23, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1665-67; “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 190’*’ 
Meeting o f the National Security Council," March 25, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 6:1668- 
71.
^  New York Times, February 13, March 4, 25, 1954.
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Secretary Dulles that the Italian govenunent was “firmly convinced that [the] E.D.C. has 
an essential function,” but that there were some “objective considerations” that could 
arise in the parliamentary debate before “the settlement of the problem o f the Free 
Territory o f Trieste or, at least, before the implementation o f the October 8“* decision.” 
Scelba argued that the Trieste question was still exploited by the extreme left, who 
accused the government o f “weakness in front o f the Allies,” and that “the 
implementation o f the decision o f October 8* could modify basically the psychological, 
parliamentary and political situation and could perhaps also mark a decisive turning point 
in the development o f Italian internal politics.” He was sure that as soon as “this obstacle 
to the participation in [the] E.D.C. were removed, the majority o f the Italian public 
opinion would align itself with the Government in favor of the ratification.” But in order 
to do that, the Italian government asked the Allies to execute “the commitment taken by 
the decision of October 8“* to transfer ^de facto ’ to Italy the administration o f Zone A.” At 
the same time, Scelba argued that the Italian government was ready to make a 
commitment “to facilitate their position toward the Yugoslavs, [if] the Allies deem it 
useful that Italy formally commit itself not to take recourse to any act o f force in order to 
modify the 'de facto  ' situation.” Scelba concluded, “ It is largely up to the Allies to give 
to the Italian Government the possibility of being in a position to obtain in the Parliament 
a quick ratification of [the] E.D.C. as well as to consolidate democracy in Italy
Dulles replied to Scelba that the United States government had “every interest in the 
earliest possible development o f an agreement” that would be satisfactory to both Italy 
and Yugoslavia. He reminded Scelba that the United States viewed the resolution o f  the
Ibid., March 25, 1954; “Prime Minister Scelba to the Secretary o f State,” March 27, 
FRUS. 1952-1954. 8:393-96.
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Trieste question “not only as o f fundamental importance to Italy and Yugoslavia, but also 
as of high concern to itself.” Dulles pointed out the importance o f  Trieste “to the security 
of Southern Europe and the special responsibilities it bears in the free world.” As the 
evidence for that, Dulles pointed to the on-going attempts at a solution in London and he 
also expressed hope that the initiation o f discussions with the Italian representatives 
would take place in the near future.^^
Dulles was confident that the United States and Britain would achieve a satisfactory 
compromise with the Yugoslavs, partly because James Riddleberger, the American 
ambassador in Yugoslavia, had sent Dulles optimistic reports during March and April 
about the revised Yugoslav position on Trieste. At first Riddleberger wrote that the 
Yugoslavs believed that the London discussions had come to a “dead-end” and that they 
were disappointed in the results. But although they thought that the territorial problem 
was “obviously the most difficult,” they pointed out that in their opinion “three 
governments had come closer together in their views.” Nevertheless, they still insisted on 
the Bassovizza strip and larger autonomy in Trieste, which according to Riddleberger, 
“could only give trouble with Italy.” Therefore, he argued that the Yugoslav territorial 
demands, which Velebit proposed on March 17 for keeping “sovereignty over Zone B 
while [the] city of Trieste would have a different regime,” unfortunately had no chance of 
Italian acceptance.^^
In a later report Riddleberger reported that “more territorial discussions are possible,” 
and suggested that the State Department explore further
36 The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Scelba,” April 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
8:403-5.
“The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department o f  State,” March 31, 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:396-400.
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Whether any chance exists o f  trading [the] Bassovizza strip for [a] comer o f  Zone B 
and drop the Muggia Peninsula rectification and whether if  is impossible the comer of 
Zone B could be enlarged to compensate for Bassovizza as it looks from our basis if 
certain possibilities exist in this region.^^
He also stressed that the Yugoslavs were interested in economic assistance and were 
concemed about the question o f economic aid for the construction of a port and railroad. 
Although “it was not [the] responsibility o f [the] US-UK,” since this question was part of 
reparations and not a part o f the Trieste settlement, they would appreciate “our good 
offices.” He suggested that the State Department consider this issue, as it was clear “that 
this would be an essential part o f  a compromise.” He did not believe that monetary 
considerations would determine “points of primary political importance,” but he realized 
that “its present financial stringency will make the financial element important re timing 
and secondary points.” Riddleberger concluded “if we think, therefore, that there is a 
possibility of a success for the London talks, Thompson should be prepared to talk 
figures on extra aid as soon as possible.”^̂
Riddleberger also conveyed to Thompson his understanding o f the Yugoslav 
expectations for a Trieste settlement. He argued that since “we more or less invited this 
lengthy negotiation by our own insistence,” all possibilities o f a settlement should be 
explored. Riddleberger expressed his optimism to Thompson about the negotiations with 
the Yugoslavs saying, “[l]ike yourself, I still feel that the Yugoslavs want a settlement, 
but they will certainly extract everything they can.” Riddleberger described to Thompson 
what Trieste meant for the Yugoslavs:
“The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department o f State,” April 1, 
1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:400-1.
“The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department o f State,” March 31, 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:396-400.
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It must not be forgotten that here the top officials live, breathe and sleep with Trieste. 
It is a problem that for them is of paramount importance and on which they think both 
we and the British are pro-ltalian. They will, therefore, try to extract from us very 
conceivable concession, and 1 have never thought that any sort of general appeals 
from even very high sources will evoke large concessions. 1 think every point will be 
fought bitterly until they have gotten what they consider to be the last drop o f juice.'***
Regarding the necessity for speed, Riddleberger wrote that he doubted the Yugoslavs
were impressed “as negotiations in one form o f another have been going on for years,”
and he thought that this would not change in the near future. He was not surprised about
“the amount of time which the London talks” have required, arguing that the United
States and Britain tried to negotiate “for three months over the possibility o f getting a
conference.” Riddleberger concluded that we shall “advance on this [Trieste] problem
through a series of tough exchanges on every point, and 1 see no reason to assume that
this will change in the near future.” '̂
Luce, however, had a different opinion about the London talks. She criticized the
Yugoslavs for not compromising on the Trieste issue, arguing that the prolonged
negotiations made the political situation in Italy even more problematic. In her reports to
the State Department and Under Secretary Smith, Luce stated that “there is no doubt that
within the next year a civil war situation can develop in Italy.” She indicated again that if
a favorable Trieste solution was not found, “the Communists would either continue to
gain rapidly (which they have done in many administrative elections since October) or
the situation would be marked by a swing to the Right.” Luce concluded that there was in
^  “The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Chief United States Negotiator 
in London (Thompson),” April 14, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954,8:407-8 
Ibid.
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any case a threat o f “dictatorship of some sort, and the consequent risk o f civil war in 
Italy.”^̂
Although Luce constantly warned the State Department about a possible communist 
coup and civil war in Italy, Cyrus Sulzberger, in the series o f articles in the New York 
Times, documented that the Communist threat in Italy was greatly exaggerated. Even 
though he did not mention Luce’s name in these articles, he criticized her in his memoirs 
describing her as “nuts” and a person who “merely wants to make a big name for herself 
as an activist in her first diplomatic job.” He wrote that while he had dinner with Luce, 
she told him “Italy was its own Indochina,” which was “going to fail to communism 
unless Congress acted.” She complained about the Trieste situation arguing that “it was a 
shame that we had not been able to do something dramatic for Italy on the subject on 
Trieste,” because “if  the October 8 decision had gone through, the Italians would have 
been pleased, but we allowed ourselves to be blocked by Tito.” She also blamed the 
Italian government for “never taking adequate steps against the Communists.”^̂
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Under Secretary o f State (Smith),” March 13, 
1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 6:1660.
New York Times, March 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1954. Sulzberger wrote: “I must say,. . .I 
basically and profoundly disagree with Mrs. Luce. She is convinced communism will 
take over unless we intervene.” Sulzberger, A Long Row o f Candles, 964,977,983. Smith 
argued that active communist party membership, as a direct result o f fascism, was very 
much larger than in other western coimtries, and in addition there were people in every 
social class who, without being ideologically committed, supported the extreme Left as 
an outlet for disaffection and alienation in many different layers o f society. The 
commimists were often backed as a defense of secularism against clericalism and this 
helped to keep alive a serious debate in the press. Successive elections would show that 
communism had no chance of becoming the majority party or o f even forming an 
alternative government. The communists and revolutionary socialists never managed to 
persuade a large enough part o f the electorate that they had accepted the democratic 
process; so they were left to criticize the govenunent and keep issues o f principle from 
being swamped by transformist pragmatism. Smith, M odem Italy, 426.
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Because of his comprehensive survey o f Italian conditions, which included 
discussions with “the principal leaders o f the country, political, economic and clerical, as 
well as hundreds o f less well-known representatives o f [the] complex Italian social 
structure,” Sulzberger concluded that “although the Communists are uncomfortably near 
power, the danger o f  their attaining it has been exaggerated [by Luce].” He stressed that 
although “Communism’s most direct assault on the free world west of the Iron Curtain is 
being made in Italy,” it was unlikely “to gain control o f Italy, at least as long as the 
United States adheres to its policy o f shoring up free lands o f Europe.” He argued also 
that it was improbable that “the Communists and their fellow traveling allies are going to 
be able to gain sufficient support to vote themselves into authority in the foreseeable 
future,” as the party was not strong enough “to gain power without direct intervention 
from abroad.” To support his arguments Sulzberger cited his conversation with Scelba, 
who argued that there was no danger o f a communist conquest o f Italy, “either by legal 
democratic means, or by violence, as Communism remains a distinct factor in the 
national life.”^
According to Sulzberger, the United States had acted to prevent a communist conquest 
in Italy by granting aid totaling “$3,274,821,828 in last ten years.” He criticized some 
American policymakers “in a position to influence Washington’s foreign policy,” 
because they made efforts to impress Congress o f the dangers to the United States if Italy 
went communist. “These tactics o f ‘scaring’ Congress entail the risk of also frightening 
the Italians,” Sulzberger wrote. Some Italian observers noted that in order to weaken 
communism in Italy, the United States “must publicly reaffirm its interest in this country
44 New York Times. March 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1954.
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and its determination to safeguard democracy in Europe.” However, some Americans 
believed that in order to gain the required strength in Parliament, “it may be necessary for 
the existing Christian Democratic government to be replaced with an alliance o f  the 
Christian Democrats and Monarchists.” Sulzberger opined that this would be an 
“extremely dangerous step,” as the Monarchists would drive all democratic forces out o f 
the Parliament, if  they strengthened their power after the June 7 elections. He saw the 
solution to the unstable Italian situation in the emergence o f a “nonclerical, liberal, 
democratic party that could regain the confidence o f the non-Communist left,” and cited 
one Italian who said, “Democracy must present a new and spiritual vitality, and the 
Christian Democratic party must experience an internal revolution.” While implicit, his 
criticism o f Luce and her strategy was clear.^^
Despite what the newspapers wrote. Luce was convinced of a real Communist threat 
in Italy and did everything possible to help solve the Trieste problem and strengthen the 
United States’ position in this part o f  the world. During April Luce became increasingly 
worried about the Italian ratification o f the EDC. She wrote to Dulles that “if  a Trieste 
solution can soon be got, there is no good reason why [the] EDC should not be ratified in 
Italy before winter.” She warned Dulles “regardless what the Italians may say, they will 
not pass [the] EDC until the Trieste question is at least within sight of settlement.” Luce 
further wrote
I am so sad to report that the brief moment when it looked to me and to Bedell Smith 
as though the Scelba Government really intended to act vigorously all along the line 
on Western policy, using the debate on [the] EDC in Italy as the signal for an all out 
political attack on the Communist problem, is past. Unless you can offer a solid 
Trieste carrot, or raise some more vigorous stick to secure [the] EDC ratification than
45 Ibid.
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any we have at hand here, 1 very much fear that the Scelba pro-EDC and anti-
Commiuiist drives will both proceed at the speed of cold molasses/*^
Luce also reported to Dulles her conversation with Count Magistrati o f  the Foreign 
Office in which she repeated that the real danger to the EDC in Italy came from two 
factors: the internal political situation and from the status of the Trieste question. 
Magistrati, according to Luce, argued that two years earUer it would have been easier “to 
accept a compromise Trieste solution than now,” because the current government “is 
much weaker, U.S. aid has dwindled, Yugoslavia has grown stronger and more 
menacing, and above all, the long delay on the October 8’*' decision,.. made the situation 
much more difficult.” She quoted his opinion that the current proposal, which was no 
better than that o f October 8’*',“would now be all but impossible for the Government to 
accept. If  it did so, it would fall as a result o f it.” Luce generally agreed with this position, 
stating that Italy was afinid “that what would come out o f the London talks would be 
‘another diktat’ like October 8**', but one less favorable.” Hence, she convinced Magistrati 
that “a reasonable solution which Italy would voluntarily accept was altogether possible 
as well as desirable.” Again, Luce warned Dulles that the Trieste question was 
increasingly used by the Communists “to gauge the value the West attaches to the 
importance o f Italy as an ally.” Since Italian public opinion always saw Italy as “the 
messenger boy, or poor relative o f the Big Three,” Luce concluded that “perhaps not 
without reason,” the Communists exploited “much of the inferior colonial status the Big 
Three always assigned to Italy.” ’̂
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Secretary of State at Paris,” April 19, 1954, 
FRUS. 1952-1954. 8:409-10.
“Memorandum o f Conversation, by the Ambassador in Italy (Luce),” April 17, 1954, 
FRUS. 1952-1954. 8:410-14.
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Dulles replied to Luce that he constantly thought about Trieste and that “some
progress is being made, but all too slowly.” He attended the Geneva Conference from
April 23 to May 3, and conversed with the Italian foreign minister Attilio Piccioni in
Paris about the Italian situation. In his account o f the conversation to the State
Department, he stressed that for the Italian government “Trieste is Italian Government’s
greatest single problem. It is [a] highly emotional question and vitally affects not only
Italian action re [the] EDC but future internal developments in Italy.” Dulles wrote that
although the Italian government had introduced the EDC treaty into parliament,
“favorable parliamentary action [was] not possible unless Trieste [was] settled.”
According to Dulles, the Italians continuously argued that
If there is a favorable solution to Trieste or a clearly defined indication that a definite 
solution is in offing, [the] Italian Government can coimt on additional support for [the] 
EDC, particularly from [the] Monarchists. Also [the] Trieste solution will deprive both 
[the] Communists and [the] political right o f a propaganda weapon against [the]
EDC.'**
To encourage the Italians to ratify the EDC treaty as soon as possible, and clarify once 
more the United States’ stand on the Trieste problem, Dulles decided to return from 
Geneva to Washington through Milan and meet personally with minister Scelba. The 
New York Times reported that this visit “will increase Signor Scelba’s prestige,” 
displaying the United States concern for the Italian affairs and “the desire to be helpful to 
the Scelba Government.” Although the two countries had different priorities, “Signor 
Scelba could not miss this opportunity to stress again that without some solution o f [the] 
Trieste problem Italy cannot play her desired role in Europe.” While Dulles’ chief interest
“The Secretary of State to the Department o f State,” April 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 
8:416-18; “The Secretary o f  State to the Ambassador in Italy (Luce), ” April 28, 1954, 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:418.
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was the EDC treaty, their meeting bad an “ample exchange o f views” on the international 
situation. The Times informed its readers o f a discussion o f “a full exchange o f views on 
aspects o f the general international situation,” as well as attention to “matters o f mutual 
interest” and “their common purpose to consolidate peace and security and further 
international cooperation.”**
Luce informed the State Department about the meeting Dulles had with Scelba, 
emphasizing that Scelba spent most of his time discussing the Trieste problem with 
Secretary Dulles, although the Italians had been advised “in firmest manner” that he 
“would not bring up the Trieste question and wished to talk on broader aspects of 
international problems, particularly [the] EDC.” She wrote that even though Scelba tried 
to divorce the EDC and Trieste, “this proved to be impossible because o f internal 
political factors.” Scelba again mentioned that “urgency re Trieste due to [the] lack of 
implementation [of] October 8, adding [the] Italian public believed we could now 
implement October 8 and could not understand [a] delay.” *̂* Dulles informed Scelba that 
he could not address the Trieste discussions in London, stressing that it could be quite 
wrong “for any one to believe that holding up [the] ratification o f [the] EDC could be 
used [to] bring about [a] more favorable solution [to] Trieste.” Dulles concluded the 
meeting by saying that both Italy and Yugoslavia “should be prepared to make sacrifices 
for the bigger issues,” and pointed out to Scelba that it was essential to keep the press
** New York Times, May I, 4, 1954.The Times stated that “It is presumed that the 
question o f greater Italian emigration came up because Signor Scelba was seen to be 
studying a report on the subject just before the meeting. On the Dulles side it is obvious 
that the Secretary was interested in pushing the European Defense Community and in the 
perennial problem o f communism in Italy, where it is numerically stronger than 
anywhere outside the Iron curtain.” Ibid., May 4, 1954.
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” May 4, 1954, FRUS. 
1952-1954, 8:419-22.
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quiet in Italy “in order not to jeopardize the strenuous efforts [the] US-UK have made in
reaching Trieste solution.” *̂
Nevertheless, speculative stories began to appear in the newspapers. On May 8, the
New York Times published Cyrus Sulzberger’s report disclosing most o f the details o f the
plan for resolving the Trieste dispute that had been worked out in the secret negotiations
in London. According to the Times, sources in Italy and Belgrade confided that
Yugoslavia would give up all claims to the city and port of Trieste; The Free Territory 
would be partitioned along the lines o f Zone A and Zone B; certain minor border 
ratifications would be made; a new port of Capodistria would be constructed in Zone 
B and awarded to Yugoslavia; this harbor would be connected with Pula and Ljubljana 
by the new set o f railroads and highways.^^
On May 9 the Times published another Sulzberger report on his interview with Tito at 
Bled, in which Tito had discussed his own plan for a settlement for Trieste, which 
Suzlberger said “closely resembles a British-United States plan worked out in London.” 
Tito stated that he “vigorously opposed the reported Italian efforts to have a temporary 
solution,” because “the problem must be settled definitely.”^̂
Ibid.
New York Times, May 8, 9, 1954. Sulzberger wrote that “Yugoslavia is arguing that if 
she gives up what she asserts is a proper and justified claim to the city o f Trieste, she 
should not be penalized by being forced to pay.. .For this reason it is insisted that even if  
Yugoslavia was given free port rights in Trieste after the city went to Italy, she would 
need a new harbor at Kopar and a new network of roads and railways. To justify this to a 
Slovene population foregoing its claim upon Trieste, it is argued, those new projects 
would have to be financed abroad. Belgrade hopes to get the necessary money in the form 
o f outright grants-largely from the United States.” Ibid., May 8, 1954; “Editorial Note,” 
FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:425.
Among other things, the article stated that “Under the plan the present state called the 
Free Territory would be ended and its territory would be divided between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. Italy would receive the city o f Trieste itself and most o f the present Zone A, 
occupied by British and American troops. Yugoslavia would receive the rest except for 
very minor adjustments.” New York Times. May 9, 1954.
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Although these reports received “the most prominent coverage in the Italian press,” 
the Italian government “carefully avoided any move that might prejudice British- 
American efforts to find a solution o f the Trieste problem and did not intend to abandon 
this attitude.” The Times reported that a Foreign Office spokesperson expressed “official 
regret that Marshal Tito had disclosed a new plan for settling the Trieste dispute.” 
According to the Times, the diplomatic quarters speculated that the piupose o f Tito’s 
announcement, “which breaks the well-disciplined silence that has been maintained for so 
many months,” was to prepare “the Yugoslav public for a settlement that would fall short 
o f  Marshal Tito’s demands last autumn.”^
As a result of these disclosures, the State Department instructed Luce to inform the 
Italian government of the United States’ displeasure at Tito’s action and to say that the 
version the Times published was inaccurate. Luce was also to indicate that within a short 
period o f time, the United States and Britain expected to be able to propose to the Italian 
government a basis for discussion that would lead to a satisfactory settlement. She should 
also ask the Italian government not to make any statement that would prejudice the 
possibility o f achieving a settlement.
In the meantime, a series o f secret meetings were held in London between the US, the 
UK and Yugoslavia that concentrated on specific proposals with some give and take in 
both directions. By the end o f May, a realistic compromise came imder discussion and 
was accepted as the proposal to be presented to Italy in the second stage o f the
“Italian official circles refused to be ruffied today by what is considered here to be a 
trap laid for them by the Yugoslav Government in connection with the Trieste issue. . ..It 
is widely believed here that the Yugoslavs tried to provoke the Italians into rejection of 
the forthcoming Trieste proposals before they have even seen them,” the Times wrote. 
Ibid., May 12, 1954.
“Editorial Note,” FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:425.
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negotiations. The Anglo-American negotiators eventually agreed with the Yugoslavs that 
there would be a partition along existing zonal lines with minor territorial exchanges 
between Zone A and Zone B. The Memorandum o f Understanding that the United States 
and Britain signed with Yugoslavia on May 3 1 stated that the boundary line between the 
two zones would be moved “about a mile and a half from Punta Grossa to Punta Sottile 
on the seashore.” In exchange, Yugoslavia would compensate Italy with a small triangle 
o f land inside Zone B, along the zonal line. Yugoslavia and Italy would also mutually 
guarantee minority rights. The Western powers also promised Yugoslavia economic aid 
of $ 20 million from the United States and 2 million pounds from Britain for “the 
construction o f a port and transportation facilities in the Capodistria-San Nicolo area,” 
that at the end helped seal the bargain.^^
Afrer the United States and Britain signed the Memorandum with Yugoslavia, Luce 
expressed to Thompson her admiration for the maimer in which he “brilliantly conducted 
the negotiations, steadily hammering back the Yugoslav demands” until they accepted 
conditions which could be presented to the Italians “with hope o f acceptance.” She 
argued that the Italians “will try to probe in Washington and here for weak spots in the 
United States governmental position which you will be presenting to them in London.” 
However, the Italians would probably accept the now “available $ 20,000,000 in aid,” 
which they might expect “in the event o f  a settlement.” At the end. Luce expressed hope
Rabel, Between East and West, 156; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 31; 
“Agreed Record of Positions Reached at the Conclusion o f Discussions in London, 
February 2-May 31, 1954, Between Representatives o f the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and Yugoslavia,” May 31, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954,8:434-38.
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that Thompson would be able to persuade the Italians “by being in a position to offer 
them something toward settlement o f  Italian claims.”^̂
On June 1, Thompson and Harrison opened the second stage o f  the negations with 
Italy and handed to Manlio Brosio the plan, which included these provisions:
-[R]eadjustment o f the interzonal boundary o f the Free Territory Trieste;
-[TJermination o f the military government and transfer o f administration;
-[Ajrrangements for maintenance o f the Free Port o f Trieste and for measure local
autonomy;
-[R]eciprocal statute[s] for protection [of] minorities;
-[RJeciprocal declaration o f non-prosecution for political activities in connection with
[the] solution [of the] Free Territory [of] Trieste problem;
-[S]ettlement [of] outstanding financial claims and counterclaims;
-[M]easures to improve [the] atmosphere and facilitate cooperation/*
Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary Dulles emphasized to the Italian ambassador 
Alberto Tarchiani that the London proposal, which was being presented to the Italians, 
could be considered “for all intents and purposes, an implementation o f the October 8 
decision,” and that it represented “something which the Italian Government could present 
to the Parliament.” Dulles also expressed hope that the negotiations with the Italians 
“would not require as much time as had the Yugoslav talks,” and again emphasized the 
importance o f a Trieste settlement not only for Italy and Yugoslavia “but for its beneficial 
effect on the general political climate of Europe.” The New York Times although not 
familiar with the details of the secret negotiations, noted that the United States officials
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Chief United States Negotiator (Thompson),” 
May 28, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:432-33.
*̂ “The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State,” June I, 
1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:439-40. Brosio s career was in many ways similar to that of 
Vladimir Velebit. An opponent o f the Fascist regime, he was a member of the Committee 
o f National Liberation from 1943 to 1944, and Minister of War in the government, which 
was in power from 1945 to 1946. During his diplomatic career, he achieved the 
remarkable record o f serving as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the United States,
Great Britain and France. He was also an effective Secretary General o f  NATO from 
1964 to 1971. Campbell, Successful Negotiation, 110-11.
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reported “good progress” toward the Trieste settlement. Even though both the State 
Department and the Ambassador were uncommunicative, the Times “learned in other 
quarters that the London talks had made such headway that the ‘second phase’ o f the 
negotiations, this time with Italy, would now be undertaken.” *̂
Nevertheless, the Italians greeted the proposal with indignation, regarding it as a diktat 
reflective o f Yugoslavia’s improved bargaining position and consequently stalling on a 
compromise. Although the United States reminded the Italians that the West had pressed 
Yugoslavia hard to make “maximum concessions,” the Italians rejected the proposal. 
They argued that “proposed settlement was disadvantageous to Italy territorially,” and 
since it was clearly final, Italy could not enter into negotiations on these terms. They also 
complained that they were presented with “a US-UK-Yugoslav proposal on a take it or 
leave it basis, and a basis o f take it or leave it soon,” with the Western implication that “if 
the Italians reject it something bad will happen.” Brosio pointed out to the American and 
British negotiators that the Western powers had acknowledged Italy’s right to the entire 
FTT in the Tripartite Declaration and promised Italy all o f Zone A in the October 8 
decision. Therefore, the Italian government could not accept the London plan without 
jeopardizing its own existence as well as free democracy in Italy and her support for 
NATO and the European Community.^
Unsatisfied with this negative Italian reaction to the US, British and Yugoslav 
proposal. Luce suggested to the State Department that the United States should “impress
*̂ New York Times, June 5, 1954; “Memorandiun o f Conversation, by the Director o f the 
Office o f Western European Affairs (Jones),” June 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:441-42. 
“  Unger and Segulja, Tlhe Trieste Negotiations, 31-32; “Memorandum of Conversation, 
by Robert G. Hooker o f the Bureau o f  European Affairs, ” June 5,1954, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:443-46.
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on all Italians the reasonable nature o f the London agreement,” urging its acceptance as
“beneficial to the over-all interests o f Italy and the common defense.” She proposed that
the United States should
speak frankly and firmly to the Italians on their attitude concerning [the] Balkan Pact 
which has now become the fuse on the Trieste bomb. We should point out to them the 
military value of such an alliance and urge a realistic consideration o f the problems 
which it poses. We should urge them to take a broader view of this development, 
taking into account the nature o f the Soviet threat and the minuteness o f the Trieste 
question in terms of general problems.^'
Secretary Dulles appreciated Luce’s “careful and thoughtful analysis and 
recommended courses of action,” arguing that while initial Italian reaction was 
disappointing, a certain amount of fireworks was to be expected as the Italians needed 
“time to work off steam.” He agreed with Luce that “they [Italians] cannot put us in 
position of being forced to choose between them and [the] Balkan Pact, or between 
NATO and [the] EDC,” because both Italy and Yugoslavia were “subject to [a] common 
danger much greater than [the] danger either might present to [the] other if we lived in [a] 
different kind o f world, not under [the] shadow o f Soviet totalitarianism.” At the NSC 
meeting on June 9 Dulles pointed out that although the Yugoslavs “had carried on these 
negotiations with the greatest deliberation, they had made a real effort to reach a viable 
solution.” The Italians had not yet made up their minds “whether to regard the new 
solution as a triumph or a disaster.” If  the Italians would not agree to go along, Dulles 
argued, “it will be most disheartening, because it is a very fair solution.” In the telegram 
he sent to the American Embassy in Britain, Dulles wrote that “this Trieste proposal 
[much less any better one is] not likely [to] be offered again,” warning that the failure to
“The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State,” June 6, 1954, FRUS. 
1952-1954, 8:446-48.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
134
find a solution to the Trieste problem would not merely mean a “return to status quo.” 
The Italians would not be able to escape “in eyes [the] fi-ee world, [a] large and perhaps 
major share [of the] blame.”^̂
Even though Italy at the begiiming of the talks rejected the US-UK-Yugoslav 
proposal, the Italian ambassador Brosio, after some discussion, consented to reconsider 
the given terms. He made some objections insisting that the boundary adjustment had to 
be reciprocal and the solution had to be de facto  provisional. He also referred to Italian 
desiderata, such were minority rights, settlements on reparations, refugees and fisheries, 
and frontier readjustments around Gorizia. In later interview Brosio explained, “after 
much haggling and going back and forth we achieved definite improvements on some 
suggestions.”®̂
A month after the second phase o f the negotiations started, “the Italians were ready to 
proceed expeditiously,” having only two main requirements; to get some modification of 
the United States-British proposals, “to show that they have negotiated successfully and 
not accepted a US-UK-Yugoslav ‘diktat,’ above all with regard to the territorial 
provisions,” and to have the settlement “presentable to the Italian public as provisional. ” 
Brosio pointed out that the Italians “are asking for adjustments at both ends of the 
proposed new interzonal boundary,” but that they would not insist on all their changes if 
they get satisfaction on the territorial adjustment.”®*
®̂ “The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy, ” June 8, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 
8:448-49; “Memorandum of Discussion at the 201** Meeting o f the National Security 
Council,” June 9, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:449-51; “The Secretary o f State to the 
Embassy in the United Kingdom, ” June 14, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:454-57.
®̂ Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 32.
®* Ibid., “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department o f State, ” June 18, 1954, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:460-61.
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The New York Times wrote in the meantime that Mrs. Luce expressed her optimism 
about the Trieste settlement “in not too distant future,” and added, “if  Italy and 
Yugoslavia reached agreement on Trieste, action by the Italian Parliament on the 
European Defense Community treaty would follow quickly.” The Times also noted that 
Luce was in the United States “for several weeks vacation,” and that her remarks that 
“the Trieste problem was imminent and was being held up only by minor differences on 
the wording o f the announcement” were confirmed in Washington. Soon thereafter the 
Times stated that an “agreement for a solution o f the Trieste problem has been reached in 
principle between Italy and Yugoslavia,” and also argued that “although the agreement 
was labeled as a provisional, in reality it was final and “ likely to regulate the future o f 
the Trieste Free Territory for as long as it can be foreseen.” The Times concluded, “a firm 
agreement already has been reached between Italy and Yugoslavia on the substance o f 
the all the main points of the Trieste solution. A few minor points-some sources say only 
two-remain to be settled.”®̂
On July 14, the Italians accepted the proposed terms, but for reasons of prestige, they 
demanded that Punta Sottile, the area composed o f two square miles o f high ground 
overlooking Trieste, remain in Zone A as they did not wish to be seen as accepting a 
dictated settlement. This was the counterproposal by which the Italians obviously wanted 
to ensure that “someone standing on the docks at Trieste and looking southward would 
see that the last point in view, Punta Sottile, was Italian and not Yugoslav.” On July 21
®̂ New York Times, July 10, 1954. Time magazine wrote that “Luce left Rome last week 
increasingly hopeful about Italy’s future. ‘If Trieste can be settled, as I hope it will be,’ 
she told reporters before she left, ‘and if  [the] EDC can be ratified by Italy, then this 
country within the next two years will begin to play much more active and dynamic role 
in foreign affairs than at any time since 1948.’” Time, July 12, 1954.
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the Times reported, “Italy has approved the major points in the United States-British
proposals,” with only minor issues “said to remain between Italy and Yugoslavia.”®®
Thompson and Harrison explained the Italian counterproposals to Velebit, and on July
21 Velebit responded with a new draft o f the proposed memorandum o f understanding,
which recommended a number o f changes in and additions to the other articles. Velebit
made it clear that the most important points for Yugoslavia were the issue of the territory,
on which he stood firm, and the possible connection of reparations with the fishing
agreement, which Yugoslavia was firmly resolved not to accept. The Italians were also
determined to be firm on their territorial proposal. Therefore, during August, agreement
was reached on all issues except the psychologically critical Punta Sottile. Thompson and
Harrison continued to act as intermediaries between Velebit and Brosio, but they made
little progress. Neither Yugoslavia nor Italy was prepared to renounce its claims. Thus, by
September 3, after seven months the Trieste negotiations had reached an impasse over a
tiny strip of land and a question o f prestige.®^
Inpatient to solve the Trieste problem. Luce advanced the idea in Washington that
eventually the United States “might have to drop its role of honest broker in the Trieste
matter and suggest to the Italians and Yugoslavs a specific settlement.” She proposed
[A] certain time limit on acceptance, with the statement to the Yugoslavs that 
otherwise we would implement the October 8 declaration and statement to the Italians 
that not only would we implement the October 8 declaration but we would also come 
out with a strong statement that this settled the Trieste matter for once and for all and 
forever.®*
®® New York Times, July 21, 1954; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, 33.
®̂ Unger and Segulja, The Trieste Negotiations, Ibid.; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:483.
®* “Memorandum by V. Lansing Collins o f the Office of Western European Affairs to the 
Deputy Director of the Office (Tyler),” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:490-91.
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Again, she pointed out “the undesirability o f the U.S. pressing the Yugoslav solution 
upon the Italians,” although she admitted that this could be done along with certain 
consequences in Italy.®*
Luce’s idea was examined and accepted in a memorandum about the “necessity of 
forcing settlement of Trieste question” that Robert G. Hooker o f  the Bureau o f Emopean 
Affairs wrote to Livingston Merchant, the Assistant Secretary o f  State for European 
Affairs. Hooker pointed out that both the Italians and Yugoslavs insisted on the proposed 
territorial issues, but that the Italians “so far ‘behaved better’ than the Yugoslavs on 
territory and reparations.” There was a fear that the uncompromising Yugoslav attitude 
could make the already “unclosed gap” between the Italians and Yugoslavs even wider. 
This raised the question of the possibility “o f the settlement slipping away entirely,” 
forcing the US and UK to determine what action they would undertake if Italy and 
Yugoslavia did not accept the compromise on the Trieste issue. Hooker concluded that 
the US and UK would again try to persuade both sides to compromise on Trieste and 
should make another effort in order to get “Tito [to] yield on the territorial issue, ” 
warning him that if there were no Trieste settlement “we will consider that the major 
responsibility is his.” ®̂
Once again. Luce helped spur action in Washington about the Trieste impasse. On 
August 31, the ambassador sent Eisenhower a lengthy analysis o f the unstable political 
situation in Italy. She said that Italian politics were polarized between the democratic pro- 
Westera and pro-Cominform parties and emphasized that “[djemocratic Italy has only
®* Ibid.
“Memorandum by Robert G. Hooker of the Bureau o f European Affairs to the 
Assistant Secretary o f State for European Affairs (Merchant),” August 31, 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954, 8:495-99.
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one alternative if  its pro-West policies fail: to adopt pro-Russian policies.” Luce argued 
that the return o f Zone A “has become a matter o f  greatest urgency to the present Italian 
Government.” Therefore, she recommended that the President should “insist on a firm 
reply from the Yugoslavs at once, which will permit the Italians to dispose o f the Trieste 
question one way or the other, before October 8*.” She concluded that the Scelba 
government might soon collapse “unless we can produce a settlement o f the Trieste 
question and immediately.”’ ’ Eisenhower accepted Luce’s view that the Yugoslavs were 
blocking progress on Trieste. He said among other things that her conclusions were not 
greatly different fi-om his own instinctive feelings and he promised to do what he could. 
He stated in his memoirs that he was “tremendously interested” in securing an agreement 
on the issue “if  for no other reason than to provide some counter-balance to the EDC 
flop.”’’
With an impasse reached in the London negotiations, a proposal originated in 
Washington that Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary o f State, should be sent to 
Belgrade in an effort to break the deadlock. The origin o f this proposal is unclear, but 
Luce subsequently received credit for suggesting that the President send Murphy. In his 
memoirs, Murphy recalled that he was seated next to Ambassador Luce at a dinner party 
in New York at the beginning o f September. Murphy told her about his amiable meetings 
with Tito during World War II. According to Murphy, Luce said, “You are just the man
”  “The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the President,” August 31, 1954, FRUS, 1952- 
1954, 8:505-11.
”  President Eisenhower replied to Luce: “I have studied your secret letter o f the 31**. The 
conclusions you present, as a result o f your convictions and study, are not greatly 
different from my own instinctive feelings, based, however, on much flimsier foundations 
than are yours. I shall certainly do what I can. Thank you very much for writing me.
Ibid.; Eisenhower, Mandate fo r  Change, 510.
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we need to bring Tito around.” She told him also that the following morning she had an 
appointment with the President, where she would suggest to President and Dulles that 
Murphy be sent to Yugoslavia. Murphy commented in his memoirs that Luce “usually 
got what she wanted” and he recalled that he received the instructions that same day to 
confer with Tito.”
However, there is no record in Eisenhower’s appointment book for September 1954 of 
any meeting with Luce. Eisenhower left Washington on August 30 for a trip to the 
western United States and did not return until October 16. In addition, Dulles left 
Washington on August 31 to attend the Manila Conference and did not return until 
September 14. In light of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ absence from Washington, Luce may 
have informed Merchant directly about her proposal that Murphy be sent to Belgrade. 
Merchant wrote to Acting Secretary o f State, Walter Bedell Smith “[ajfter discussion 
with Mrs. Luce, I suggest that we should plan for Mr. Murphy to go to Belgrade and 
Rome to present the US-UK proposals to Tito and Scelba.” He asked for Smith’s 
approval for Murphy’s trip “for the above purposes.”’*
Smith considered that the Trieste issue was of such urgency that he approached 
President Eisenhower to secure authorization for Murphy’s trip. He suggested to 
Eisenhower that it would be “most helpful if  he [Murphy] were authorized to deliver [a] 
personal oral message fi’om you to Scelba and Tito.” Murphy could also invoke “yoiu*
”  However, Merchant, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in a memorandum to 
Secretary Dulles, suggested that Murphy should be sent on such a mission, but the 
suggestion was not acted upon at that time. “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:513- 
14; Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1964), 422.
’* “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 513-14; “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Acting Secretary of State,” September 2, 
1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:514-15.
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personal authority in warning o f [a] future less sympathetic US attitude toward their 
requests for economic and military aid if they refuse the concessions.” Eisenhower 
replied that he was anxious that “everything be done to settle the Trieste situation” and 
that he was in favor of Smith’s suggestion, further remarking, “I instinctively share your 
feeling that the approach to Tito should take more the terms of a warning while in 
Scelba’s case the proposed term might be mild, even to the point of being encouraging.”’  ̂
Since the Yugoslavs were “in great need o f wheat,” and “greatly worried by their 
financial problem o f converting their short-term liabilities into long-term obligations, ” 
the United States’ officials understood that they “had certain leverage on the Yugoslavs 
in the coming talks.” Before Murphy went to Yugoslavia, he received suggestions that he 
could use in his Belgrade conversations. Merchant instructed Murphy to approach “the 
matter of US-Yugoslav relations in the very broad terms o f the mutual benefits [to] be 
gained from steady improvement of these relations.” Merchant also suggested that 
Murphy “indicate our potential to exert pressure on Tito” by reviewing US military and 
economic assistance since 1948. In addition, he should bring out “the fact that thus far 
there have been no strings attached to our actions in Yugoslavia’s behalf’ and “develop 
the possibilities for further progress in Yugoslav-Western relations and the advantages to
“The Acting Secretary of State to the President,” September 3, 1954, FRUS. 1952- 
1954, 8:517. In his letter to the State Department, Riddleberger wrote that: “We are 
delighted with proposal to send Murphy to Belgrade and Rome. It seems to us that if [the] 
Italians refuse [the] present proposal [the] point has been reached in [the] negotiations 
where [a] high-ranking American official should make what we hope will be [a] final and 
successful effort on [the] Trieste negotiations. Hope we can come prepared to talk on aid 
and wheat, as well as details of [the] Trieste settlement. In addition to the desirability of 
having [a] high-ranking American official team to Belgrade, I think Murphy is an 
excellent choice and his previous acquaintance with Tito will be helpful.” “The 
Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department o f State,” September 5, 
1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 8:519-20.
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Yugoslavia which would unfold once the Trieste block had been removed.” Merchant
submitted the principal arguments for Murphy to include in his talks with Tito with
regard to economic and military aid and concluded, “this combination o f the screw and
the carrot might have a good chance of success whereas either one or the other used alone
would probably fail to turn the trick.”’®
Murphy was also instructed to give Tito a personal letter from President Eisenhower
that contained references to American economic aid but primarily stressed Yugoslav-
American friendship. Eisenhower also wrote that he counted on Tito’s continued
diplomatic wisdom because o f “the larger issues weighing on the free world o f which our
countries are part.” Eisenhower wrote
I have asked my friend and your friend, Robert Murphy,. . . to ask your assistance in 
bringing these delicate negotiations to a successful conclusion now .... In stressing the 
importance to Europe and to the United States o f a prompt and happy termination of 
the long, drawn-out negotiation regarding Trieste, I count on your continued wisdom 
and statesmanship. .. As you know, the United States is providing massive support in 
Europe to promote collective security which benefits both our countries. .. I feel it is 
appropriate to call on you in this friendly fashion to intervene personally in the Trieste 
negotiations to settle the exceedingly small differences now remaining. ’
Eisenhower also emphasized the sacrifices the Yugoslavs made in the London
negotiations from February 2 to May 31, “urging this small concession” that could not
otherwise solve the Trieste problem. Finally, he mentioned “certain economic
developments and emergencies” that Murphy would discuss privately with Tito.’*
’® “Memorandum by the Assistant Secretaiy o f State for European Affairs (Merchant) to 
the Deputy Under Secretary o f State (Murphy),” September 9, 1954, FRUS. 1952-1954, 
8:525-26.
”  Murphy was one among several people who took part in the drafting o f  a letter fro 
President Eisenhower, which he was to deliver to Tito. “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952- 
7954,8:531.
’* Ibid.
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The Yugoslavs regarded highly this letter from Eisenhower that acknowledged and 
sympathized with the Yugoslavia’s position yet asked for a concession that would make a 
settlement possible. It is unclear whether Tito was moved by this personal appeal or by 
the prospect o f continued American economic assistance. In any case, the Yugoslav 
leader proved accommodating and the mission was successful. Tito abandoned the claim 
to Punta Sottile and submitted two alternative proposals. According the first, the border 
would be moved immediately south of Punta Sottile so as to leave the village of 
Lazzaretto to Yugoslavia, and Italy would obtain the triangle o f Zone B. The second 
alternative would move the border further to the south, somewhere in the middle between 
the Punta Sottile and Debeli rtic, giving Lazzaretto to Italy but without the compensation 
with the land from Zone B. Murphy publicly expressed the satisfaction with his talks with 
President Tito declaring that the United States “would naturally welcome the Trieste 
solution,’’ and that he hoped “the Italians share this desire with us and I am sure the 
Yugoslavs do too.” ’̂
After his talks with the Yugoslavs, Murphy flew to Italy where he presented the 
Yugoslav alternatives to the Italian government. The Times wrote that Murphy and Luce 
“talked for one and a half hours with premier Mario Scelba,’’ informing him about the 
talks with the Yugoslavs, after which Scelba “told the Cabinet about his discussion with
Since Murphy’s mission was secret, the New York Times first reported that Murphy 
was traveling to Europe to assess “problems o f Western security’’ and that his principal 
concern would be “with the plan for West German rearmament”  The talks would also 
touch on issues like “the dispute over Trieste and economic aid that depended on the 
ratiftcation of the European Defense Community treaty”  The Times discovered later, 
however, that Murphy had changed his plans and “will meet Marshal Tito’’ probably to 
“discuss the Yugoslav-Italian dispute over Trieste.” His chief task “is to drive home to 
both President Tito o f Yugoslavia and the Italian Government how keenly the United 
States desires a solution of the Trieste question.” New York Times, September 12, 15, 
1954; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 455.
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Mr. Murphy.” The Times also pointed out that Italy and Yugoslavia “are now so close in 
their views on Trieste that an agreement should be reached if  a minimum o f goodwill is 
shown by each side.” Indeed, a few days later the Italian council of ministers chose the 
second alternative. Italian President Einaudi “had urged both minister Scelba and the 
foreign office to accept the Trieste settlement.” A public announcement was desired 
before October 4, when the Italian Government would be submitting the Foreign Office 
budget to the parliament, and certainly before the October 8 anniversary o f the Allied 
promise to return Trieste to Italy. After nine months o f secret negotiations, the efforts o f 
the Anglo-American negotiators finally paid off.*°
On October 5, 1954, Thompson, Harrison, Velebit and Brosio initiated the 
Memorandum o f Understanding that assigned virtually all o f Zone B and a strip o f Zone 
A to Yugoslavia, the city o f Trieste and almost the entire remainder o f Zone A to Italy. 
Both Yugoslavia and Italy were content with the agreement and in a matter o f days they 
approved it. Tito in his speech on October 6 pointed out that Yugoslavia had to make 
sacrifices in order to reach the agreement. However, Tito declared, it was not a diktat 
imposed on Yugoslavia by other powers but an agreement in which Yugoslavia 
participated as an equal member.^' Scelba emphasized in presenting the London 
Agreement to the Senate that almost all o f Zone A was returned to Italy comprising 
“four-fifths o f the population and the most important economic part o f the Free 
Territory.” He also reminded the Senate that broad minority rights were guaranteed to 
those Italians who would pass under Yugoslav jurisdiction. He admitted that the London
New York Times, September 19, 21, 1954; Unger and Segulja, The Trieste 
Negotiations, 37.
Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 461.
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Agreement secured for Italy less than the Tripartite Declaration had, but stressed that 
Italy had obtained the best possible solution under the circumstances/^
The State Department released the announcement o f the Memorandum, which among 
other things stressed the finality o f the agreement, since Scelba was unwilling to 
renounce his claims to Zone B emphasizing the agreement’s provisional character. The 
Yugoslavs clearly intended to regard the London agreement as final. The Memorandum 
stated:
Today’s initiating came as a successful conclusion to conversations among the four 
Governments which have been carried on for eight months in an endeavor to work out 
arrangements for the Free Territory o f Trieste which would be acceptable to 
Governments o f Italy and Yugoslavia. The United States welcomes the understanding 
reached today which it believes will lead to improved relations and closed cooperation 
between Italy and Yugoslavia. The United States Government takes this opportunity 
to declare it will give no support to claims o f either Yugoslavia or Italy to territory 
under the sovereignty of administration of the other.
Although “the Russians were expected to protest ” against the agreement as a “one­
sided and illegal alternation o f the Italian peace treaty,” Soviet Russia recognized the 
agreement, demonstrating a major shift from its previous opposition to a division of the 
FTT. The representative of the Soviet Union sent a letter to the president o f  the United 
Nations Security Council on October 12 saying that his government accepted the 
Memorandum of Understanding because it believed that the agreement would restore 
normal relations between Yugoslavia and Italy and contribute to the lessening o f tensions 
in that part o f  Europe.^
“  Ibid., 462.
”  “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1952-1954, 8:570-73; New York Times, October 5, 6, 1954; 
The Department o f  State Bulletin (Washington DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1954), October 18, 1954, 555-61.
^  New York Times, September 29, 1954; Novak, Trieste, 1941-1954, 460-61.
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Therefore, the Trieste negotiations were successfully concluded after “the long months 
of wrangling, riots, uncertainty, and tangled diplomacy.” It took a full year o f secret 
negotiations at ambassadorial level in London, fortified by American and British 
promises o f  additional economic aid to Yugoslavia, to undo the damage and arrive at the 
same solution proposed in October 1953, with the difference that this time the Yugoslavs 
were full and equal negotiating paitners.®^
For the Eisenhower administration the elimination of the Trieste problem was very 
important because it removed a problematic distraction in Italo-Yugoslav relations and 
enabled both nations to stand more effectively alongside the United States in its global 
confrontation with the Soviet Union. This was also the conclusion o f the 216* meeting of 
the NSC on October 6, which expressed the opinion that the Trieste settlement 
strengthened the United States’ position in Europe.®^
The New York Times and Time pointed out that the successful negotiations improved 
relations between Italy and Yugoslavia and secured the Mediterranean basin against the 
Soviets. The Times commented that the “delicate Trieste question, ” after nine years o f 
conflict, now offered the possibility for “greater security against Communist aggression 
in Southeast Europe.” Time declared that the Trieste settlement was “a triumph of patient 
US diplomacy, topped by the personal intervention o f President Eisenhower with the 
right move at the right time.” Even though the Trieste problem was never a large issue 
“which American publicists like to roll around iii their larynxes, ” it stood as a “symbol o f 
the inability o f the anti-Soviet nations to settle their own disputes.” At the same time.
New York Times. October 5, 1954.
^  “Memorandum o f Discussion at the 216* Meeting o f the National Security Council,’ 
October 6, 1954, FRUS: 1952-1954, 8:574-76.
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describing in the general terms the events that resulted in success, the New York Times
and Time emphasized the role o f Clare Boothe Luce in the Trieste settlement. Time
pointed out that the Luce’s role was important as she had “signaled Washington into a
sense of urgency about Trieste.” The New York Times argued that Clare Luce was
“instrumental in the elimination o f  the Trieste question,” and saw the settlement as a
victory for Luce “who floated the problem off the reef on which it had floundered some
years before her arrival in Italy.” The Times also argued
Her achievement is the more remarkable because the agreement is, in effect, a carbon 
copy, with a few embellishments, of the United States-British declaration o f Oct. S 
1953. This declaration, under which the two nations announced their intention of 
withdrawing their troops from Zone A and o f entrusting its administration to Italy, 
was originally suggested by Mrs. Luce and was made as a result o f her insistence.^^
Even if Clare Boothe Luce had not taken a strong personal interest in the Trieste
dispute, the United States would probably have explored the possibilities that led to a
lasting settlement in 1954, namely, initiating four-power negotiations and using political
and economic pressure on Italy and Yugoslavia to bring about the final solution.
However, it is clear that her role was crucial as she not only initiated the process that
resulted in the successful Trieste settlement but also insisted on settling the dispute once
and for all. She worked hard on securing the position of the United States in Southeast
Europe against the threat of the Soviet Union and after the Trieste settlement pressured
the Italians to ratify the EDC treaty. After October 5, Luce explained that the Trieste
agreement “removed one of the most irksome and troublesome of the many problems
confronting the free world,” and foresaw as the consequence o f the agreement “a
New York Times. July 12, October 5, 1954; Time, October 11, 1954.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
147
strengthening o f Western defenses in the Mediterranean area and an increase of trade 
between Italy and Yugoslavia and the other countries served by the port of Trieste.”**
88 Rabel, Between East and West. 167; New York Times. October 5, 1954.
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CONCLUSION
From the time that Clare Boothe Luce became the American ambassador to Italy, she 
involved herself in Italian domestic politics because she wanted to reduce the strength of 
Communism in this part o f the world. She frequently contacted the Washington 
policymakers warning them about the “communist threat in Italy,” and thereby 
influencing American policy. Having political influence o f her own, support from the 
Time-Life empire o f her husband, as well as direct access to President Eisenhower, Luce 
made her arguments felt.
Her first involvement in Italian domestic affairs came during the Italian national 
election campaign in June 1953, when she tried to obtain a decisive victory for the 
Christian Democrats. She threatened Italy with an economic boycott unless it voted for 
the party that the United States recommended, which was the Christian Democratic Party. 
However, after she failed to secure victory for the Christian Democrats, she warned the 
State Department about a possible communist coup in Italy. Although her assessment was 
unrealistic, she managed to spur action in Washington. Luce stressed that although there 
were many reasons for Christian Democrats’ election loss, the main reason for the June 
fiasco was the failure o f the United States, Britain and France to implement the Tripartite 
Declaration from 1948, which gave Italy the whole Free Territory o f Trieste. Throughout 
the summer of 1953, she sent her long and forceful reports on the problematic situation in
148
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Italy, arguing that if  the United States did not give Italy the whole FTT as was promised 
in 1948, Italy would become a communist country. She contacted the State Department 
and President Eisenhower, and pressured Dulles to work out a plan to solve the Trieste 
problem. With Luce’s help Dulles came up with the October 8 decision, which 
terminated the AMG and divided the FTT along existing zonal lines giving Italy Zone A 
with the city o f Trieste and leaving Zone B in the Yugoslav hands.
Instead of solving the Trieste dispute, the October 8 announcement created a new 
crisis between Italy and Yugoslavia that almost produced a military conflict. When the 
October 8 decision and Luce’s initiative to solve the Trieste problem failed and the 
situation between Italy and Yugoslavia became troublesome, the United States and 
Britain decided to act more vigorously. After a few months o f unsuccessful attempts, they 
organized a three phase negotiating process that eventually led to a successful solution. 
During almost nine months of secret negotiations. Luce warned the State Department 
about the possible civil war in Italy if a timely solution on the Trieste was not found. She 
continually blamed the Yugoslavs for asking for the maximum demands and prolonging 
the negotiations. Although her reports gave important overviews about different aspects 
o f the Italian political life, they were not realistic as they exaggerated the danger of 
communism in Italy. Still, they had impact on Washington and finally produced the 
successful settlement that solved the Trieste dispute forever.
Certainly, Clare Luce did influence American policy in Italy and the settlement of 
Trieste crisis. In many cases, the forceful reports and memoranda she sent to the 
Department o f State, and to the major policymakers, were unrealistic. However,
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according to sympathetic contemporaries her mission was successful as she managed in 
her mandate to help contain communism in Italy and solve the Trieste dispute.
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